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This Risø Energy Report, the seventh of a series that began 
in 2002, takes as its point of reference the recommendations 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
in 2007. The IPCC states that if anticipated climate change 
is to remain in the order of 2 to 3 degrees centigrades over 
the next century, the world’s CO2 emissions would have to 
peak within the next 10 – 15 years and ultimately be reduced 
to approximately 50% of their present level by the middle of 
the century.
The IPCC states further that this would be possible, provid-
ed that serious action is taken now. The different regions and 
countries of the world are in various states of development, 
and hence have different starting points for contributing to 
these reductions in CO2 emissions.
This report presents state-of-the-art and development per-
spectives for energy supply technologies, new energy sys-
tems, end-use energy efficiency improvements and new pol-
icy measures. It also includes estimates of the CO2 reduction 
potentials for different technologies. The technologies are 
characterized with regard to their ability to contribute either 
to ensuring a peak in CO2 emissions within 10 – 15 years, or 
to long-term CO2 reductions.
The report outlines the current and likely future composi-
tion of energy systems in Denmark, and examines three 
groups of countries: i) Europe and the other OECD member 
nations; ii) large and rapidly growing developing economies, 
notably India and China; iii) typical least developed coun-
tries, such as many African nations. The report emphasises 
how future energy developments and systems might be com-
posed in these three country groupings, and to what extent 
the different technologies might contribute.
The report addresses the need for research and demonstra-
tion together with market incentives, and policy measures 
with focus on initiatives that can promote the development 
towards CO2 reductions. Specifically, the report identifies 
system options and technology mixes that can lead to the 
emissions peak in 2020 and 50% reduction in the long run, 
at the Danish and global level.
The report is based on the latest research results from Risø 
DTU, together with available international literature and re-
ports.
Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy, 
Technical University of Denmark
Preface
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The global energy scene is currently dominated by two over-
riding concerns that strongly affect decisions on energy de-
velopment priorities:
1. Security of supply
2. Climate change
This is especially true for industrialised countries and the 
more rapidly developing economies. At the same time, many 
developing countries face really basic energy development 
constraints that give a quite different meaning to the concept 
of energy security.
Climate change is widely recognised as the major environ-
mental problem facing the world. The IPCC Fourth Assess-
ment Report states clearly that it is no longer relevant to dis-
cuss whether the climate is changing.
Many countries concerned about energy security and cli-
mate change have set ambitious targets for renewable energy. 
Renewable energy worldwide is still dominated by the “old” 
renewables: hydropower and traditional biomass that supply 
respectively 6% and 9% of global primary energy demand. 
Only around 2% of the world’s primary energy is currently 
provided by “new” renewable sources such as wind, photo-
voltaics and mini- and micro-hydro.
The introduction of more renewables needs to be managed 
in a way that ensures security of supply and economic per-
formance, while delivering better environmental perfor-
mance, especially with regard to CO2 emissions, and less 
dependence on fossil fuels.
Different solutions for different regions
The countries of the OECD strongly influence the develop-
ment of energy demand and new energy supply opportuni-
ties. The OECD countries are amongst the fastest in devel-
oping new renewable technologies, but they are at the same 
time becoming increasingly dependent on imported fossil 
fuels.
OECD countries’ growth in energy demand will be much 
lower than in the rest of the world. The OECD’s share of 
world primary energy is as a consequence expected to de-
cline from almost 49% in 2005 to 34% in 2050, provided that 
energy and environmental concerns receive the political at-
tention they deserve.
Fossil fuels are currently the dominating energy supply in 
OECD-countries. Worldwide, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) estimates the share of fossil fuels to be ap-
proximately 50% in 2050. 
Rapidly-developing countries like China and India are im-
portant in shaping world trends in economic and energy de-
velopment and how they develop will affect the possibilities 
for solving the climate problem. With their enormous new 
investments in energy infrastructure over the coming de-
cades, these countries have a rare window of opportunity to 
move towards low-carbon development and low-cost green-
house gas (GHG) emissions reduction.
With their large territories and population bases, high eco-
nomic growth and rising living standards, China and India 
are seeing strong growth in freight and passenger transport. 
They are already home to several of the world’s mega-cities, 
while new cities are being created and others continue to ex-
pand as a result of ongoing massive urbanisation. In view of 
the lack of oil reserves in these countries, clean vehicles and 
public transport will be the key technologies for tackling the 
four-fold challenge of oil supply, local air pollution, traffic 
congestion and GHG emissions.
These countries generally use energy less efficiently than the 
OECD countries. China’s energy conversion and utilisation 
efficiency, for instance, is around 25% lower than in indus-
trialised countries. In 2000, energy consumption per physi-
cal unit of industrial production in China was around 40% 
higher than that in advanced developed countries.
Compared to other parts of the world, the rate of economic 
development in the least developed regions like sub-Saharan 
Africa has been extremely low over the last 45 years.
Climate change is not in itself a priority driver in the energy 
policies of the least developed countries, since per-capita 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions are low. However, 
in many of these countries the first option for new energy 
supply is fossil fuel, and there will thus be increasing oppor-
tunities for cooperation with industrialised countries. These 
opportunities include carbon financing and investment in 
low-emission energy technologies, including clean coal, gas, 
biomass and other renewables, where appropriate.
Future energy development in the least developed countries 
will depend strongly on economic growth. This in itself will 
rely on, among other things, the establishment of an enabling 
environment in terms of energy infrastructure.
Large-scale infrastructure investments need to go hand in 
hand with the development of decentralised energy systems 
at the community level. In the first few years these are ex-
pected to be based on small-scale diesel systems, but from 
2010 to 2020 they will increasingly be established as hybrid 
systems based on small-scale hydro, wind or photovoltaics 
(PV), depending on available resources of wind and hydro. 
Summary and recommendations
6Summary and recommendations
For these systems, diesel may increasingly be substituted 
with biofuels, provided that biofuels are not conflicting with 
food production.
Regional trends and development potential
Although climate change is a common global challenge, the 
different regions of the world have quite different economic, 
technological and political preconditions for emissions re-
duction strategies.
The EU has taken the global political lead with its ambitious 
targets for GHG reductions and an increased proportion of 
renewable energy.
The USA has focused much more on domestic energy se-
curity; its rapid increase in corn-based bioethanol is a clear 
example of policy that addresses energy security but con-
tributes very little to GHG reductions or longer-term supply 
stability. 
China and India share a diversified approach that reflects 
their rapidly-growing economies and associated expansion 
in energy demand. This includes ambitious targets for re-
newable energy and energy efficiency, increased domestic 
production, and collaboration with a large and diverse group 
of oil- and gas-producing countries, notably in Africa.
While the impacts of climate change will be felt in every re-
gion of the world, it is clear that poorer developing countries 
and tropical islands are particularly vulnerable. With weak 
institutions and limited human and financial resources, such 
countries have limited ability to cope with or adapt to climate 
change, and they will require strong international support.
The focus on climate and energy security has reduced the 
political attention given by most potential donors to energy 
access in the poorest countries.
Finding a global energy development path that addresses 
both security of supply and climate change is a major chal-
lenge that requires coordinated action from all countries.
CO² reduction strategies in Denmark
Denmark has the potential for large CO2 reductions at low 
additional cost. This will require a mix of measures covering 
both energy demand and energy supply, the most important 
of which are:
t &OFSHZTBWJOHTXJUIBOOVBMSFEVDUJPOTPGoJO 
 energy consumption
t .PSFFďDJFOUDPOWFOUJPOBMWFIJDMFTBOEQMVHJOIZCSJE 
 vehicles
t *ODSFBTJOHUIFTIBSFPGXJOEQPXFSJOQBSUJDVMBS 
 offshore
t *ODSFBTFEVTFPGCJPNBTTGPSCVJMEJOHIFBUJOHBOE 
 process heat in industry and CHP plants
t %FWFMPQNFOUPGTFDPOEHFOFSBUJPOCJPGVFMUFDIOPMPHZ 
 for transport
t &OFSHZJOGSBTUSVDUVSFEFWFMPQNFOUJODMVEJOHĘFYJCJMJUZ
t /FXBOEJNQSPWFENBSLFUNFBTVSFT
Global CO²  reduction possibilities
In the shorter term (up to 2030), the main contributors to 
GHG mitigation are demand-side measures, efficiency im-
provements in the energy sector, and reductions in emis-
sions of GHGs other than CO2. Many short-term energy 
efficiency measures even have negative abatement costs.
In the longer term, efficiency can be improved in many 
ways. The multitude of options creates many opportunities 
for GHG reduction, as well as challenges in identifying the 
winning technologies.
Climate change is a long-term problem, and early action is 
important if we are to remain on a lower emissions trajec-
tory that will allow flexibility in the future. Technologies that 
are important for short-term mitigation are not necessarily 
sufficient for the long term. A diversified portfolio of choices 
is needed, and this will require R&D investment over long 
periods before we reach the ultimate objective.
Recommendations
Denmark could profit by being in the front with developing 
a low carbon energy system that could increase indepen-
dence in relation to energy supply and give a competitive 
advantage in new energy technologies.
There is a need to reinforce Denmark’s power transmission 
grid, in part to meet the needs of future offshore wind power 
plants. Electricity storage is an important element in rein-
forcing the grid. Another pressing matter is the establish-
ment of an intelligent grid with two-way communication to 
facilitate the integration of more wind power.
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Large-scale integration of renewable energy in Europe re-
quires a pan-European transmission network to allow effec-
tive cross-border power trading and provide mutual support 
for security and quality of supply.
International collaboration and support for the introduction 
of new, more efficient, energy technologies for countries like 
China and India will be important.
It is important to expand the use of instruments like the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to further the de-
velopment and implementation of low-carbon energy sys-
tems in developing countries.
Stimulating cooperation between existing regional power 
pools in developing countries will be essential in exploiting 
large but regionally-diverse resources such as hydro, coal and 
natural gas, needed to provide electricity to meet increasing 
urban demand. Rural electrification will depend on options 
for affordable grid based electricity.
Intensified research and demonstration for new energy tech-
nologies, particularly systems adapted to the specific needs 
of different regions of the world, and preferably in interna-
tional collaboration, must be stimulated locally, regionally 
and globally.
Educating the next generation of energy specialists, engi-
neers and energy policy makers worldwide is important to 
the development and use of new energy technologies at lo-
cal, regional and global levels.
Initiatives are needed to raise industrial energy efficiency at 
local, regional and global levels.
The global building sector offers tremendous possibilities for 
saving energy, but incentives are needed to make this a real-
ity.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) could be an important 
medium-term option, allowing the world’s large remaining 
reserves of fossil fuels to be used in an environmentally-be-
nign manner. R&D and international cooperation in CCS 
should therefore be stimulated.
Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
Risø National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy, 
Technical University of Denmark
Summary and recommendations
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John M. Christensen, Risø National Laboratory for Sustain-
able Energy; Prof. Ogunlade Davidson, University of Sierra 
Leone & Co-chair IPCC WG III
3.1 Major global challenges for energy  
 development
The global energy scene is currently dominated by two over-
riding concerns that are strongly affecting decisions about 
energy development priorities:
t $MJNBUFDIBOHF
t &OFSHZTFDVSJUZ
This is especially true for industrialized countries and the 
more rapidly developing economies while many develop-
ing countries are facing really basic energy development 
constraints giving quite a different meaning to the concept 
of energy security. There is broad global recognition of the 
need to support these countries in their efforts to increase 
access to cleaner and more efficient forms of energy for the 
more than 1,6 billion people currently having no access to 
electricity and largely relying on traditional forms of bio-
mass for basic energy services, but progress is slow in many 
regions.
The three areas, security, climate and poverty are in several 
ways interlinked, and ideally national energy policies and 
development programmes should address all the above is-
sues — or at least not have negative effects in any area. In 
practice, however, many national policy landscapes have 
been dominated by just one of these factors. In the political 
debate the access issue is often seen as a potential climate 
problem, but most studies indicate that access to basic en-
ergy services for the poorest one billion people, even based 
on fossil resources, will make very marginal contributions 
to global GHG emissions. The more relevant and pressing 
political concern is how to limit global emissions and allow 
the emerging economies to continue their economic growth, 
but as discussed in this report the technological options will 
be available and solutions depend on political will and agree-
ments on sharing the technologies and financial resources.
 
3.2 Climate change – emerging political  
 consensus on the need for urgent  
 action
Climate change is widely recognized as the major environ-
mental problem facing the globe and evidence is building 
that impacts are already being felt in the form of melting 
icecaps in the polar areas and increased variability of tem-
perature, rainfall and storms in virtually all regions and in-
creasing intensity and frequency of climate extremes.
The scientific consensus underpinning the rising political 
and public recognition of the climate problem is captured in 
the recent reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC). The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4) clearly states that it is no longer relevant to discuss 
whether the climate is changing but how much change we 
are committed to and how fast this will happen and what 
areas will be affected [1]. 
The IPCC concludes that in order for the changes to be man-
ageable and avoid acceleration effects the level of GHG con-
centrations should be contained between 450 to 600 ppm 
and preferably at the lower end of this range. This is a major 
challenge since the level is already over 390 ppm and in-
creasing by 10 ppm annually.
It is evident from the AR 4 Working Group III report that 
if the ambition is to limit the future stabilization level of 
atmospheric concentrations to less than 600 ppm, this will 
require unprecedented action in terms of changing the way 
Danish and global climate and 
energy challenges
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Figure 1
IPCC WG III, Illustrating GHG emissions from different sectors with historic trends
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especially energy is produced and consumed and strong ac-
tion on forestry and ecosystems management [2]. Historical 
emission developments in these sectors are shown in Fig 1.
The IPCC states that the required action is possible with 
strong policies, technology development and transfer using 
a broad range of both policy and technology options. The 
total costs will be significant, but compared with the size of 
the world economy and its expected growth over the next 
decades, the cost of the necessary mitigation efforts will only 
amount to a small fraction of that stipulated growth and 
therefore in no visible way affect overall economic devel-
opment patterns. The report, however, underlines that this 
statement is only true if action is taken urgently as the costs 
will increase with delayed action. 
The timing and cost of reducing GHG emission reductions 
are, though speculative, fairly well documented, but evident-
ly depend heavily on policy implementation and anticipated 
technology development.
The cost of inaction or - in other words - the cost of a more 
rapidly changing climate has not been assessed in detail by 
the IPCC. With the nature of the climate problem being tru-
ly global where there is no correlation between a country’s 
emissions and its potential impacts from climatic changes. 
This is not really a question to be answered at the national 
level.  It does, however, come up at the global level when the 
major GHG emitters discuss future limitations. 
While climate change impacts will be felt in all regions of the 
world it is clear that poorer developing countries and island 
states in the tropical regions are particularly vulnerable; with 
weak institutions and limited human and financial resourc-
es their ability to cope or adapt is limited and will require 
strong international support.
One major recent study that has addressed this issue is the 
Stern Review report: The Economics of Climate Change [3]
undertaken with support from the UK Government, which 
has been widely recognized as a major contribution to espe-
cially the international political debate. It should be noted 
that this report is a national effort and not governed by the 
intergovernmental rules that apply to the IPCC and their re-
view procedures; but this also means that more direct politi-
cal statements and suggestions can be made. While some of 
the specific numbers in the Stern Review have been debated 
the overall conclusions are quite robust:
“The basic conclusion of the Stern Review is that the costs 
of strong and urgent action to avoid serious impacts from 
climate change are substantially less than the damages there-
by avoided. This conclusion is robust to a wide range of as-
sumptions “
“Using the results from formal economic models, the Review 
estimates that if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of cli-
mate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global 
GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks and 
impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could 
rise to 20% of GDP or more. In contrast, the costs of ac-
tion – reducing greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst 
impacts of climate change – can be limited to around 1% of 
global GDP each year.” The IPCC GDP estimates for differ-
ent stabilization levels are shown for comparison in Table 1.
The understanding is, however, only slowly being reflected 
in political action, in part because public understanding of 
the required level of change is still limited. 
3.2.1 Energy security 
The concept of “energy security” is in most political applica-
tions very directly linked with energy supply. Securing stable 
supply is a major political concern and a challenge facing 
both developed and developing economies since prolonged 
disruptions would create serious economic and basic func-
tionality problems for most societies. 
On a more detailed level the issue of supply security can be 
disaggregated into a number of more detailed concerns:
t $IBOHFTJOHMPCBMEJTUSJCVUJPOPGEFNBOEBOETVQQMZ
t *ODSFBTJOHJNQPSUPGGPTTJMSFTPVSDFTJONPTU0&$% 
 countries but also for example for China and India
t 1PMJUJDBMGPDVTPOOBUJPOBMDPOUSPMPGTVQQMZBOE 
 production 
t "ČPSEBCJMJUZPGFOFSHZJNQPSUTGPSMPXJODPNF 
 countries 
t .JDSPMFWFMBDDFTTUPBČPSEBCMFBOESFMJBCMFTVQQMZ
Ensuring stable supplies are considered on both short and 
long time horizons. To deal with short term disruptions, 
Table 1 
IPCC WG III, Macro-economic costs in 2050 for different stabilization levels
Trajectories 
towards stabil-
ization levels
(ppm CO²-eq)
  
590-710
535-590
445-535
 Median
GDP reduction
(%)
 
0.5
1.3
 Not available
 Range of GDP 
reduction 
(%)
 
-1 – 2
Slightly negative -4
< 5.5
Reduction of 
average annual 
GDP growth rates 
(percentage points)
 
< 0.05
< 0.1
< 0.12
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actions generally focus on establishing strategic reserves in 
several countries, who can afford to do this. For oil in the 
OECD countries, the International Energy Agency co-or-
dinates the use of member countries’ emergency oil stocks. 
Governments often have contingency plans to curtail con-
sumption in order to deal with disruptions of supply.
For the longer term aspect of energy supply security actions 
generally focus on establishing policies tackling the root 
causes of energy insecurity in OECD countries, which can 
be separated into four broad types [4]:
1. Concentration of fossil fuel resources: Government  
 action aims to minimize the exposure to resource  
 concentration risks in fossil fuel markets and includes 
 moving away from fossil fuels, or diversifying supply 
 routes and means
2. Energy system disruptions linked to extreme weather 
 conditions or accidents: Government policies are gener- 
 ally precautionary in nature. Governments notably 
 have an important role in preparing contingency ar- 
 rangements for the management of, and recovery from, 
 such incidents after they happen
3. Short-term balancing of demand and supply in electric- 
 ity markets: governments may for example establish   
 independent transmission system operators (TSO)  
 responsible for the short-term balancing of demand and 
 supply
4. Regulatory failures: Government action aims to moni- 
 tor the effectiveness of regulations and to adjust regula- 
 tory structures when inefficiencies are detected
This approach to analyzing energy security helps identify 
areas where synergies best can be found with policies and 
measures to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Policies addressing security concerns related to re-
source concentration generally have the most obvious op-
portunities for also addressing climate change mitigation, 
e.g. increasing renewable energy supply or increasing effi-
ciency of production and use of energy. 
In contrast, interactions with policies correcting for regula-
tory failures may have only secondary effects on greenhouse 
gas mitigation policies. Finally, energy security measures 
responding to the risks of short-term physical disruptions 
and the balancing of electricity grids have very limited direct 
interactions with climate mitigation efforts. 
A similar but slightly more encompassing approach to energy 
security is included in the World Economic Forum publication 
iUIF/FX&OFSHZ4FDVSJUZ1BSBEJHNw	4FF'JHVSF
<>
The WEF approach also addresses the more political con-
cerns, which do not come out in a more technical discus-
sion, like geopolitical stability and use of control of energy 
resources as a political tool.
The major reasons for increased concern about energy se-
curity in the last years stem from a mixture of old and new 
causes. 
The “traditional” concern - like in the seventies and early 
eighties - about stability of oil supply combined with the major 
increase in oil prices in the last years are clearly major drivers. 
The overall oil intensity (oil consumed per unit of economic 
output) of the global economy has however declined by a 
factor of three over the last 25 years making many especially 
developed economies less vulnerable to fluctuations in oil 
markets. The transport sector is a special concern in relation 
to oil, as the dependency is virtually 100% and while biofuels, 
batteries and hydrogen are options for the future the current 
situation is an almost total dependency on oil.
The gas market has in the same period grown significantly 
and is gradually globalizing in terms of supply infrastructure 
although piped supply is still dominant. For example for the 
EU countries the import dependency is around 75% for oil 
and over 50% for natural gas and when the location of future 
reserves is analyzed it portrays a picture of further concen-
tration of supply of both oil and gas, shown in Figure 3.
Diversifying oil and gas supply sources is one strategic ap-
proach to enhancing security for many countries and recent 
political interest in Africa by USA, EU and China illustrates 
more energy security concerns than concerns about African 
development per se. 
On the consumption side the OECD countries have until 
recently experienced relatively stable growth with linked ex-
pansion of energy consumption in most countries. At the 
same time the large emerging economies like China and In-
Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates [5]
Security of Infrastructure
Security of Supply
Security of Revenue
Access to New Reserves
Prices
Supply Diversity
Security Margin
Energy as a Weapon
Investment Regimes
Risks of Terrorism and War
Figure 2
Energy security: An umbrella term
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dia have over the last couple of years become significant net 
importers and with both population and economic growth 
this trend is expected to accelerate the coming decades and 
is already reflected in how these large countries operate stra-
tegically on the global energy market (Figure 4).
In addition to the overall supply and demand changes there 
have also been a number of incidents in recent years in terms 
of political and natural events that have had major impact on 
the supply situation of oil. The Iraq war and hurricane Ka-
trina are two extreme cases, but there are numerous smaller 
and less spectacular examples. Similarly the changing insti-
tutional ownership and market structures in many regional 
power markets have changed operations and regulation with 
some isolated but spectacular examples of black outs in large 
sub-regions.
So overall the concerns over energy supply security have 
become more complex and multi-faceted and many gov-
ernments are still struggling to find the most effective solu-
tions. 
3.2.2  Developing economies
The previous sections are mainly reflecting concerns as 
they are seen from a “G8 + 5” perspective and while glob-
al demand and supply changes do affect all countries. The 
concept of energy security in most developing countries is 
much more associated with affordability of imported fos-
sil resources or optimizing the rate of exports for fossil fuel 
producers and finally providing access to modern forms of 
energy for the poorest parts of the population.
Studies by the World Bank indicate that higher oil prices 
are causing many net oil importing Sub-Saharan African 
countries to lose economic ground — costing them a cu-
mulative loss of over 3 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) — and increasing poverty in those areas by as much 
as 4 to 6 percent [7]. Evidently the oil exporting countries 
are experiencing a windfall profit situation and focus in this 
limited number of developing countries will evidently be on 
investing the revenues in securing future development also 
beyond the current fossil dominated period.
The present “oil crisis” has however in some African coun-
tries not had as severe effects as those experienced during the 
oil price hikes in the seventies and early eighties. In general 
the share of oil import costs as part of the overall imports has 
declined. For example in Tanzania where it has gone from a 
share of 70% to now around 20%. Higher prices on locally 
produced non-oil commodities have also helped compen-
sate import costs associated with the oil price increase in a 
number of countries [8].
3.2.3 Danish perspectives
The Danish energy policy situation is in many ways a re-
flection of the joint EU priorities and reflects in many ways 
the discussions above about combining climate change and 
energy security priorities. The approaches and tools embed-
ded in the national energy strategy for 2025 [9] and most 
recently elaborated in a more detailed political agreement 
for the coming 5 years include:
t *ODSFBTFEVTFPGSFOFXBCMFFOFSHZFTQFDJBMMZXJOEBOE 
 biomass
t *ODSFBTJOHPWFSBMMFOFSHZFďDJFODZ
t 4QFDJBMFČPSUTGPSSFEVDJOHPJMDPOTVNQUJPOJOUSBOTQPSU
t %FWFMPQNFOUBOEJNQMFNFOUBUJPOPGJOOPWBUJWFQPMJDZ 
 tools to make this happen
t 4VQQPSUGPSJODSFBTFE3%JOSFOFXBCMFFOFSHZBOE 
 energy efficiency
Figure 3 
Share of global oil and gas reserves in the Middle East and North Africa 
is much higher than its share of current production. [6]
OIL
NATURAL GAS
Non-MENA 39%
Other non-MENA 28%
Other MENA 14%
Russia 27%
Iraq 9%
Saudi Arabia 4%
Iran 10%
UEA 8%
Kuwait 8%
Saudi Arabia 20%
Iran 16%
Qatar 14%
Other MENA 8%
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The agreement includes specific targets of a 20% share of 
renewables in the Danish energy system by 2011 and re-
duced gross energy consumption by 2% in 2011 and 4% in 
2020. The most direct driver currently is probably climate 
change with the already existing commitments under the 
Kyoto protocol and joint EU policy targets mentioned above 
combined with the joint climate target on 20% reductions of 
GHG emissions by 2020.
The latest analysis from the European Environment Agency 
(EEA) shows that while many of the EU member countries 
have achieved their targets there are still a number of coun-
tries that have a long way to go [10]. Denmark is still approx. 
11% from the target but with current plans and measures the 
EEA expects Denmark to meet its target (Fig. 5). The two 
UBCMFTGSPNUIF%BOJTI/BUJPOBM"MMPDBUJPO1MBOTIPXJO5B-
ble 2 the domestic measures including what will be achieved 
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Figure 4 
Oil import projections for major countries and regions [6]
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Table 2 
Key figures in Denmark’s National Allocation Plan 2008-12 [9]
Electricity and heat production
Other industries, including offshore
New enterprises
Auctioning
Total CO² emissions/allowances in ETS sectors
Non-ETS sectors and gases in total ¹
Total greenhouse gas emissions ²
Emissions target
Deficit
Notes:  ¹ : Stated in CO² equivalents. Includes emissions of CO² by non-ETS sectors and emissions of other greenhouse gases than CO² by ETS as well as non-ETS sectors. 
              ² : Stated in CO² equivalents.
Expected annual CO² emissions 
2008-12 (mill. tonnes)
Annual allowance allocation 
2008-12 (mill. tonnes)
Annual allowance allocation 
2005-07 (mill. tonnes)
Table 3
Closing the gap – options for Denmark meeting its Kyoto target. How the deficit will be eliminated [9]
Deficit
Central government initiatives, including
– monitoring CO²  removals by sinks
– new national measures within non-ETS sectors
– JI/CDM credits, 2003-07
To cover possible losses if, contrary to expectation, Denmark does not get compensation for 
the reference year, and/or to cover uncertainty in projections, inclusion of sinks ect., including
– contributions from JI/CDM credits from 2008-09 resources
– resources in reserve under section 35 of the Finance Act
Central government initiatives in total
Enterprises’ commitment, including
– electricity sector
– other ETS enterprises (net) ¹
Total
Notes:  ¹ : A pool of 0.5 milion tonnes/year for new entrants will be established, deducted from other enterprises’ net contribution.
Mill. tonnes annually
20.5
9.2
29.7
38.1
67.8
54.8
13.0
15.8
8.2
0.5
0
24.5
 
21.7
9.2
1
1.7
33.5
13.0
-6.8
-2.3
-1.3
-3.2
-0.3
-0.7
-7.8
-5.2
-4.4
-0.8
0
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through companies participating in the EU Emission Trad-
ing Scheme (ETS). Table 3 shows how the “deficit” will be 
met through additional measures and trading [9].
The specific approaches to address climate change and en-
ergy security evidently have to reflect the specific national 
circumstances and the Danish example only illustrates one 
approach, one which with all its proposed actions will ad-
dress both concerns at the same time, as compared to other 
opportunities like increased domestic production of oil and 
gas which would increase short term energy security by re-
ducing imports of coal etc. but have no longer term security 
value and very limited effect on climate mitigation efforts.
Whether the measures to close the gap will suffice remains 
to be seen and as indicated in the EU environment data in 
Fig. 5 their analysis indicates the resulting emissions will be 
close to the target, but may just fall short, However, this will 
EU – 15
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Netherlands
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France
Finland
Belgium
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Austria
Greece
Luxembourg
Italy
Denmark
Spain
Estonia
Latvia
Bulgaria
Romania
Hungary
Poland
Lithuania
Czech Republic
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Iceland
Croatia
Norway
Switzerland
Lichtenstein
+ 4.0 %
– 3.4 %
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Figure 5 
EU status on Kyoto goal achievement in 2008 [10] 
Percent points over-delivery (–) or shortfall (+) respective of emission target
Projections for 2010 with existing measures          Projections for 2010 with all measures, use of carbon sinks and Kyoto mechanisms
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depend on specific assumptions that differ from those of the 
Danish Government.
3.2.4 Concluding remarks
Political, economic and environmental drivers have moved 
energy to the forefront of international politics in recent 
years and 2007 was a clear example of this with an unprec-
edented focus on climate change worldwide and at the same 
time significant concerns about impacts of the growing oil 
and gas prices and the associated impacts on many societies.
The EU has taken the political lead globally with agreements 
on ambitious targets for GHG reductions combined with 
specific targets for the increased contribution of renewable 
energy in the energy supply within the Union. The US has 
focused much more on domestic energy security with the 
rapid increase of corn based bio-ethanol as a clear example 
of policy action that addresses this concern but has very little 
contribution to GHG reductions and longer term supply sta-
bility. China has developed a very diversified approach re-
flecting its very rapidly growing economy and associated en-
ergy demand expansion, this includes ambitious targets for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, increased domestic 
production and establishing collaboration with a larger and 
more diversified group of oil and gas producing countries, 
most clearly exemplified by the strong expansion of col-
laboration with African countries. India has embarked on 
similar strategies, while less ambitious, but it has increased 
its interests and investments in neighboring countries like 
Bangladesh and Burma on gas and Iran, Syria and Sudan on 
oil supply options.
The strong international focus on climate and security has 
reduced the political focus on energy access in the poorest 
countries, so while some progress is achieved in selected 
countries there is overall not any major improvement in this 
area.
As the previous sections have shown, however, decisions 
on energy policy are subject to many regional and national 
priorities. Finding a global energy development path that 
satisfies all three concerns, especially climate change, is a 
major challenge that requires coordinated action from all 
countries. 
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The following chapter presents the status of R&D in prog-
ress for selected supply technologies and energy enabling 
technologies (energy enabling technologies are technologies 
with a function as enablers for other energy sources such 
as wind), and energy savings and efficiency improvements, 
based on the more detailed descriptions in Risø Energy Re-
port 6, published in 2006 [1].
The chapter presents an overview (Table 4, see pages 30-31), 
which lists the technologies and provides a number of key 
facts for each technology, among others the potential contri-
bution to future CO2 reductions.
The presented technologies are assessed with respect to tech-
nological status and development, estimated time to con-
tribution on commercial conditions, market development, 
challenges and barriers, CO2 reduction potential, needed 
investments in research, demonstration and commercial 
production facilities, Danish strengths and possibilities in 
developing the technology, the technology’s potential con-
tribution in Denmark and globally, and finally adverse ef-
fects. The technologies are categorised in the following way:
Energy supply
Wind
Photovoltaics
Solar thermal
Biofuels for transport
Thermal fuel conversion technologies for fossil fuels and 
biofuels
/VDMFBSFOFSHZ
Fusion energy
Geothermal energy
Hydro, ocean, wave and tidal
Energy enabling technologies
Fuel cells
Hydrogen generation
CCS (carbon capture and storage)
Energy storage
Heat pumps
Energy savings and efﬁciency improvements
Savings in new buildings, in retrofitting old buildings,  
LED lighting, efficiency in the transport sector etc.
 
4.1 Energy supply
4.1.1 Wind
Wind energy is a mature option in sustainable energy with 
great potential and a rapid development over the past 25 
years. In 2007 the installed capacity in Denmark was about 
3 GW and wind turbines produced electricity equal to 20% 
of the total Danish electricity demand. In 2008 the global 
installed wind power capacity was about 100 GW [2, 3]. For 
some years, world wind capacity has been doubled every 
three to four years. In the years ahead the growth rate is ex-
pected to be higher in the USA and Asia. Despite this tech-
nological development, and rapid growth in a few countries, 
wind today provides only a small percentage of the world’s 
electricity. 
Assuming further rising primary energy prices, wind tur-
bines are approaching the point where they can compete 
economically with conventional power production. A recent 
analysis from the EA Energy Analyses for Danish Energy 
Association concludes that offshore wind turbines will be 
competitive with other energy technologies in 2015 [4].
Denmark has a world leading position in wind energy research, 
development and production, but now several other countries 
record a fast development in the area of wind energy. 
Globally there are many plans for wind energy R&D. Up-
Wind is the largest EU initiative in wind energy R&D to date. 
Catalogue of energy technologies 4
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UpWind looks towards future wind power, including very 
large turbines (8–10 MW) placed in wind farms of several 
hundred MW in total, both on- and offshore. In the USA, the 
Department of Energy (DoE) has laid out a five-year plan for 
wind energy R&D [5]. The plan focuses on cost reduction, in-
creased energy and reliability performance, and achieving 20 
% of the electricity market by 2030 for onshore applications. 
European countries and the EU as a whole are leading the 
deployment of wind energy. Today the industry produces 
wind turbines that take an active part in the control and 
regulatory functions of power systems. Turbine manufactur-
ers will continue to develop these capabilities in response to 
new requirements in the grid codes – the rules that govern 
how generating equipment interacts with the transmission 
grid – for “fault ride-through” and power quality, and the 
increasing importance of short term wind forecasting. An 
important way to remove trade barriers and disseminate re-
search results is to establish international standards for wind 
technology. Both national and European R&D programmes 
have supported this approach. 
4.1.2 Photovoltaics
Photovoltaic (PV) devices, otherwise known as solar cells, 
convert light directly into electricity. PV technology is mod-
ular and contains no moving parts. Solar cells are commonly 
divided into at least three categories. First-generation solar 
cells are made from crystalline silicon. Second-generation 
PV uses thin-film technology, including amorphous silicon, 
CIS and CdTe. Third-generation technologies combine or-
ganics and semiconductors.
First-generation solar cells are currently dominant: crystal-
line silicon constitutes about 90% of the world market, and 
this situation is expected to continue until at least 2015. 
Second-generation solar cells are increasing in market share, 
with high-efficiency cells produced for high-value applica-
tions including satellites. Third-generation cells are still 
mostly at the research stage. Solar electricity is forecast to 
reach grid parity after 2016.
Solar cells were the fastest-growing renewable energy tech-
nology market in 2005, with a global annual growth rate of 
more than 40%, and this trend continued in 2006. Growth 
has been dominated by grid-connected distributed systems 
in Germany and Japan.
The status of PV technology, its potential and R&D challeng-
es were addressed comprehensively by the EU-supported 
publication A Vision for Photovoltaic Technology compiled 
by the Photovoltaic Technology Research Advisory Coun-
cil [6]. These R&D challenges are presently being analysed 
in more detail in a study called the PV Strategic Research 
Agenda (SRA), which was published in 2007 [7].
Solar cells are not produced in Denmark. One company has 
the potential to produce solar-grade. 
Denmark has particular strengths in inverters, an essential 
TVQQPSU UFDIOPMPHZ GPS TPMBS DFMMT /FUNFUFSJOH JT OPX B
permanent incentive in Denmark, and this allows long-term 
planning of PV investments.
Third-generation solar cells bring opportunities to integrate 
PV into other products via printing and plastics processing, 
and a number of Danish industries already have many of the 
skills needed to do this. PV is in the middle of a technologi-
cal and commercial breakthrough, and new generations of 
technology promise a continued bright future. It is impor-
tant to maintain Danish industrial competence in PV by se-
curing a national market.
4.1.3 Solar thermal
Solar thermal heating is a long-established technology for 
TQBDFIFBUJOHBOEEPNFTUJDIPUXBUFS/FXBQQMJDBUJPOTBSF
emerging for industrial processes, where solar energy could 
replace fossil fuels or electricity.
For solar thermal devices the average annual market growth 
rate has been 17–20% in recent years. The most dynamic 
market areas are China and Europe. In absolute terms the 
European solar thermal market is dominated by Germany 
(~50%), followed by Greece and Austria (~12% each). Eu-
rope’s present solar thermal capacity provides around 0.15% 
of the overall EU requirements for hot water and space heat-
ing. The EU goal for solar thermal units is 100 million m2 by 
2010. However, with the present market trends only about 
40 million m2 is likely to be reached by 2010.
In general, costs per unit area decrease with the size of the 
system. Solar thermal systems connected to a district heat-
ing network are therefore more cost-effective than systems 
for single family houses. Solar thermal systems traditionally 
include short-term hot water storage capacity in the range 
50–75 l per m2 of collector. Seasonal storage of around 2,000 
l per m2 has been investigated, but is still considered to be at 
the R&D stage.
A relatively new market for solar thermal units is industrial 
process heat. Low-temperature process heat, in the range 
achievable by traditional solar collectors, is needed in many 
industries.
Concentrating solar power systems (CSP) can be sized for 
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village power (10 kilowatts) or grid-connected applications 
(up to 100 megawatts). Some systems use thermal storage 
during cloudy periods or at night. Others can be combined 
with natural gas and the resulting hybrid power plants pro-
vide high-value, dispatchable power. These attributes, along 
with high solar-to-electric conversion efficiencies, make 
concentrating solar power an attractive renewable energy 
option that is rapidly gaining momentum in the US. It could 
be viable in many parts of the world, but not so attractive in 
Denmark and the northern part of Europe. 
4.1.4 Biomass based fuels for transport
There are several motivations to provide alternative trans-
port fuels based on biomass as a raw material. It will be a 
transport fuel with low CO2 emissions, it will reduce the de-
pendence on imported fossil fuels in the Western world and 
it is possible to further develop a domestic industry based on 
liquid fuels. Liquid transport fuels based on biomass can be 
produced by several different means such as biodiesel from 
rape, ethanol by fermentation and by the GTL-technology 
(Gas-To-Liquid). The GTL-technology has the potential to 
obtain a high biomass to liquid conversion efficiency, and it 
should be possible to develop the technology so that a broad 
range of solid input fuels can be applied. A disadvantage is 
that GTL-plants are relatively large and complicated. 
The GTL-technology uses natural gas or gas produced from 
solid fuels or from gasification of biomass, waste or coal, 
where it is converted to a gas rich in CO and H2. This gas is 
then used for a synthesis of hydrocarbon liquids, by use of a 
catalyst. Depending on the catalyst type and operating con-
ditions different products can be made e.g. ethanol, DME 
(dimethyl ether), higher alcohols, and Fischer-Tropsch gas-
oline or diesel. Often a pressurized oxygen blown entrained 
flow or fluid bed gasifiers is used to produce the synthesis 
gas. The gas supplied from the gasifiers to the catalytic syn-
thesis does often need to be carefully conditioned in order to 
obtain an adequate H2/CO ratio, and to be cleaned of species 
that might poison the catalysts. 
The GTL-technologies are presently used on a large scale to 
produce methanol from natural gas, and for many years Fisch-
er-Tropsch hydrocarbon production in South Africa. Because 
of the relatively high fossil oil prices, GTL-technologies have 
gained renewed global attention, and in China plants for DME 
production from coal are being erected. Large-scale commer-
cial production of transport fuels from biomass with the GTL 
technology is not done presently, but the increased awareness 
of the need to reduce CO2-emissions, and the need to provide 
alternative transport fuels, do strongly favour this technology.
A broad band of research work needs to be initiated to con-
solidate the GTL-technology for commercial application, 
improve energy efficiency and improve the possibilities to 
integrate the technology with other energy technologies. 
Possible research areas could be:
t 'VSUIFSEFWFMPQNFOUPGQSFTTVSJ[FEHBTJĕFSTUPIBOEMF 
 biomass and waste as well as co-gasification of biomass  
 and coal
t 8PSLPOJOUFHSBUJPOPGUIF(5-UFDIOPMPHZXJUIQPXFS 
 production so that waste heat can be used efficiently for  
 power and central heat production. Integration with  
 other advanced technologies so outlet CO2-sequestra- 
 tion can be obtained and that the gasification can be  
 integrated with combined cycle power production
t *ODSFBTFPGQMBOUFďDJFODZCZJNQSPWJOHUIFFďDJFODZ 
 of both the gasification and synthesis process
t %FWFMPQNFOUPGOFXDBUBMZTUTXJUIIJHIFSUPMFSBODF 
 towards poisoning, and improved control over product  
 composition
t %FWFMPQNFOUBOEUFTUPGNPUPSTBOEEJTUSJCVUJPOTZT 
 tems, for new fuel types
The biological based production of transport fuels is often 
based on fermentation. Large scale commercial production 
of biofuels today mainly covers the production of bioethanol 
of the first-generation type, meaning that it is made from 
corn, wheat, sugar cane or sugar beet). The technology 
needed to make first-generation bioethanol from starch has 
developed rapidly, thanks to intensive research in enzyme 
technology. 
Second-generation bioethanol is produced from plant sugar 
components in straw, wood chips, grasses, waste paper and 
other “lignocellulosic” materials. It requires more expensive 
methods to release and ferment the different kind of sugars. 
Today, lignocellulosic processing is well advanced, and the 
EU has three demonstration plants, one in Denmark.
By 2030 the European Union and the USA plan to meet 25–
30% of their transport fuel needs with sustainable and CO2-
efficient renewable biofuels. Vehicles with ordinary gasoline 
engines can use a blend of gasoline with 10% ethanol (E10) 
while modified “flexi-fuel” engines can use E85 (85% etha-
OPMBOEHBTPMJOF
/FBUFUIBOPM	&
DBOBMTPCFVTFE
in gasoline-type (Otto) engines with high compression ra-
tios, and in diesel engines with the addition of an ignition 
enhancer. The actual critical discussion on biofuels in the 
EU will at least slow down the realisation of an area covering 
biofuel infrastructure.
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The IEA (2006) has projected an average annual growth rate 
of 6.3% for liquid biofuels between 2005 and 2030, most of 
which will be in the form of ethanol [8].
4.1.5 Thermal fuel conversion – combustion,  
 gasiﬁcation and pyrolysis of biomass
The thermal conversion of biomass and waste into power, 
heat and process energy is today the world's largest con-
tributor of CO2 neutral energy and will also in the future 
provide a large share of CO2 neutral energy supplies. A very 
broad range of thermal based technologies are used today, 
and some emerging thermal technologies will also be used 
in the future. This includes technologies as:
t 8BTUFJODJOFSBUJPOCBTFEQPXFSBOEIFBUQSPEVDUJPO
t #JPNBTTQPXFSQMBOUTVTJOHCPUIHSBUFBOETVTQFOTJPO 
 fired boilers and using different co-firing technologies
t 0YZGVFMCBTFEDPNCVTUJPOBQQMJFEGPSDBSCPOTUPSBHF
t -BSHFTDBMFQSFTTVSJ[FEHBTJĕDBUJPOBTBOJOUFHSBUFEQBSU 
 of flexible high efficient power plants
t 4NBMMTDBMFCJPNBTTHBTJĕDBUJPOVOJUTBQQMJFEGPSMPDBM 
 power production
t 1ZSPMZTJTVOJUTVTFEGPSQSPEVDUJPOPGCJPPJMBOEUSBOT 
 port fuels
Through cooperation between Danish research institutions 
and industry, Denmark has obtained a leading position in 
waste and biomass combustion technology; however, to 
maintain this position a high activity level and public spon-
sored research is also needed in the future.
A range of research challenges persists including: Increased 
biomass fuel share in power plant boilers, increased electri-
cal efficiency of waste and biomass combustion plants and 
reduced operational problems, development of mature and 
flexible pressurized gasification technologies and develop-
ment of reliable biomass pyrolysis reactors.
4.1.6 Thermal fuel conversion – fossil fuels
Modern industrial development is to a significant extent 
based on production of heat and electricity from combus-
tion of fossil fuels like coal, oil and natural gas. One of the 
adverse effects is that combustion of fossil fuels is the larg-
est source of carbon dioxide emissions. Fossil energy use is 
responsible for about 85% of the anthropogenic CO2 emis-
sions produced annually [9].
In industrial applications, by far the most common utiliza-
tion of fossil fuel energy is combustion. Fossil fuels supplied 
80% of the world’s primary energy demand in 2004 and their 
use is expected to grow in absolute terms over the next 20–
30 years in the absence of policies to promote low-carbon 
emission sources. Traditional biomass excluded, the largest 
DPOTUJUVFOUXBTPJMUIFODPBM	
BOEHBT	
/BUVSBM
gas is the fossil fuel that produces the lowest amount of GHG 
per unit of energy consumed and is therefore favoured in 
mitigation strategies [9].
Coal is the most abundant fossil fuel, with widespread re-
sources all over the world – enough to last several hundred 
years with the current consumption rate. Due to this, coal 
shows better price stability than oil and gas, and has gained 
renewed interest as an energy source over the past decade. 
Coal is mainly applied as a solid fuel to produce electricity 
and heat through combustion. Most of the energy supply in 
Denmark comes from combustion of pulverized coal, and 
the Danish power plants are leading worldwide with respect 
UPFOFSHZFďDJFODZPG UIFTFQMBOUT/FWFSUIFMFTTDPBMXJMM
only be an option for the future if it is feasible to reduce the 
emissions of CO2 cost-efficiently. 
Approximately 40% of the world electricity production is 
based on coal. The total known deposits recoverable by cur-
rent technologies, including highly polluting, low energy 
content types of coal (i.e. lignite, subbituminous), might 
suffice for around 300 years of use at current consumption 
levels, though maximal production could be reached within 
decades.
When coal is used for electricity generation, it is usually pul-
verized and blown in suspension into a furnace where it re-
acts with primary and secondary air. The furnace is equipped 
with a steam cycle (boiler). The furnace transforms chemical 
energy in the coal to heat in a hot flue gas. The heat from the 
hot flue gas is subsequently applied to convert boiler water 
to steam, which is then superheated and in a series of steps 
used to spin turbines which turn generators and create elec-
tricity. The thermodynamic efficiency of converting coal to 
electricity has improved significantly over time. The most 
advanced standard steam turbine reached about 35% ther-
modynamic efficiency for the entire process, which means 
that 65% of the coal energy is waste heat released into the 
surrounding environment. Old coal-fired power plants are 
significantly less efficient and produce higher levels of waste 
heat. Supercritical turbine concepts are predicted to run a 
boiler at extremely high temperatures and pressures with 
projected efficiencies of 46%. 
Other efficient ways to use coal are combined cycle power 
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plants, combined heat and power cogeneration, and an 
MHD topping cycle. The MHD (magnetohydrodynamic) 
generator converts thermal energy or kinetic energy di-
rectly into electricity. MHD generators can operate at high 
temperatures without moving parts. The exhaust of a MHD 
generator is a flame, still able to heat the boilers of a steam 
power plant. So high-temperature MHD could be as a top-
ping cycle to increase the efficiency of electric generation, 
especially when burning coal or natural gas. This technology 
is still far from commercial status. 
/BUVSBMHBTQSFTFOUMZBDDPVOUTGPSPGHMPCBMDPOTVNQ-
UJPOPGNPEFSOFOFSHZ/BUVSBMHBTĕSFEQPXFSHFOFSBUJPO
has grown rapidly since the 1980s because it is relatively su-
perior to other fossil-fuel technologies in terms of invest-
ment costs, fuel efficiency, operating flexibility, rapid deploy-
ment and environmental benefits, especially when fuel costs 
were relatively low. Combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) 
plants produce less CO2 per unit energy output than coal 
or oil technologies, because of the higher hydrogen-carbon 
ratio of methane and the relatively high thermal efficiency of 
the technology [9].
Conventional oil products extracted from crude oil-well 
bores and processed by primary, secondary or tertiary meth-
ods represent about 37% of total world energy consump-
tion with major resources concentrated in relatively few 
countries. Assessments of the amount of oil consumed, the 
amount remaining for extraction, and whether the peak oil 
tipping point is close or not, have been very controversial. 
/PXUPZFBSTTVQQMZJTBSFBTPOBCMFFTUJNBUF6ODPO-
ventional liquid fuels, i.e. oil that requires extra processing 
(heavy oils, oil (tar) sands or from shales), will then become 
more economically attractive. Resource estimates are uncer-
tain, but together contributed around 3% of world oil pro-
duction in 2005 (2.8 EJ) and could reach 4.6 EJ by 2020 and 
up to 6 EJ by 2030 [9].
4.1.7 Combustion
Direct combustion of fuels may in principle occur in one 
of the following technologies; fixed-bed firing on a grate, 
fluidized bed combustion or (co-)firing in suspension. Each 
of these technologies poses different characteristics and is 
well-suited for fuels of quite different physical and chemical 
composition. In order to increase the total plant efficiency, 
most modern boilers (except for waste incinerators outside 
of Europe and Japan) produce both heat and power. 
An energy-efficient way of using coal for electricity produc-
tion would be via solid oxide fuel cells or molten carbonate 
fuel cells (or any oxygen ion transport based fuel cell that do 
not discriminate between fuels, as long as they consume ox-
ygen), which would be able to reach 60%–85% combined ef-
ficiency (direct electricity + waste heat steam turbine). Cur-
rently these fuel cell technologies can only process gaseous 
fuels, furthermore they are sensitive to sulfur poisoning; this 
operational problem must be solved before large scale com-
mercial success is possible with coal. As far as gaseous fuels 
go, one possible solution is pulverized coal in a gas carrier, 
such as nitrogen. Another option is coal gasification with 
water, which may lower fuel cell voltage by introducing oxy-
gen to the fuel side of the electrolyte, but may also greatly 
simplify carbon sequestration.
4.1.8 Gasiﬁcation
Industrial-scale gasification is currently mostly used to 
produce electricity from fossil fuels such as coal, where the 
syngas is burned in a gas turbine. Four types of gasifier are 
currently available for commercial use: counter-current 
fixed bed, co-current fixed bed, fluidized bed and entrained 
flow. Gasification is also used industrially in the production 
of electricity, ammonia and liquid fuels (oil) via Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycles (IGCC), with the possibility 
of producing CH4 and H2 for fuel cells. IGCC is also a more 
efficient method of CO2 capture as compared to conven-
tional technologies. IGCC demonstration plants have been 
operating since the early 1970s and some of the plants con-
structed in the 1990s, are now entering commercial service. 
In the early research stage is microbes for the in-situ-coal 
mining producing methane as a product of digestion.
4.1.9 Reduction of emissions
.BOZ UFDIOJRVFT GPS /0X- and SOX-removal from flue 
HBTFTIBWFCFFOEFWFMPQFEPWFSUIFMBTUEFDBEFT/PXBEBZT
the preferred technologies are selective catalytic reduction 
	4$3
XJUI/)ǡGPS/0XDPOWFSTJPOUP/ǠBOEXFUHZQTVN
producing SO2 reduction by limestone.
Reductions in CO2 emissions can be gained by improving the 
efficiency of existing power generation plants by employing 
more advanced technologies using the same amount of fuel. 
For example, a 27% reduction in emissions (gCO2/kWh) is 
possible by replacing a 35% efficient coal-fired steam turbine 
with a 48% efficient plant using advanced steam, pulverized-
coal technology. Replacing a natural gas single-cycle turbine 
with a combined cycle (CCGT) of similar output capac-
ity would help reduce CO2 emissions per unit of output by 
around 36%. Switching from coal to gas increases the effi-
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ciency of the power plant because of higher operating tem-
peratures, and when used together with the more efficient 
combined-cycle results in even higher efficiencies [9].
4.1.10 Nuclear energy
/VDMFBSĕTTJPOFOFSHZJTBNBKPS$0ǠFNJTTJPOGSFFFOFSHZ
source; it provides 15% of the world electricity production 
and 7% of the total energy consumption. Globally, 440 reac-
tors are in operation in 31 countries with most of the nuclear 
generation capacity being in Europe, the US, and Southeast 
Asia. Due to the high capital cost of nuclear reactors and low 
fuel prices nuclear energy is used predominantly for base 
load electricity production. In Europe, nuclear accounts for 
20% of the generation capacity but provides 31% of the elec-
tricity generation. 
The technology is fully developed and available to the mar-
ket. However, the majority of existing nuclear power units 
was built in the 1970s and 1980s. After 1990, nuclear power 
globally faced stagnation. Construction of nuclear power 
plants, however, continued in the Far East, especially in 
Japan and South Korea. Since 1990 the global installed ca-
pacity has increased only slightly to the present value of 370 
GWe.
/VDMFBSQPXFSJTOPUWVMOFSBCMFUPFWFOIJHIGVFMQSJDFĘVD-
tuations, and as it is based on uranium sources that are wide-
ly distributed around the globe, fuel supply is not strongly 
affected by geopolitical issues. In addition, because many 
years’ worth of nuclear fuel can be stored in a small area, the 
presence of local uranium resources is not a pre-condition 
for nuclear energy security.
Most projections from IEA, IPCC and others expect some 
growth in the installed capacity of nuclear energy in the 
coming decades, with large regional differences and from 
country to country, primarily due to the public acceptance 
issue. A growing number of countries in Asia, e.g. Indonesia, 
Thailand and Vietnam, are seriously considering or planning 
to use nuclear energy for electricity generation. India and 
the US have agreed to cooperate in increasing the nuclear 
power generation capacity in India. The nuclear option is 
primarily considered for energy security purpose at present. 
The nuclear option is expected to be even more attractive 
in countries like China and India concurrently with agree-
ments on CO2 reduction targets.
/VDMFBSQPXFSEPFTOPUGPSNQBSUPGUIF%BOJTIFOFSHZNJY
and at present there seems to be little political will to change 
this position. As a result, Denmark has relatively little exper-
tise in nuclear power and no university courses for nuclear 
engineers. Denmark maintains limited preparations for a 
nuclear emergency besides monitoring for anthropogenic 
radioactivity in the environment.
4.1.11 Fusion energy
A fusion reactor would “burn” the isotopes deuterium and 
tritium at moderate pressure and at a temperature of 150 
million Kelvin. A fusion reactor will produce much less 
radioactive waste than a fission reactor. Fusion plants are 
inherently safe as the reactor only contains enough fuel to 
feed the fusion processes for the next few seconds. The main 
cost of fusion energy will be in constructing the power plant, 
while the cost of fuel is negligible. Fusion power will there-
fore be most economical when run as base load, though it 
can easily contribute to a sustainable energy mix. 
Estimation of cost per ton CO2 reduction is premature due 
to the state of development of the technology. In IPCC AR4 
fusion power is regarded as basic research at the moment, 
hence cost estimates are not included. Fusion offers a safe, 
clean, zero-CO2 energy source, burning fuel that is abun-
dantly available everywhere that may be ready to make a 
large contribution to world energy production in the sec-
ond half of this century. A realistic size for a fusion plant is 
1,500 MWe. Such power plants could be built throughout 
the world including in Denmark. 
The design and building of the largest fusion reactor ITER 
has begun in broad international cooperation. The ITER is 
projected to start operating in 2016. The next step is likely 
to be a demonstration fusion power plant called DEMO. 
To make use of the results from ITER, the construction of 
DEMO will probably not start until some years after ITER 
starts operating, most likely not before 2025. 
As a part of the European fusion research programme Den-
mark makes significant contributions to the field of research. 
In many of these areas Danish industry is in a strong posi-
tion to enter into industrial contracts. This involvement of 
Danish industry is facilitated by Risø DTU.
4.1.12  Geothermal energy
Geothermal energy is heat from within the earth. The steam 
and hot water produced inside the earth can be used to heat 
buildings or generate electricity. Geothermal energy is a renew-
able energy source because the water is replenished by rainfall 
and the heat is continuously produced inside the earth. 
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The main uses of geothermal energy are: 
t %JSFDUVTFBOEEJTUSJDUIFBUJOHTZTUFNTXIJDIVTFIPU 
 water from springs or reservoirs near the surface
t &MFDUSJDJUZHFOFSBUJPOJOBQPXFSQMBOUSFRVJSFTXBUFSPS 
 steam at very high temperature (300 to 700 degrees  
 Fahrenheit). Geothermal power plants are generally  
 built where geothermal reservoirs are located within a  
 mile or two of the surface
t (FPUIFSNBMIFBUQVNQTVTFTUBCMFHSPVOEPSXBUFS 
 temperatures near the earth's surface (less than 100  
 metres) for space heating
Installed geothermal generating capacity in the EU was 893 
MWe in 2005, mostly in Italy and Iceland. European produc-
tion of geothermal energy for heating was 2.3 Mtoe in 2005. 
Most geothermal heat is produced in Turkey and Iceland. 
The first plant in Denmark opened in 1984 in Thisted. The 
second, which opened in 2005 at Margretheholm, supplies 
1% of the total heat demand in Copenhagen.
The resources are huge in many parts of the world, hence 
only market conditions sets limits for the application.
In its Alternative Policy Scenario, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) assumes an installed capacity of 3,000 MWe in 
OECD Europe by 2030 [8]. Today the technology to extract heat 
from underground aquifers is well known, but the energy avail-
able at shallow or moderate depths is limited, However, a huge 
energy resource exists at greater depths, including in Denmark.
Denmark has huge potential for geothermal energy, and high 
oil prices have encouraged an increasing number of cities to 
embark on geothermal projects. It is difficult, however, to 
predict the share of geothermal energy in the future Danish 
energy system. In some countries, including Denmark, geo-
thermal energy is not available at a high enough temperature 
for electricity production. District heating systems based on 
heat pumps, however, can make good use of low-tempera-
ture geothermal energy.
4.1.13 Hydro, ocean, wave and tidal
This group of energy supply technologies is based on the 
use of potential, kinetic or thermal energy of water as en-
ergy source and show different stage of development. Hydro 
power and pumped hydro storage systems have for many 
years been fully commercially competitive in many parts of 
the world. On the other hand ocean energy, including wave 
and tidal are at an early stage of development.
OECD and non-OECD countries produce roughly equal 
amounts of hydroelectricity. Little growth is expected in 
OECD countries, where most hydro potential has already 
been realised: on average, capacity has increased by just 
0.5% annually since 1990. The OECD nations produced 
1,343 TWh of hydroelectricity in 2003, the largest contribu-
tors being Canada (338 TWh), the USA (306 TWh) and 
/PSXBZ	58I

Large hydro remains one of the lowest-cost generating tech-
nologies, although environmental constraints, resettlement 
impacts and the limited availability of sites have restricted 
further growth in many countries. Large hydro supplied 16% 
of global electricity in 2004, down from 19% a decade ago. 
Large hydro capacity totaled about 720 GW worldwide in 
2004 and has grown historically at slightly more than 2% an-
nually. China installed nearly 8 GW of large hydro in 2004, 
taking the country to number one in terms of installed capac-
ity (74 GW). With the completion of the Three Gorges Dam, 
China will add some 18.2 GW of hydro capacity in 2009.
Small hydropower has developed for more than a century, 
and total installed capacity worldwide is now 61 GW. More 
than half of this is in China, where an ongoing boom in 
small hydro construction added nearly 4 GW of capacity in 
2004. Other countries with active efforts include Australia, 
$BOBEB/FQBMBOE/FX;FBMBOE
Ocean currents, some of which run close to European 
coasts, carry a lot of kinetic energy. Part of this energy can 
be captured by submarine “windmills” and converted into 
electricity. These are more compact than the wind turbines 
used on land, simply because water is much denser than air. 
The available power is about 1.2 kW/m2 for a current speed 
of 2 m/s, and 4 kW/m2 for a current of 3 m/s. The main Eu-
ropean countries with useful current power potential are 
France and the UK.
Ocean tides can be exploited for only four or five hours per 
cycle, so power from a single plant is intermittent. A suitably 
designed tidal plant can, however, operate as a pumped stor-
age system, using electricity during periods of low demand 
to store energy that can be recovered later. The only large, 
modern example of a tidal power plant is the 240 MW La 
Rance plant, built in France in the 1960s, which represents 
91% of world tidal power capacity.
Wave energy can be seen as stored wind energy, and could 
therefore form an interesting partnership with wind energy. 
Waves normally persist for six to eight hours after the wind 
drops, potentially allowing wave power to smooth out some 
of the variability inherent in wind power.
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Wave power could in the long term make an important con-
tribution to the world’s energy demand, if it can be developed 
to the point where it is technically and economically feasible. 
A potential 2,000 TWh/year, or 10% of global electricity 
consumption, has been estimated, with predicted electricity 
costs of €0.08/kWh. Wave power is an energy source with a 
low visual and acoustic impact. Oceanic waves – those oc-
curing far offshore – offer enormous levels of energy; power 
levels vary from well over 60 kW per metre of wave front in 
UIF/PSUI"UMBOUJDUPBSPVOEL8NOFBSFSTIPSF
Wave power is being investigated in a number of countries, 
particularly Japan, the USA, Canada, Russia, India, China, 
1PSUVHBM/PSXBZ4XFEFO%FONBSLBOEUIF6,"UQSFT-
ent, the front runners are Portugal and the UK. 
In contrast to other renewable energy sources, the number 
of concepts for harvesting wave energy is very large. More 
than 1,000 wave energy conversion techniques have been 
patented worldwide, though they can be classified into just 
a few basic types:
t 0TDJMMBUJOHXBUFSDPMVNOT	08$T

t 0WFSUPQQJOHEFWJDFT
t )FBWJOHEFWJDFT
t 1JUDIJOHEFWJDFT
t 4VSHJOHEFWJDFT
Wave power has gained renewed interest in Denmark. Ex-
amples are Wave Dragon and Wave Star. These demonstra-
tion projects are very successful as a starting point for the 
commercial development of this technology.
4.2 Energy enabling technologies
4.2.1 Fuel cells
Fuel cells are at the point of breakthrough as a most versatile and 
efficient energy conversion technology. They have strong links 
with renewable technologies, such as wind, solar and wave power, 
and they will be central to any future “hydrogen society”, with its 
promise of a release from dependence on fossil fuels. Denmark is 
playing a significant role in the development of fuel cells, all the 
way from fundamental research to consumer applications.
Low-temperature fuel cells, notably PEMFCs could replace car 
engines and are already being used in commercial uninterrupt-
ible power supplies, such as those made by the Danish company 
Dantherm.
High-temperature fuel cells (solid oxide fuel cells (SOFCs) 
and molten carbonate fuel cells (MCFCs) are fuel-flexible, 
highly efficient and environmentally clean. They can run on 
fuels such as natural gas, biogas and methanol. Risø is one 
of the leading developers of SOFCs, in collaboration with 
Topsoe Fuel Cell A/S.
The application areas for fuel cells fall into three main mar-
kets: stationary, transport, and portable. The stationary 
market ranges from small (≤1 - 5 kW) CHP units for single 
households to 100-1000 kW CHP units for district heat-
ing; and multi-MW units for power generation. Fuel cells 
may become important in the transportation sector in hy-
brid cars, buses, trucks and trains. The first commercial fuel 
cells are now appearing in portable applications and backup 
power systems. 
The main drivers in favour of fuel cells are:
t )JHIFMFDUSJDBMBOEUPUBMFďDJFODZFWFOJOTNBMMTJ[FT 
 allowing for application of cogeneration in small  
 buildings
t "CJMJUZUPVTFSFOFXBCMFMPDBMMZQSPEVDFEGVFMTBOE
 thus reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels
t 4JUJOHOFBSUIFQPJOUPGVTFFMJNJOBUFTPSDPOTJEFSBCMZ 
 reduces distribution losses for both heating and elec- 
 tricity
t *NQPSUBOUBTBOFOBCMFSGPSPUIFSSFOFXBCMFFOFSHZ 
 sources such as wind
t $BOCFVTFEUPIFMQUIFXPSMENFFUJUTJODSFBTJOHEF 
 mand for energy
t $SFBUFTFNQMPZNFOUPQQPSUVOJUJFTGPSTLJMMFE 
 labour and a basis for export of value added goods
By 2015 many developers foresee production capaci-
ties in the 100 MWe/y range, and forecasts for 2025 are 
in the GWe/y range. In the very long term, the world 
wide potential for fuel cells in power generation is more 
than 100 GWe/y. Fuel cells in the transportation sector 
will begin with their use as APUs in about 2020, followed by 
fuel cell hybrid vehicles in approximately 2025.
The high electrical efficiency and reduced transmission 
losses promised by fuel cells translate directly to lower CO2 
emissions. The amount of CO2 reduction depends on the 
scenario chosen, especially the fuels used, but the potential 
savings run into millions of tonnes of CO2 per year in Den-
mark alone.
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4.2.2 Hydrogen
Hydrogen is an energy carrier, not an energy source. Real-
izing hydrogen as an energy carrier depends on low-cost, 
high-efficiency methods for production, transport and stor-
age. Hydrogen can be produced by many technologies, based 
on fossil and sustainable fuels. Thermal and thermochemi-
cal processes use heat to release hydrogen and are the most 
mature technologies. Electrolytic processes use electricity to 
produce hydrogen. Here renewable sources such as wind can 
be considered. An electrolyser is based on the same prin-
ciples as a fuel cell, but the process is reversed, i.e. electricity 
is used. Electrolysis will likely play an important role in any 
future non-fossil energy scenario, not only in the hydrogen 
society. Current costs of electrolysers are high but declin-
ing. The degree of sustainability of the hydrogen production 
strongly depends on the feedstock used. Ultimately, hydro-
gen fuel could be produced in association with CCS leading 
to low-emission transport fuels. Photolytic processes offer a 
challenging, long-term potential for a sustainable hydrogen 
production and have to be further developed.                                  
In a world wide perspective, the United States has the most 
significant hydrogen and fuel cell programs. The manage-
ment of funds for development of hydrogen production and 
storage technologies is provided by the Department of En-
ergy (DoE). The DoE Office of Energy Efficiency and Renew-
able Energy has an actual funding for hydrogen R&D, which 
includes fuel cells on $US 194 million in 2007 and $US 211 
million in 2008. 
At the EU level, research funds for hydrogen and fuel cells 
have increased over the years in the Framework Programmes. 
The development of a hydrogen economy, with H2 produced 
from renewable energy sources, is a long-term objective of 
the European R&D agenda, and substantial funds have been 
allocated over the years to pave the way. A Joint Technology 
Initiative (JTI) for Fuel Cells and Hydrogen will be estab-
lished in order to establish a public-private partnership on 
the European level. The budget will be in the range of 80-100 
million Euro/year. 
A Strategic Research Agenda as well as a Deployment Strat-
egy were endorsed by the managing body of the European 
Technology Platform for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in 2004. 
An Implementation Panel was established in 2006 to take 
the strategy for research and demonstration of hydrogen and 
fuel cells technologies to the implementation stage by 2010-
2015. This will require an estimated investment of 7.4 billion 
Euro between 2007-2015. 
At the national level, the Danish Energy Authority, togeth-
er with other energy research funding agencies, published 
a strategy in 2005 [10]. The strategy estimates a total in-
vestment of 1.5-2.0 billion DKK over a 10-year period. In 
2006, the Danish partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells 
was established with the aim to promote the technological 
development. A first important step to realise this strat-
egy has been made by the proposed governmental RD&D 
programme for new energy technologies with an estimated 
public investment of 477 MDKK for the period 2007-2010. 
Most important, a national hydrogen technology platform 
with the participation of public authorities, research insti-
tutes and private companies develops research, development 
and demonstration projects in selected key hydrogen and 
fuel cell energy technologies.
The long-term vision of the hydrogen economy will take sev-
eral decades to be achieved. 
4.2.3 Carbon capture and storage
Carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) is a pro-
cess in which CO2 is separated from sources such as big boil-
ers, and held in long-term storage instead of being released 
to the atmosphere. CCS could be applied in large scale units 
in the power sector and in energy dense industry. Captured 
CO2 may be stored in geological reservoirs such as oil wells 
or aquifers, or on the ocean floor; or it may be chemically 
fixed, by converting it into solid substances known as inor-
ganic carbonates.
Capturing, transporting and storing CO2 carries an energy 
penalty: a plant with CCS will consume roughly 10– 40% 
more energy than a similar plant without CCS. The net re-
duction in CO2 emissions to the atmosphere therefore de-
pends upon the fraction of CO2 captured, the increased CO2 
production necessitated by the energy penalty, and any CO2 
leakage during transport and storage.
Capture is the most energy-intensive process in the whole 
CCS chain. CCS costs are projected to fall, however, with fur-
ther R&D and economies of scale as more plants are built.
The CCS and coal is an important combination, e.g. IGCC, 
as it is less expensive to extract CO2 upfront from the gasifi-
cation stage than from the flue gas as in the case of CCGT. 
US Future-gen initiative and the CO2 pumping in the Texas 
oil fields are interesting developments internationally.
For geological reservoirs the fraction of CO2 retained is very 
likely to exceed 99% over 100 years. 
Large-scale injection of CO2 into the ocean could make the 
seawater more acidic, with damage to local marine life.
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The European Community is active in CCS R&D through 
the Framework Programmes.
Energy systems of some large developing countries such as 
China, India and South Africa have strong coal dependence 
and therefore CCS could play a critical role in mitigating 
their GHG emissions while maintaining their coal depen-
dence in the future.
At the global level, several European countries are active in 
the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. At the moment 
these nations are Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, 
the Netherlands, the UK and the European Commission.
At the Danish coal-based power plant Esbjergværket the 
world’s largest post-combustion capture test facility has been 
in operation since March 2006.
CCS is a promising technology for greenhouse gas mitiga-
tion, so investing in CCS R&D could prove to be good for 
Danish industry in the short and medium term. There are 
opportunities to market CCS globally, including in large de-
veloping countries like China and India. Denmark’s strength 
in technologies such as very-high-efficiency coal combus-
tion for power generation, research on new adsorbents for 
CO2 capture, and pre-combustion CO2 capture through 
solid oxide fuel cells and oxygen membranes all have excel-
lent market potential, and should therefore be pursued. For 
developing countries, CCS adsorbents that can handle dirty 
flue gas containing SOX and NOX could also be an interesting 
research opportunity. Collaboration with large consumers of 
coal, such as the USA, China, India, Australia and South Af-
rica could provide good business opportunities, since a less 
expensive CCS could make an attractive GHG mitigation 
option.
4.2.4 Energy storage
The rationale behind storage of energy is: 
t 1PUFOUJBMFDPOPNJDBMTBWJOHT
t 4FDVSJUZPGTVQQMZPS
t ćFQPTTJCJMJUZGPSTUPSJOHSFOFXBCMFFOFSHZ
In Denmark there is a significant focus on the introduction of 
more wind power as well as maintaining the security of supply 
in spite of the fluctuating wind power. For this reason signifi-
cant efforts are done in order to develop an optimal storage 
system for electricity. Similar interests are observed in other 
EU countries and other parts of the world. 
Storage of energy should be divided into different applica-
tions: 
t 4UPSBHFGPSIFBUTVQQMZ
t 4UPSBHFGPSFMFDUSJDJUZTVQQMZ
For both applications several technologies exist for both 
large scale and small scale storage.
4.2.5 Heat storage
Within the energy system, storage of thermal energy for 
heating is used in industry for process heat, but significant 
energy savings may also be obtained by storing surplus heat 
as hot water, e.g.  for use in cleaning in place (CIP) systems. 
In combined heat and power and other district heating sys-
tems storage of heat in hot water tanks separates heat and 
power production and thus makes it possible to optimize 
operation strategies in both markets at maximum energy 
utilization.  The energy utilization of thermal energy stor-
age is generally close to unity, however the second law ef-
ficiency will be high only if small temperature differences 
are utilized.
Available technologies:
t 4UPSBHFPGTFOTJCMFIFBU	XBUFSUBOLHSBWFMTPJM

t 4UPSBHFPGMBUFOUIFBU	FOUIBMQZPGGVTJPOPSFWBQPSB 
 tion, e.g. by zeolithes or molten salts)
4.2.6 Electricity storage
Electricity storage involves several storage technologies 
which all require one or more conversions of energy from 
electricity to the storage and back to electricity. The energy 
form used in the storage may be potential energy, chemical 
energy, thermal energy, kinetic energy or electrical energy. 
Some of the available technologies are:
t 1VNQFEIZESPTUPSBHF
t $PNQSFTTFEBJSFMFDUSJDJUZTUPSBHF	$"&4

t #BUUFSJFT
t 'MPXCBUUFSJFT
t 'MZXIFFMT
t )ZESPHFOHFOFSBUJPOCZFMFDUSPMZTJTBOETVCTFRVFOU 
 electricity production
t 4VQFSDPOEVDUPST
Only a few of these actually are in operation for large scale 
electricity storage today: pumped hydro storage and CAES. 
Storage technologies may be seen as competitors to load con-
trol of production units and demand response by consumers. 
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4.2.7 Electricity storage in the energy system
The CAES plant in Huntorf, Germany, is equipped with a 60 
MW compressor unit, a 290 MW turbine unit and 300.000 
m3 cavern for storage of 500 MW compressor input power. 
It has had 30 years of operation as an integrated part of the 
FMFDUSJD TZTUFNPG/PSUIFSO(FSNBOZćFDPOTUSVDUJPOPG
the plant was decided to make it possible for a nuclear power 
station to operate at full load while the consumption fluc-
tuated. Due to less and less operation of the nuclear power 
stations the number of operating hours of the Huntorf plant 
was decreasing. However, over the last decade the number 
of operating hours has been increasing due to installation of 
more fluctuating production units, i.e., wind turbines. The 
example shows that a properly working electricity storage 
unit may be an important part of the electricity system. As 
fluctuating production units receive increasing focus and are 
installed to large extent globally there may exist significant 
potential for electricity storage in the future energy system. 
In order to install storage units we will have to accept :
t -PTTFTJOUIFFMFDUSJDJUZUPTUPSBHFUPFMFDUSJDJUZDZDMF
t "EEJUJPOPGJOWFTUNFOUTBOEPQFSBUJOHBOENBJOUFO 
 nance costs to the resulting electricity price
Further investigation of the CAES technology reveals all of 
these issues: CAES involves losses in the compression process 
as well as the turbine. Most losses occur due to intercooling 
of the compressor which is required as the underground salt 
caverns do not tolerate high temperature. As a consequence, 
the turbine expansion requires heating by natural gas com-
bustion to avoid extremely low temperatures during expan-
sion. Thus, we see that the material limits of the storage will 
result in significant requirements for design of the process 
and that these result in both high investments in equipment 
and storage and in operating costs for fuel.
Suggestions for improvement of the process show that stor-
age of energy at high temperature or increasing the number 
of compression steps may improve efficiency and lower the 
fuel consumption significantly. However, such improve-
ments will require research and development, e.g. within 
thermodynamics to optimize the process, within fluid me-
chanics to develop turbomachinery, within material science 
to develop high temperature storage systems. 
By this example it can be seen that even mature technol-
ogy needs scientific work at several levels. The same is the 
case for other technologies, which are less mature. Different 
technologies utilize electricity storage by conversion to other 
energy forms and thus require investigations within several 
fields of science in order to make a highly efficient electricity 
storage economically feasible. 
4.2.8 Energy efﬁciency by storage
The range of options shows that many different technolo-
gies may be involved and that many different systems may 
be proposed. It has been observed that each step of the full 
conversion from electricity to storage and back to electricity 
introduces a loss of electric potential (exergy). This means 
that any electricity storage will result in losses. It will thus 
introduce an extra cost of the output electricity from the 
storage compared to the production cost.
In addition to the efficiency of the storage, several other fac-
tors are of importance in the design of a large-scale electric 
storage, e.g. volume density, mass density, cost, geographi-
cal requirements, start up time and impacts on the overall 
energy system. One important observation is that storage of 
large amounts of energy requires a lot of space when the full 
storage cycle is taken into account. 
Many different fields of expertise and research will be in-
volved in developing an optimum system for storage of elec-
tricity. The current interest in it opens up many possibili-
ties for R&D and for interaction between different types of 
research, such as materials science, fluid mechanics, electric 
engineering, thermodynamics, geology, civil engineering 
and chemical engineering. 
4.2.9 Heat pumps
Heat pumps are in general a mature technology which is 
available for heating of residential buildings and industrial 
installations. In a heat pump the surroundings are cooled 
by a refrigerant. By addition of external energy resulting in 
an increase of pressure, the temperature of the refrigerant 
is increased. This makes it available as a heat source. The 
external energy may be delivered as mechanical power for 
driving a compressor (compression heat pump) or as high 
temperature heat, e.g. steam or waste heat, for driving an ab-
sorption system. The effectiveness of a heat pump is usually 
determined by the Coefficient of performance (COP) which 
measures the total energy available for heating compared to 
the input of driving energy. The COP values of heat pumps 
driven by mechanical compression and that by absorption 
are not comparable. 
4.2.10 Compression heat pumps
Most heat pumps are running by the compression cycle uti-
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lizing electricity to transfer the external heat source at low 
temperature to a temperature high enough for heating pur-
poses. These may be integrated with solar heating systems to 
raise the low temperature in the system as this will improve 
the COP. Mechanical heat pumps will improve the energy 
economy of electrical heating at the cost of installation of a 
heating system in the building. Compared to domestic boil-
ers based on oil or natural gas the primary energy efficiency 
is of the same order as heat pumps consume electricity that 
is usually produced at an efficiency of the order of 30-45% at 
a thermal power station. The heat pump converts electricity 
to heat by a COP factor of the order of 3-4. If electricity is 
produced by other sources more sophisticated comparisons 
are required.
4.2.11 Absorption heat pumps
Absorption heat pumps are used in the Copenhagen area 
in connection to the district heating system of the city. The 
plant uses geothermal energy as low temperature heat source 
and extraction steam from the Amagerværket power station 
as driving heat for the absorber.  Absorption systems usually 
require big investments and the availability of a high tem-
perature waste heat for driving. 
4.2.12 Research and development
A significant amount of research is done in order to improve 
both types of heat pumps. The research aims at improve-
ment of: 
t 0QFSBUJOHĘVJETOBUVSBMSFGSJHFSBOUTGPSNFDIBOJDBM 
 heat pumps, in particular CO2. For both types of heat  
 pump fluids for operation at higher temperature in  
 district heating are of interest
t $ZDMFJNQSPWFNFOUPGCPUIUZQFTPGDZDMFT
t *OUFHSBUJPOXJUIPUIFSTZTUFNTTVDIBTTPMBSIFBUJOHPS 
 biomass
t *OUFHSBUJPOJODPNCJOFEIFBUBOEQPXFSTZTUFN
Integration in electric systems with large shares of wind 
power and CHP is an interesting application of heat pumps 
as it opens the opportunity for additional utilization of fluc-
tuating electricity production. This may be used for driving 
heat pumps and can thus make it possible to have renew-
able energy in the district heating system. Several Danish 
companies have investigated this possibility and developed 
technical solutions for it. The research is aimed at selection 
of operating fluids and development of compressors for high 
temperature applications as well as improvement of system 
COP.  The COP that can be obtained will be relatively low 
due to the requirement of a large temperature difference be-
tween low temperature heat source and the high tempera-
ture forward in the district heating system.
4.3 Energy savings and efﬁciency  
 improvements
4.3.1 End use energy efﬁciency improvements
i/FHBKPVMFTw	FOFSHZDPOTVNQUJPOBWPJEFEUISPVHITBWJOHT

have become the single most important “energy resource” in 
the EU.  Even though energy efficiency has improved con-
siderably during the last decades, it is technically and eco-
nomically feasible to save even more energy. This potential 
plays a prominent role in the European Energy Action Plan 
adopted in March 2007 by the European Council [11]. As 
part of this plan, the EU leaders set the objective of saving 
20% of the EU’s energy consumption compared to current 
projections for 2020.
Realising this potential, which is equivalent to some 390 
Mtoe in the year 2020, will yield large energy and environ-
mental benefits. CO2 emissions should be reduced by 780 
million tCO2 for the single year 2020 with respect to the 
baseline scenario – more than twice the EU reduction re-
quired under the Kyoto Protocol for the whole 5-year period 
2008-2012. Additional investment in more efficient and in-
novative technologies will be more than compensated by an-
nual savings exceeding €100 billion by 2020. 
The further down the chain efficiency is improved, the 
greater the impact on primary energy consumption and 
emissions. As an example based on data from 2002 averaged 
across the EU, 1 kWh of electricity at the point of use re-
quires 2.2 kWh of energy from primary fuel to be converted 
in a power plant accompanied by the emission of about 314 
g of CO2. Including the energy used upstream of the power 
plant – to extract, process and transport the primary fuel – 
multiplies the primary energy consumption and CO2 emis-
sions by a further factor of 1.08, so every kWh saved at the 
point of use means a saving of around 2.4 kWh in primary 
energy and 340 g of CO2.
Energy conversion losses account for 33% of the primary en-
ergy consumption in the EU. These losses can be cut signifi-
cantly by introducing combined heat and power (CHP) gen-
eration. To date, only around 13% of all electricity in the EU 
is generated using this technology, and it is recommended to 
increase this fraction to approach the Danish figure of 50% 
electricity production by CHP, always under the precondi-
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tion that the thermal waste energy from the cogeneration 
process is used adequately for heat applications. 
According to the  IEA approximately one-third of end-use 
energy consumption in IEA member countries occurs in 
residential, commercial and public buildings. Uses include 
heating, cooling, lighting, appliances, and general services. 
Buildings are therefore a major demand on energy resources 
and the emissions associated with supplying and consum-
ing this energy make up an important component of total 
emissions. Using an accounting system that attributes CO2 
emissions to electricity supply rather than building end-
uses, the direct energy-related carbon dioxide emissions of 
the building sector are about 3 Gt/yr. Savings in residential 
and commercial buildings, transport and manufacturing 
have energy saving potentials of 25-30%. Buildings account 
for about 40% of the total final energy consumption in the 
EU. Most of the energy used in buildings takes the form of 
low-temperature heating for rooms and domestic hot water. 
Electricity, which is a high-grade form of energy, is also used 
in large quantities for building services such as lighting, air 
conditioning and ventilation, as well as for the electrical 
equipment used in homes, shops and offices. 
The largest savings potential in end-use energy is in build-
ings, in particular retrofitting of old buildings. It is highly 
recommended that the principles of the European Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) are followed ev-
erywhere for both new and existing buildings. By doing so 
in all EU countries, it is estimated that 28% energy savings 
in this sector can be achieved by the year 2020 correspond-
ing to a reduction of the total EU final energy consumption 
by 11%.
Electricity is a “high-quality” (high-exergy) form of energy 
that should preferably be used for applications such as light-
ing, electronic equipment and motorised appliances, for 
which other forms of energy cannot be used. Electricity for 
space heating makes sense in the case of low energy houses, 
where the thermal time constants of conventional hydraulic 
systems lead to overheating of rooms, or by using very ef-
ficient heating technology such as heat pumps. 
Energy sources suitable for heating buildings include solar 
thermal systems, heat pumps, waste incinerators and CHP 
systems. District heating systems, in which heat produced in 
one place is used elsewhere, can improve energy efficiency 
through economies of scale and by providing heat storage to 
smooth out variations in heat supply and demand. Individ-
ual heat pumps and solar heating systems can supply heat to 
buildings in the countryside and other areas where district 
heating is not available. Individual solar photovoltaic (PV) 
systems and wind turbines can also provide electricity, mak-
ing buildings entirely sustainable and self-sufficient, though 
using wind power to run heat pumps can be problematic on 
calm winter days.
There are important niches for Danish R&D in monitoring 
and reducing the electricity consumption of private house-
holds. Examples are methods of visualising the standby 
power consumption of equipment, energy-efficient lighting 
technology such as LEDs, energy-efficient hot water circu-
lation pumps for one-family houses, and integrated heat-
ing systems – heat pumps, solar cells and ventilation – for 
houses and holiday homes. The EU commission prepares a 
plan for progressive phasing out incandescent bulbs starting 
in 2009.
4.3.2 Energy efﬁciency in transport
Special attention should be paid to transport. World energy 
demand for transport has increased significantly for many 
years. This trend is projected to continue in the years to 
come, one reason being that large and rapidly developing 
economies have increasing demand for the transport of both 
goods and people, including rising transport demand due to 
greater integration of developing countries in international 
trade.
Transport not only accounts for approximately 20% of the 
total world energy consumption, but is almost entirely based 
on fossil energy resources and thus is a major contributor to 
the CO2 emissions.  This has put huge political emphasis on 
sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels for transport; the trend 
in European transport policy is to encourage reduction of 
fossil fuel use.
The car industry continues to improve the fuel efficiency of 
conventional vehicles by reducing weight. In the power train 
this is done by replacing cast iron with lighter alloys based 
on magnesium and especially aluminium, while bodywork 
and structural elements are lightened by using polymers and 
composites instead of steel. These efforts are strongly sup-
ported by the EU, and in principle they will cut CO2 emis-
sions.
The internal combustion engine in a hybrid car is small 
compared to that in an ordinary car, because at times of 
peak power demand it is backed up by the electric motor. 
In addition, energy use is controlled more carefully than in 
a conventional vehicle, and energy released during braking 
is used to charge the battery so that it can be re-used during 
acceleration. Taken together, these techniques result in fuel 
consumption much lower than in today’s standard cars.
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Table 4 
Energy technologies, future challenges and possibilities
Notes:  ¹ : Figures form Risø Energy Report 6 [1] and WEO 2006 [8] (or later if available)
              ² : Figures from IPCC WG III AR4 (2007) [9]
              ³ : Figures from IPCC WG III AR4 (2007) [9]
 Technological 
status
Mature
1G:  Mature
2G:  Market pene-
        trating phase    
3G:  Research phase
Mature
1G bioethanol: Mature    
2G bioethanol:  
Demonstration phase      
GTL-technology: 
Mature in niche areas
Mature   
(large potential for 
optimization)
Coal: Mature
Mature
Research phase
Mature
Hydro power: Mature    
Wave, current and tidal: 
Demonstration phase
SOFC: Market entering 
phase in niche markets  
PEMFC: Commercial in 
niche markets
Research phase;
Demonstration phase in 
some projects
Research and 
demonstration phase
Pumped hydro and CAES: 
Mature 
Other: Research, develop- 
ment or demonstration
Mature for domestic 
applications
Research phase for district 
heating integration
Mature
Major challenge
Integration of high 
shares in the grid
Cost reduction and increased lifetime 
for 2nd and 3rd generation solar cells. 
Advanced manufacturing techniques
Connection of solar thermal to district 
heating network
2G: reduce energy demand, operating 
costs and capital costs in integrated 
biorefinery demonstrations
To obtain high power efficiency and fast 
load adaption
Shift toward low- and zero-carbon 
sources, capture and store the
CO² emissions
Uprating and life extension
Make ITER a success
Exploitation of the resources at greater 
depths
Hydro: None     
Wave, current and tidal: 
Reliability and cost
SOFC: Lower working temperature
Sustainable production of hydrogen
Reduce the “energy penalty” with around 
25%
Costs
Investments
Reverse consumer behavior
Major barrier
Insufficient international 
standards
Lack of feed-in tariff 
and other incentives 
(except for Germany)
Bioethanol: Disparity 
in custom duties and, 
tax exemptions;  
GTL-technology: Motors 
and distribution systems
Insufficient knowledge of 
the real potential
Coal: Price stability and 
abundance
Costs, safety, waste  
management, and 
proliferation risks
immense investments 
in R&D are needed
Build the necessary 
infrastructure
Hydro: resources and 
planning
Ocean, wave and tidal: 
regulatory barriers
SOFC: Lack of testing and 
demonstration
Storing and infrastructure
Full scale demonstration of 
the technology
Lack of efficient dynamic 
standards, reliable label-
ling, white certificates 
and behavioural research
Technology
Wind
Photovol-
taics
Solar 
thermal
Biomass 
based fuels 
for transport
Thermal fuel 
conversion 
technologies 
- biomass
Thermal fuel 
conversion 
technologies
Nuclear 
energy
Fusion 
energy
Geothermal 
energy
Hydro, ocean, 
wave and 
tidal
Fuel cells
Hydrogen
CCS
Storing 
technologies
Heat pumps
End use ener-
gy efficiency 
improve-
ments
 Annual 
average 
growth ¹
17.1%
40%
17 – 20%
6.3%
Coal: 1.8%
Gas:  2.3%
Oil: 1.3%
0.7%
20%
2%
Cost per ton 
CO² reduction, 
USD/tCO²-eq ² 
< 0 - 50
50 – > 100
< 0 – 100
< 0 – 20
Not available
< 0 to 50
Hydro:  < 0 to 50     
Wave etc: 
Not available
Not available
Not available
CCS + coal: 20 – 50
CCS + gas: 20 – 100
> 0 - 20 6
 Commercial 
contribution 
Exists
2016
Exists
1G: Exists
2G: 2010
Exists
Coal: Exists
Exists
2045
Exists
Hydro: Exists       
Wave, current 
and tidal: 2020
SOFC: 2010    
PEMFC: Exists
2030
2015
Exists
Exists
Exists
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Notes:  4 : Figures from WEO 2006 [8] and Risø Energy Report 6 [1]
              5 : Figures from WEO 2006 [8] and Risø Energy Report 6 [1]
              6 : IPCC WG III AR4, p 389 [9]
Needed research 
and development
Improved performance and reliabil-
ity through advanced rotor technol-
ogies and power train enhancements 
and generic long-term research
Efficiency improvement and prolonged 
lifetime for polymer and nanomaterial 
solar cells
Bioethanol: Pretreatment, 
C5 fermentation integration    
GTL: Integration of the GTL technology 
with power production
large biomass fuel share on power plant 
boilers, increased electrical efficiency of 
waste combustion plants, development 
of mature and flexible pressurized 
gasification technologies, development 
of reliable biomass pyrolysis reactors
Economic acceptable high efficiency 
combustion technologies, clean 
utilization  technologies and CCS
Development of Generation III+ and 
Generation IV fast neutron reactors with 
efficient closed fuel cycle
Understanding and control of the plasma
Further development of the hot dry rock 
technology
Hydro: None       
Wave etc: Large demonstration projects.
Computational modelling and evaluation 
of innovative concepts
SOFC: Lower working temperature, lower 
production costs and stacking
Development of cost effective storage 
and sustainable production technologies
Development of systems with lower 
costs of  CO² capture
Improvement of efficiency of existing 
technology and development other types 
for high efficiency
High temperature systems for CHP 
integration and for absorption systems in 
waste heat recovery
Consumer behavior 
Danish 
strengths
World leading 
in research, 
development and 
production
World leading in polymer 
solar cell research
Bioethanol: Efficient 
enzyme systems, 
pretreatment processes 
for 2G
Biomass combustion 
research conducted 
in collaboration between 
industry 
and universities
None
Modeling of turbulence 
and transport in plasmas
Utilization of the results 
from the demonstration 
plant at Amagerværket
Hydro: None      
Wave: Promising demon-
stration projects, e.g. 
Wave Dragon and 
Wave Star
SOFC: Among the world 
leaders and close 
cooperation with industry, 
e.g. Topsoe Fuel Cell A/S
SOEC electrolysis cells;
Demonstration projects
Research in  capture and
pre-combustion capture; 
Experience from the de-
monstration plant in Esbjerg
Possible integration with 
wind power
Extensive CHP system
Low energy buildings;
Passive houses;
LED lighting
Possible 
adverse effects
Visual intrusion and envir-
onmental considerations 
for land based turbines
Disposal of worn out turbines
Harmful production 
materials, disposal 
measures and land use 
in some areas
Consequences of using the 
land to produce fuel rather 
than food. Consequences of 
competing uses of land.
Consequences of using the 
land to produce fuel rather 
than food.
Consequences of competing 
uses of land.
Emissions of CO², NOx and 
SOx
Waste management, disposal 
and proliferation
Worn-out reactors will be 
radioactive for 50 – 100 
years, but there is no 
long-lived radioactive waste
Risk of CO² releases from the 
underground during the heat 
extraction
Hydro: Environment, 
resettlement, lack of sites
Ocean, wave and tidal: 
Environmental sensitivities
Disposal of worn out fuel cells
Atmospheric and environ-
mental risks and safety
Leakage of captured CO² to 
the atmosphere;
Sudden release could be 
dangerous to the health
Geographical and geological 
requirements
Mitigation 
potential 
GtCO2/yr ³ 
3.1
0.25
1.22
1.88
Not available
0.43
Hydro: 0.87
Wave etc: 
Not available
Not available
Not available
CSS + coal: 0.49
CSS + gas: 0.22
5.0
Total share of 
global energy mix 
2007 4
3.3% of electricity
0.1% of total supply
1% of transport fuel
Coal: 25%
Gas: 25% of electricity
Oil: 37%
16% of electricity
0
0.4% of total supply
Hydro: 16% of 
electricity     
Wave, current and 
tidal: 0
Potential total share 
of global energy mix 
2030 5
29.1% of electricity
1 – 2% of electricity
10% of transport fuel
25%
Coal: 25%
Gas: 31% of electricity
10% of electricity
2% of total energy mix
Hydro: 16% of electricity     
Wave: 10% of electricity 
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lulis and Peter Meibom, Risø DTU; Jacob Østergaard, DTU 
Electrical Engineering; Hannele Holttinen, VTT, Finland
An energy system with large-scale integration of renewable 
energy, particularly wind power, is expected to meet the 
same requirements for security of supply and economic effi-
ciency as the energy systems of today, while delivering better 
environmental performance, especially with regard to CO2 
emissions and dependence on fossil fuels.
Wind power affects power systems at different scales of time 
and geography (Figure 6), starting with local issues of grid 
connection (power quality), and going all the way up to sys-
tem-wide effects (reliability and adequacy).
Large proportions of wind power and other fluctuating re-
newable generation technologies introduce uncertainty into 
the power system. In such cases the system’s flexibility in 
generation, demand management and intra-area transmis-
sion may therefore need to be increased. The layout and 
basic structure of the grid, as well as operational practices, 
need to adapt to the presence of large amounts of fluctuating 
supply.
There are four main areas of interest: renewable energy pow-
er plant capabilities; grid planning and operation; energy 
and power management; and energy markets. Each of these 
is important for the large-scale integration of wind power 
at a system level. This chapter describes the system aspects 
involved in using wind power at high levels of penetration. 
5.1 Renewable energy power plant  
 capabilities
5.1.1 Power control
To obtain the maximum benefit from a power system as a 
whole, large-scale renewable energy should replace energy 
from conventional thermal power plants; this way both con-
sumption of fossil fuels and the resulting emissions can be 
reduced.
Some of today’s large wind farms already have some of the 
main characteristics of conventional power plants. One of 
these is the ability to control the amount and quality of the 
power produced. Modern wind turbine technologies make 
it possible to control both active and reactive power, though 
the power a wind plant can produce at a given time is obvi-
ously limited by the strength of the wind.
Since the wind itself costs nothing, reducing the power pro-
duced by a wind farm below the maximum power available 
in the wind at that time reduces operating costs by only a 
very small amount. Still, such reduced production can be 
required in critical system situations when other control 
reserves are scarce, and it can be a low-cost option during 
periods where the market price of electricity is low or zero.
In Denmark, low to zero electricity prices sometimes occur 
during cold and windy periods. At such times, combined heat 
and power (CHP) plants need to increase production of heat for 
buildings, leading to the generation of large amounts of CHP 
electricity when the output from wind turbines is also high.
5.1.2 Fault ride-through
The behaviour under grid fault conditions (fault ride-
through capability) of renewable energy generation is a key 
issue in the large-scale use of renewables in a power system. 
This is reflected in the grid codes – the rules that govern the 
behaviour of generating equipment, including grid-connect-
ed wind turbines – now used by every country planning to 
develop large-scale wind power.
The purpose of fault ride-through is to ensure that the renew-
able generation is able to stay connected to the grid during 
and after a grid fault. Today, most wind turbine manufactur-
ers provide wind turbines with fault ride-through capabili-
ties. If the turbines are not able to stay connected during and 
after the fault, the consequence is a sudden loss of generation 
which must be replaced by fast reserves from other genera-
tors to prevent loss of load. Fault ride-through is not unique 
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Effects of wind power on power systems at different scales of time 
and geography [1]
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to renewable generators; similar capabilities are required of 
conventional generators to ensure that the system will con-
tinue to operate if one generating unit fails.
5.1.3 Black start and isolated operation
Another fault mode arises when part of the grid becomes 
isolated from the main synchronous system. If the isolated 
area is able to control its own frequency and voltage, a black-
out can be avoided and the reliability of the power system 
improves. If the part of the system that is isolated is domi-
nated by renewable and decentralised generation, then the 
contribution of these generators to the control of frequency 
and voltage can be the key to avoiding substantial load shed-
ding or even a blackout.
If a blackout cannot be avoided, it is important to re-start the 
system as soon as possible afterwards. This “black start” pro-
cess can be supported by renewable and distributed genera-
tion, provided that these generators support frequency and 
voltage control. In cases like these, the control dynamics of 
the power system can be very important. Risø DTU has run 
a number of simulations of wind farm models connected to 
simplified grid models, to test the ability of wind farm power 
controllers to provide the necessary grid support [2].
5.1.4 Reliability
The reliability of wind power is an issue in normal opera-
tion as well as under fault conditions. Wind farm owners 
measure reliability in terms of their ability to sell power. In 
this case, a simple measure of reliability is the ratio of actual 
production to the energy available according to wind speed 
data and turbine power curves, taking into account failures 
in wind turbines and the grid itself.
From the point of view of the system operator, reliability is main-
ly about the risk that all or some of the predicted wind power will 
not be produced. Factors affecting this measure of reliability are:
t 1PXFSGPSFDBTUJOHFSSPSTDBVTFECZFSSPSTJOXJOETQFFE 
 forecasts; these generally cannot be avoided, but can  
 probably be reduced
t *GUIFXJOETQFFESJTFTUPUIFiDVUPVUwTQFFEPGUIF 
 turbines, production of individual turbine drops sud- 
 denly from rated power to zero
t 'BJMVSFTJOUIFUSBOTNJTTJPOMJOFMJOLJOHUIFXJOEGBSN 
 to the transmission system
t 'BJMVSFTJOUIFQPXFSDPMMFDUJPOHSJEXJUIJOUIFXJOE 
 farm
t 'BJMVSFTPGXJOEUVSCJOFT
 
At the power system level, reliability is about the total per-
formance of all the wind farms in the system, not about fail-
ures of individual turbines or wind farms.
Another reliability issue is whether the power system can 
handle peak loads. With large-scale renewable generation in 
the system, many thermal power plants will have to operate 
at reduced load factors. This may reduce investment in new 
thermal power plants, which in turn might lead to problems 
with system adequacy at peak loads when the amount of re-
newable generation is low.
A major research challenge is to build reliability models that 
combine general reliability factors, such as grid failures, with 
factors specific to wind power, such as wind forecast errors 
and cut-outs at high wind speeds.
5.2 Grid planning and development
One of the biggest challenges to the reliable integration of 
large amounts of wind energy in power systems is power 
transmission. Areas with good wind potential are often lo-
cated far from load centres. To manage variable energy pro-
duction on a large geographic scale, the grid infrastructure 
and interconnections should be extended and reinforced. 
As the first phase of the European Wind Integration Study 
(EWIS) 1 concluded, without grid reinforcement Europe will 
not be able to reach its targets for renewable energy [3].
Large-scale integration of renewable energy requires a pan-
European transmission network for effective cross-border 
power trading and mutual support for security and quality 
of supply. There is a need for advanced simulation and anal-
ysis tools, combined with dynamic calculations for the inter-
connected European power system. Planning tools should 
be developed for the design of efficient grids.
Risø DTU is taking part in several projects aiming to develop 
software tools and use them for grid integration studies. One 
of these is TradeWind [4], an EU-funded project which aims 
to provide technical and economic justification for strategic 
decision-making on the development of the EU’s grid and 
generation infrastructure [4].
1 An initiative established by the TSO associations of the European transmission system operators (such as UCTE and ETSO) in collaboration with 
the European Commission.
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In addition to grid planning and development, better and 
more reliable use of the existing grid is required. At the 
distribution level, new system architectures and operating 
modes – notably demand response – are being investigated.
5.3 Energy and power management
In any power system, the instantaneous power production 
must be maintained in perfect balance with power consump-
tion at all times. Transmission system operators (TSOs) use 
different types of reserves to maintain this power balance. 
ćF/PSEFMNBSLFUBSFBDPNQSJTFTUIF"$DPOOFDUFETZO-
DISPOPVT/PSEJDTZTUFN	/PSXBZ4XFEFO'JOMBOEBOE&BTU
Denmark) and West Denmark, which is connected to the 
TZODISPOPVT/PSEJDTZTUFNWJBIJHIWPMUBHFEJSFDUDVSSFOU
(HVDC) links.
Reserves are activated whenever planned production and 
expected consumption deviate from actual production and 
consumption. The system operates as a cascade. As soon 
as there is a power imbalance, the frequency changes and 
the primary reserve reacts automatically and very rapidly 
to counteract this. The technology is known as Automatic 
Generation Control (AGC).
/FYU UIF TFDPOEBSZ SFTFSWF JT BDUJWBUFE NBOVBMMZ CZ UIF
TSOs, taking the cheapest bids first from the common bal-
BODJOHNBSLFUPG/PSEFM540T"DUJWBUJPOPGUIFTFDPOEBSZ
reserve relieves the primary reserve, which it is then free to 
handle new deviations.
Deviations between power production and consumption 
have three main causes: errors in forecasting consump-
tion, fluctuating production, and outages of power plants 
PSUSBOTNJTTJPOMJOFT*OUIF/PSEJDTZTUFNQSPEVDFSTBOE
DPOTVNFST TFMM BOECVZFMFDUSJDJUZPO UIFEBZBIFBE/PSE
Pool market: obligations to produce or consume power are 
fixed 12–36 hours before the power is actually delivered or 
consumed. Wind power producers base their day-ahead 
sales on wind forecasts for the corresponding period, and 
these are less reliable than the forecasts of electricity con-
sumption relied on by buyers. As the amount of wind power 
in the system increases, power balance predictions therefore 
become dominated by the error in predicting wind power 
production.
The necessary allocations of both primary and secondary re-
TFSWFTBSFEFUFSNJOFECZUIF/DSJUFSJPOoUIFBNPVOU
 of reserve needed to cover the loss of the largest generating 
VOJU JO UIFXIPMF/PSEFM TZTUFN	GPSQSJNBSZSFTFSWFT
PS
the region covered by each TSO (for secondary reserves). In 
addition, a normal operational primary reserve is held in the 
/PSEFMBSFBBOECJET GSPNUIFDPNNPOCBMBODJOHNBSLFU
are used as secondary reserve.
As the amount of wind power increases, the wind power 
forecast error starts to increase the required amount of re-
serves, especially secondary reserves.
There are several ways to add the necessary extra control 
capacity to the system. One interesting possibility is the ad-
dition of electrically-driven heat pumps to Danish district 
heating systems. This could provide price-flexible power 
management, with the heat pumps consuming power when-
ever it is cheap, and shutting down temporarily when reserve 
power is needed. Other forms of flexible power consumption 
such as plug-in hybrid vehicles might also become attractive 
within the next ten years.
Power control of wind turbines is a less obvious way to cor-
rect imbalance between supply and demand, because, unlike 
with a conventional generating plant, down-regulated wind 
power is lost forever. However, the Danish grid codes re-
quire large wind farms and new large wind turbines to have 
active power control. The two largest wind farms in Den-
NBSL)PSOT3FW 	.8
BOE/ZTUFE 	.8
CPUI
have controllers that support active power control. The wind 
farm controllers are used by the TSOs to maintain stability 
in critical situations, while power producers who own both 
wind farms and conventional power plants take advantage of 
the rapid controllability of wind power to balance the much 
more sluggish response of conventional plants.
5.4 Energy markets
Power is traditionally traded in a series of forward markets 
(day-ahead markets or bilateral contracts), so the amount of 
power to be produced and consumed within any given hour 
needs to be determined beforehand. In the case of Denmark, 
GPS JOTUBODF UIF /PSEJD QPXFS QPPMT EBZBIFBE NBSLFU
	/PSE1PPM4QPU
PQFSBUFTIPVSTJOBEWBODF
A higher proportion of power that is only partly predict-
able, such as wind power, creates more deviations between 
the production planned in the markets and the actual power 
produced during the hour in question. Making up any short-
fall requires calling on short-term regulating power, which is 
more expensive than power bought in the day-ahead market.
The extra costs of using regulating power are paid either by 
the producers or by the consumers, according to specific “im-
balance settlement” rules set by the market. Whoever pays, 
it is important to ensure that the amount accurately reflects 
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the cost of keeping the system in balance. A wind power pro-
ducer, for instance, should not have to pay more than the 
actual costs incurred by wind power prediction errors [5]. 
Risø coordinated WILMAR, an EU-funded research project 
that developed a planning tool for analysing the operational 
consequences of wind power prediction errors (www.wil-
mar.risoe.dk). The WILMAR planning tool has been used 
for wind integration studies in Ireland, and is presently used 
in phase two of the EWIS study mentioned above.
The shorter the timescale at which the power market can 
function, the more accurate the wind power forecasts will 
be. It will therefore become increasingly important to create 
intra-day markets that can trade closer to the actual deliv-
ery. A requirement for well-functioning intra-day markets 
should be for all power producers to make their regulating 
capabilities available for the intra-day as well as for the regu-
lating power markets. The use of flexible power consump-
tion (demand management) in the regulating power market 
can decrease regulation costs, so the development of market-
based solutions to allow this should be continued.
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6Regional developments in energy 
systems, economics and climate
6.1 OECD countries
Poul Erik Morthorst, Risø DTU; Dolf Gielen, IEA, Paris
The countries of the OECD2 strongly influence the develop-
ment of energy demand and new energy supply opportuni-
ties. OECD members are generally characterised as well-de-
veloped, industrialised countries, the only exceptions being 
Mexico and Turkey. In the development of new renewable 
technologies such as photovoltaics, wind power and biofu-
els, the OECD countries are amongst the fastest, as shown by 
FYBNQMFTTVDIBTXJOEQPXFSJOUIF&6BOE/PSUI"NFSJDB
and photovoltaics in Germany, the USA and Japan. This sec-
tion outlines current trends in the development of energy 
demand and supply in the OECD countries, including the 
main economic and demographic drivers and policy initia-
tives.
6.1.1 Economic and demographic development
Among the drivers for energy development, two of the most 
basic are economic growth and population growth. By 2004 
the total population of the OECD nations was close to 1,200 
million, or approximately 19% of the global population. For 
comparison, India and China have around 16% and 20%, re-
spectively, of the world’s population. The population of the 
OECD countries has grown only modestly for many years, 
however, while over the last 25 years India and China have 
seen average annual population growth of 1.5% and 1.2% re-
spectively (Table 5).
By 2005 the OECD’s share of global gross domestic product 
(GDP) was 77%, while India and China had approximately 
5% and 2%, respectively3. Thus, although the populations of 
these three blocs are very similar, there is still a big differ-
ence in the value of the products they manufacture, with the 
OECD having almost 15 times the GDP of China.
As with population growth, however, economic growth in 
the OECD countries has been moderate: around 2.8% an-
nually on average from 1980 to 2004. In comparison, annual 
growth in India and China has been much faster, averaging 
almost 6% for India and almost 10% for China in the same 
period. Moreover, the growth rates of the mature industria-
lised OECD countries are declining, while India and China 
– if we discount a few ups and downs of the world trade cycle 
– have maintained their high average growth rates for more 
than 20 years. Table 1 shows the growth in population and 
GDP for selected economic groupings and countries.
Figure 7 shows GDP (2007) per capita for selected countries 
and regions. The chart clearly shows the difference in eco-
nomic terms between the industrialised western countries 
and the developing countries such as India and China, per-
capita GDP for the USA being 20 times than of China and 45 
times that of India. These gaps are narrowing rapidly, how-
ever: in 2000 the USA had 33 times the per-capita GDP of 
China, so a corresponding figure of 20 in 2007 represents a 
catching-up by nearly 40% in seven years.
6.1.2 Energy development
In 2005, total primary energy demand in the OECD coun-
tries was 5,542 Mtoe, or almost 49% of the global energy 
demand. The USA was the world’s main energy consumer, 
accounting for 20% of total demand; China’s share was 15%, 
Table 5 
Growth rates of population and GDP for selected economic groupings and countries
OECD
  USA
  EU  
  Japan
Transition economies
Developing countries
  China
  India
  Brazil
World
 Population growth % /y
1980–1990
0.8
0.9
0.3
0.6
 0.6
2.1
1.5
2.1
2.1
1.7
1990–2004
0.8
1.2
0.3
0.2
–0.2
1.7
1.0
1.7
1.5
1.4
 Economic growth % /y
1980–1990
3.0
3.2
2.4
3.9
 –0.5
3.9
9.1
6.0
1.5
2.9
1990–2004
2.5
3.0
2.1
1.3
–0.8
5.7
10.1
5.7
2.6
3.4
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD region comprises the EU member states, the USA, Canada, Japan, Aus-
USBMJB/FX;FBMBOE4PVUI,PSFB*DFMBOE/PSXBZ5VSLFZBOE.FYJDP
3 Calculated in constant USD at the 1995 exchange rate.
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and India’s just 5%. The OECD share of the world’s energy 
use has gradually declined from 52% in 1990 to 49% in 2005. 
In the same period China has increased its share from 10% 
to 15%.
By 2005 primary energy demand in the OECD region was 
dominated by the USA and the EU, with 41% and 33%, re-
spectively, of the OECD total (Figure 8). Third was Japan, 
with approximately 10%. Over the last 15 years OECD's pri-
mary energy demand has grown at an average annual rate of 
1.4%, but with a tendency towards slower growth in recent 
years. Thus the growth of primary energy demand in the 
OECD is fairly slow compared to China (4.7% in the same 
period) and India (3.5%).
Oil is still the dominant fuel, accounting for 40% of OECD 
primary energy, followed by gas (22%) and coal (20%). Re-
newable sources, including hydro, biomass and waste, cov-
ered approximately 7% of OECD total primary energy de-
mand by 2005.
In 1990, for comparison, the relative contributions of oil and 
coal were higher (41% and 24% respectively), while that of 
natural gas was lower (19%). However, although the propor-
tion of oil fell between 1990 and 2005, total oil consumption 
rose by 1.2% /y in the same period. Consumption of coal 
increased modestly, by 0.4% annually, while consumption of 
natural gas increased by 2.4% annually.
Total final energy consumption in the OECD can be split into 
three sectors of almost equal size: industry (30%); transport 
(34%); residential, services and agriculture (33%)4. Industrial 
use of energy has grown only moderately in the last 15 years 
(0.8% /y), Residential, services and agriculture has grown by 
1.4% /y, and transport has grown the most significantly, by 
1.8% /y. Energy use for power generation and heating plants 
has increased by 1.7% /y, and now accounts for almost 40% 
of primary energy demand in OECD countries.
Mainly because of its rapidly growing transport sector and 
shrinking domestic supplies of oil and gas, the OECD as a 
whole is becoming increasingly dependent on imported fos-
sil fuels. Oil production in OECD countries peaked at the 
beginning of the current decade and is now gradually fall-
JOHFTQFDJBMMZJO&VSPQFCVUUPBMFTTFSFYUFOUBMTPJO/PSUI
America. Figure 9 shows OECD dependence on imported 
oil and gas. The decline in domestic oil production implies 
that by 2005 the OECD was importing 57% of its oil needs, 
and this figure is expected to increase in the future. OECD 
Figure 8 
Primary energy demand in the OECD by country and fuel type, 2005
USA 41%
Coal 20%
Rest OECD 16%
Other renewables 1%
Gas 22%
EU 33%
Nuclear 11%
Japan 10%
Oil 40%
Hydro 2%
Biomass and waste 4%
4  The remainder is for non-energy use.
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
OECD1000 US$
/capita
United
States
EU
(15)
China India
Figure 7
GDP (USD) per capita for selected countries and regions, 2007
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gas imports are relatively lower, at 23% of consumption, but 
are also expected to rise.
Fossil fuels thus still heavily dominate the OECD’s energy 
supply, and this is clearly reflected in emissions of CO2. By 
2005, CO2 emissions from OECD countries totalled 12,838 
Mt, or 48% of the world total. The main OECD contributor 
is the USA, whose CO2 emissions account for 22% of the 
world total, followed by the EU (15%) and Japan (5%)5. In 
comparison China in 2005 emitted 19% of global CO2 emis-
sions, and India a little more than 4%. Thus China and the 
USA now have almost the same energy consumption and 
CO2 emissions, although the USA has a GDP more than five 
times that of China6.
In the last 15 years CO2 emissions from the OECD as a whole 
have increased by 1% annually. In the USA emissions have 
grown faster, at 1.2%, while for Japan the figure is 0.9%, and 
in the EU CO2 emissions have been declining by 0.2% annu-
ally. Both China and India doubled their CO2 emissions from 
1990 to 2005, corresponding to annual growth of approxi-
mately 5%. Figure 10 shows the increase in CO2 emissions by 
country and economic grouping for the period 1990-2004. 
The influence of China and the USA is overwhelming: China 
by itself accounted for 44% and the USA for 17% of the total 
rise in CO2 emissions during this period.
Despite efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions, the situ-
ation is getting worse. From 1990 to 2000, the average an-
nual global increase in emissions was 1.1%. Between 2000 
and 2005, though, growth accelerated to 2.9% per year, de-
spite the increased focus on climate change. High economic 
growth, notably in coal-based economies, and higher oil and 
gas prices (which have led to an increase in coal-fired power 
generation) are the main reasons for the increase. Emissions 
from coal use increased by 1% per year between 1990 and 
2000, but by 4.4% per year between 2000 and 2005.
6.1.3 Trends in renewable energy
On the world scale, renewable energy is still dominated by 
the “old” renewables, hydropower and traditional biomass, 
which supply respectively 6% and 9% of global primary en-
ergy demand. In 2004 renewable sources supplied approxi-
mately 17% of global primary energy demand. Subtracting 
the contributions from hydro and traditional biomass leaves 
only around 2% attributable to “new” renewable sources 
such as photovoltaics (PV), wind power, small scale hydro, 
biogas and new biomass.
/FWFSUIFMFTTXIJMFUIFUXPiPMEwSFOFXBCMFTBSFJODSFBTJOH
only slowly or even staying constant in absolute terms, the 
contributions from new renewable sources are expanding 
rapidly. Today the fastest-growing energy technology is PV, 
which over the last five years has increased at 35% per year. 
Other new renewables are not far behind: over the same pe-
riod wind power has grown by 28%, biodiesel by 25% and 
solar water heating by 17%, all calculated as average annual 
growth rates [2].
Compared to the rest of the world the OECD has a sig-
nificant share of renewable energy, especially in “new” re-
newables, and OECD countries including Germany, Spain, 
the USA, Japan and Denmark have seen remarkably rapid 
development. Figure 11 shows the use of renewable energy 
sources in power generation in selected countries and eco-
nomic groupings.
Developing countries
Transition economies
OECD
-1500 -1000 -500 0 500 1000 1500Mtoe
Figure 9 
OECD imports and exports of oil and gas, 2004 
(note the different scales of the axes)
Developing countries
Transition economies
OECD
-300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300Mtoe
Import/export of oil
Import/export of gas
European Union
Latin America
OECD Pacific
India
Middel East
USA 
China
Figure 10 
Increase in energy-related CO² emissions from selected countries 
and economic groupings, 1990–2004
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500Million tonnes
5  The shares of total OECD CO2 emissions for the USA, EU and Japan are 45%, 31% and 9%, respectively. 
6  2006 calculated in constant 1995 USD.
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Some OECD countries are also among the most active in 
adopting new policies to promote renewable energy.
By 2007 the EU member states, for instance, had adopted a 
long-term target for renewable energy: by 2020, the plan is 
that 20% of the EU’s final energy demand will come from 
renewable technologies such as wind, solar and biomass. 
This target will be implemented mainly through national 
initiatives7, and at the start of 2008 the European Commis-
sion presented a proposal for sharing the burden among the 
EU member states. The proposed share of renewables by 
2020 varies significantly between member states: Denmark, 
for instance, is set for an increase of 13%, to a total of 30% 
renewable energy, while the Czech Republic will see an in-
crease of 6.9%, to a total of 13%. While this division is still 
being negotiated, there is no doubt that the EU’s binding 
targets will create strong incentives for the continued rapid 
development of renewable energy technologies in Europe.
At present the use of wind power is soaring in the USA, driv-
en mainly by federal tax credits (the Production Tax Credit, 
or PTC), but biofuels are also developing rapidly. With the 
exception of California, individual states provide relatively 
little R&D support for renewable technologies. However, 
more and more policy initiatives supporting the deployment 
of renewables are being taken at state level, including quotas 
for renewables (Renewable Portfolio Standards).
6.1.4 Conclusions
The OECD countries are amongst the most active in adopt-
ing new policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions and support the development of energy-efficient and 
renewable energy sources. At the same time these countries 
are becoming increasingly dependent on imported fossil fu-
els, mainly owing to a rapidly growing transport sector and 
shrinking domestic supplies of oil and gas.
By 2005 40% of the OECD’s energy demand was still met by 
oil, of which 57% was imported – and this share is expected 
UPSJTFJOUIFGVUVSF/BUVSBMHBTQSPWJEFEPGUIF0&$%T
primary energy in 2005. Only 23% of this gas was imported, 
but this proportion is also expected to rise.
This dominance of fossil fuels in the energy supply of the 
OECD countries is clearly reflected in CO2 emissions. By 
2005, OECD CO2 emissions amounted to 12,838 Mt, or 48% 
of the world total. The main OECD contributor is the USA, 
which accounts for 22% of world CO2 emissions. And de-
spite efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions, the situation 
is getting worse.
The OECD countries have a significant share of the world’s 
renewable energy, and are developing their renewable re-
sources rapidly, especially in “new” areas such as wind pow-
er and PV. Much still needs to be done, however, if these 
countries are to achieve sustainability in the energy sector.
25
20
15
10
5
0
% OECD EU USA Japan Germany Denmark Spain
Figure 11
The contribution of renewable energy sources in power generation, 
2006 
Source: Enerdata [1]
7  The European Trading System for CO2 allowances will be part of the regulatory framework.
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6.2 China, India and other rapidly  
 developing countries 
Xianli Zhu, Subash Dhar, Kirsten Halsnæs, UNEP Risø  
Centre, Risø DTU
6.2.1 Economic and social development
Despite fluctuations in global economic growth, some coun-
tries’ economic growth consistently outperforms that of oth-
ers. These rapidly growing economies are powerhouses for 
regional economic growth. Through market reforms, their 
productivity and competitiveness on the global market are 
increasing. The dynamics and influence of these countries 
cannot be neglected in an analysis of global economy, en-
ergy, and GHG emissions in the coming decades because of 
their large economic sizes and big populations.
China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and other large 
and rapidly-emerging economies are important forces, 
shaping global trends in development, energy, and climate 
change mitigation. The enormous investments in energy 
infrastructure in these countries in the years to come will 
provide a rare window of opportunity for low-carbon de-
velopment and low-cost reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions. At the same time, they face the challenge of support-
ing economic growth and eliminating poverty for billions of 
people in a world already facing many constraints on energy 
and carbon emissions. 
Of all the emerging economies, China and India deserve spe-
cial attention due to their huge populations, large economies, 
and remarkable economic growth over the last three decades 
(Table 6). This section will examine the recent trends in the 
economic, energy, and climate development in China and 
India and sets the stage for the analysis of the future energy 
system and climate implication analysis in the next chapter.
6.2.2 Energy consumption and CO² emissions in 
  China
A profile of the energy consumption and CO2 emissions of 
China and India could be summed up as: large aggregate, 
low per capita, low efficiency, high coal dependence, and 
rapid growth. China and India, with their large territory 
area, population, and economy, are the biggest energy con-
sumers and CO2 emitters amongst the developing countries. 
In 2005, 15.2% of the world total primary energy supply was 
consumed in China, contributing 18.8% of the global CO2 
emissions from fuel combustion. India consumed 4.7% of 
the world total primary energy consumption and emitted 
4.2% of the global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion [2]. 
In per capita terms, China and India are characterised by 
lower-than-world-average energy consumption and GHG 
emission (Table 7). In India, over 400 million people still 
have no access to electricity. In both countries, a large share 
of the population is relying on non-commercial energy for 
cooking and heating and the ownership of cars and electrical 
appliances is lower than in OECD countries. 
To create the same value of GDP, China and India use more 
energy. To produce 1 USD of GDP (on exchange rate ba-
sis), China and India consume over 4 times of the energy in 
Table 6 
China and India in the World, 2006 [1]
Population
GDP (PPP) (USD)
GDP (official exchange rate) (USD)
China India
1,314 m
8.18 trillion
1.79 trillion
World ranking
1
2
6
% of World total
20.1
13.7
4.1
1,112 m
3.70 trillion 
0.72 trillion
World ranking
2
4
12
% of World total
16.8
6.2
1.7
Table 7 
Per-capita GDP, energy consumption and CO² emissions for China and India: a snapshot from 2005 [3]
China India World average OECD average
3.88
1.32
6,012
0.83
0.22
2.94
0.65
1.05
0.49
3,071
0.83
0.16
2.14
0.34
4.22
1.78
8,492
0.32
0.18
2.33
0.50
11.02
4.74
25,880
0.20
0.21
2.37
0.43
Per-capita CO² emissions (t)
Per-capita energy consumption (toe)
Per-capita GDP (USD 2000 PPP)
TPES¹ /GDP (exchange rate)  
(tOe per thousand USD 2000)
TPES¹ /GDP (PPP) (tOe per thousand 
USD 2000 PPP)
CO²/TEPS  (t CO² per tOe)
CO²/GDP (kg CO² per 2000 USD PPP)
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OECD countries. This is due to the lower efficiency in elec-
tricity and heat generation, and end use energy consump-
tion. Another reason is that in China, over half of the GDP 
comes from the industrial sector, which in most cases is 
more energy intensive than agricultural and service sectors.
On PPP (purchasing power parity), the picture is slightly dif-
ferent. The energy intensity of Chinese economy (TEPS/GDP) 
is 16% higher than the OECD level [3].  In contrast, the energy 
intensity of the Indian economy is 11% lower than that OECD 
average [3]. This is because in India, agriculture and service 
sectors contribute a much bigger share of the country’s GDP. 
In addition, the households are characterised by low incomes 
which result in low vehicle and appliance ownership. 
In both China and India, a large share of the energy supply 
is from coal, which emits more CO2 to generate the same 
amount of electricity and heat than natural gas and oil. The 
carbon intensity of energy, i.e., ton of carbon per toe of en-
ergy consumed for China is 26% higher than the OECD 
average whereas for India this is 8% lower than the OECD 
average. During 2005, in China, 78% of the electricity gen-
eration is based on coal, and in India, the share is 69% [2]. 
The carbon intensity of energy in India is lower because the 
wide use of biomass and waste is an important source of en-
ergy, especially in the household sector. In 2004, 13.6% of 
China’s total primary energy supply was from combustion 
of renewable and waste, while in India the share was as high 
as 37.4%, which significantly lowered the CO2 intensity of 
India’s energy consumption [2]. 
The fourth and most important feature in the Chinese and 
Indian energy consumption and associated CO2 emission 
is the rapid increase in total amount. As shown in Figure 
12, the Chinese economy grew more than 16-fold between 
1971 and 2005, while that of India expanded around five-
fold. Improvements in energy efficiency and the growth of 
low-carbon energy sources have been unable to keep pace 
with this growth, so both energy demand and CO2 emis-
sions grew. China, however, has to a remarkable extent de-
coupled economic growth from energy consumption. From 
1971 to 2005, China’s CO2 emissions increased by 489%, but 
over the same period its GDP on a purchasing power parity 
(PPP) basis went up by 1,038%. In India the effect was less 
pronounced, but CO2 emissions growth of 410% was still 
considerably less than the 454% increase in GDP (PPP basis) 
over the same period.
China’s performance notwithstanding, experiences from a 
range of countries show strong links between GDP growth 
and energy consumption. India’s economic take-off began 
around ten years after that of China, but as Figure 12 shows, 
it seems to be following a similar development curve. The 
growth trends for per-capita energy consumption and per-
capita GDP have been similar for the two countries, though 
the transformation in China has been much faster than in 
India. In the case of China, energy consumption rose sharp-
ly when per-capita GDP (PPP) reached USD 3,000 in 2002; 
according to an ADB study, this figure is the tipping point 
for an increase in vehicle ownership [2]. If this holds true for 
India, we can in due course expect a sharp upturn in energy 
demand from the transport sector.
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Figure 13 
Energy and economic transitions 1965 to 2005 for India & China
Source: GDP [4], Population [5] and Energy [6]
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Figure 12 
Growth in GDP, total primary energy supply and CO² for India & China
(UNEP Database from Sustainable Development, Energy and Climate project)
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As Figure 12  shows, CO2 emissions in both China and India 
have been growing faster than energy supply. This is because 
these countries are highly dependent on fossil fuels, espe-
cially coal, to meet their energy needs (Figure 14). China 
and India both have large coal reserves and small reserves of 
oil and natural gas, so coal, the fossil fuel which emits much 
more CO2 for the same energy output, is the main fuel for 
power generation [2].
Figure 15 shows that in both countries, the share of total CO2 
emissions attributable to electricity and heat production has 
increased significantly since 1971. The manufacturing sector 
is another major source of CO2 emissions. Together, these 
two industries contribute around 80% of total CO2 emis-
sions in both China and India.
The significantly larger share of CO2 emissions from the 
Chinese industrial sector can be explained by comparing the 
two countries’ economic structures. In China, a much larger 
share of GDP is generated by industry, reflecting China’s role 
as a world manufacturing centre with a big export market. 
In India, industry is currently less important to overall eco-
nomic growth than the service sector, though the share of 
GDP attributable to industry has been increasing since 1970. 
In both countries, agriculture has become less important to 
GDP (Table 8).
Despite the growing prosperity of China and India, per-
capita electricity consumption is still much lower than in 
OECD countries. Per-capita electricity consumption in 2003 
was 1,440 kWh for China and 594 kWh for India, compared 
to the OECD average of 8,777 kWh [5]. China has had a 
government-led rural electrification programme since the 
1980s, and as a result, more than 98% of the country’s popu-
lation has some kind of grid access. Similar policies in India 
have had limited success, and by 2005 only 74% of Indian 
villages had been electrified [7].
Rapid population growth and urbanisation have helped 
push up energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions 
(Table 9). Although population growth in both India and 
China has slowed, the large population and relatively young 
age distribution mean that both countries’ populations will 
continue to grow in the next few decades. In China, with its 
population control policy, average annual population growth 
has declined from 2.21% during 1970–1975 to 0.67% during 
2000–2005 (http://esa.un.org/unup) [8], but the popula-
tion still grew by 8 million in 2005 [9]. In India, population 
growth is even faster, and population growth boosts demand 
for energy.
Both China and India still have large numbers of rural peo-
ple who rely on firewood and agricultural wastes as their 
2000
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Figure 14 
Growth in commercial energy for India & China 
Renewables including solar, wind and biomass are not included, since they 
accounted for less than 1% of commercial energy in 2005 [6]
China
OilCoal Gas HydroNuclear
Share of 
fossil fuels      93%      92%      91%      89%      88%      87%      85%      84%
India
Share of 
fossil fuels      73%      72%      70%      77%      79%      81%      84%      84%
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Figure 15 
CO² emissions by sector [2]
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Table 8 
Structure of Chinese and Indian economies [4]
1970
35%
40%
24%
42%
21%
37%
1990
27%
42%
31%
29%
27%
44%
2005
13%
48%
40%
18%
28%
54%
Country
China
India
Sector
Agriculture
Industry
Service
Agriculture
Industry
Service
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main source of fuel for cooking and space heating. With on-
going urbanisation, ever more of these people are moving to 
cities, where they are more likely to use commercial energy 
for cooking and heating. Urbanisation also drives up the 
demand for housing, schools, transport and other energy-
consuming infrastructure.
6.2.3 Energy and climate change on national  
 development agenda
The existing energy and climate policy initiatives in China 
and India are designed mainly to improve energy security 
and reduce local pollution. Even given China’s ambitious 
targets for energy efficiency and renewable energy, these 
two countries’ strong economic growth is very likely to yield 
continued rapid rises in energy consumption and CO2 emis-
sions. Aligning GHG mitigation without undermining ef-
forts to climb out of poverty remains an enormous challenge 
for China, India, other developing countries, and indeed the 
world as a whole.
China has set two ambitious energy targets to address the 
problems of resource constraints, local pollution and na-
tional energy security:
t Energy efficiency: reduce energy intensity by 20%  
 during 2006–2010, and by 50% during 2003-2020  
 (China 2020 Energy)
t Renewable energy: enlarge the share of energy from  
 renewable sources in the total commercial energy  
 supply from 7% in 2002 to 10% in 2010, and then to  
 15% by 2020, and increase the proportion of electricity  
 from renewable sources (China 2020 Renewable Energy 
 Development Programme)
These are extremely ambitious targets. It is estimated, for in-
stance, that the renewable energy target alone will require 
China to invest around 185,000 million USD (1.5 trillion 
RMB) in the period 2006-2020.
China has put in place a wide variety of policies and mea-
sures to stimulate energy efficiency and renewable energy 
investment. These include legislation, mandatory energy 
intensity targets for each province, mandatory elimination 
of energy-inefficient industrial processes and production ca-
pacity, voluntary agreements, subsidies, and preferential tax 
treatment.
India’s five-year plans also include low-carbon development. 
For example, in the plan for 2002–2007 India set two major 
targets for renewable energy:
t $PNNJTTJPO(8PGOFXIZESPQPXFSBOE(8PG 
 other renewable electricity, out of a total generating  
 capacity increase of 41.1 GW between 2002 and 2007;  
 and
t &MFDUSJGZWJMMBHFTCZUISPVHIDPOWFOUJPOBM 
 grid expansion, and the remaining 18,000 villages by  
 2012 using decentralised non-conventional sources  
 such as solar, wind, small hydro and biomass
Table10 lists some of the measures taken by China and India 
to cut growth in energy consumption and encourage renew-
ables.
6.2.4 Conclusions
China and India are the two largest representatives of a 
group of countries experiencing rapid economic growth. 
Although India’s economic take-off began around a decade 
later than that of China, it seems to be following a similar 
development curve.
The two nations have several features in common that are 
relevant to energy and climate issues. Their large sizes and 
populations, for instance, mean that their aggregate energy 
use and greenhouse gas emissions are already among the 
largest in the world, and thanks to rapid economic devel-
opment, both these measures are growing much faster than 
the world average. At the same time, per-capita energy con-
sumption and greenhouse gas emissions are still low, and 
both countries still have enormous numbers of people who 
will be affected adversely by climate change.
The Chinese and Indian governments have already begun to 
address the economic, social, and environmental problems 
caused by their countries’ rapid energy growth. China, es-
Table 9 
Population growth and urbanisation [8]
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
831
17.4%
549
19.8%
999
19.6%
689
23.1%
1,149
27.4%
860
25.5%
1,270
35.8%
1,046
27.7%
1,313
40.4%
1,134
28.7%
China
India
Population (m)
Urbanisation
Population (m)
Urbanisation
45
Regional developments in energy systems, economics and climate
Risø Energy Report 7
6 
pecially, has made very ambitious plans for energy efficiency 
and renewable energy development. Considering the size 
of the challenges, however, the existing measures are not 
enough. Getting these two countries onto the track of low-
carbon development will require more effective policies to 
ensure technology transfer as well as rapid technology de-
velopment and deployment.
Table 10 
Chinese and Indian policies with significant greenhouse gas mitigation effects
China
Higher grid upload tariff for electricity from renewable sources 
Require grid companies give priority to purchase electricity from
renewable sources 
Gradually tighten energy efficiency standards for electricity
generation
Plan to to close 50GW of inefficient thermal power plants by 2010
Government investment in nuclear power plants
Reduce subsidies to fossil fuel
Energy efficiency targets for energy-intensive products and major 
energy-consuming equipment
Energy efficiency labeling
Prererence to energy efficient equipment in government purchases
Binding energy efficiency targets for 1,000-plus large energy-
intensive enterprises
Lower purchase tax for energy-efficient cars
Build public transport infrastructure in cities
Subsidise public transport
Mandatory energy efficiency standards for new and existing 
buildings
Government-subsidised renovation schemes to increase energy 
efficiency
India
Tariff-based bidding for large thermal power plants
Import of supercritical generating technology will improve 
efficiencies and lower CO² emissions
Coal washing plants to improve coal quality, leading to lower SOx 
emissions and lower CO²  emissions through improved efficiency
Incentives for renewables 
Proposal to import hydropower from neighboring countries 
 
Energy Conservation Act to promote energy efficiency through 
energy audits, benchmarking and raising the profile  of this issue
 
Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) has proposals 
to improve public transport in major cities
Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) has imposed mandatory energy 
labeling of all electrical equipment, with the aim of raising 
consumer awareness
Sector
Power
Industrial
Transport
Building
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6.3 Africa 
Ivan Nygaard, Gordon Mackenzie  and Said Abdallah, UNEP 
Risø Centre, Risø DTU; Peter Zhou, EECG, Botswana
Most of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with the 
notable exceptions of South Africa and a few others, fall into 
the category of “least developed countries” (LDCs), typi-
cally with per-capita GDP below USD 2,000. Table 11 shows 
key indicators for some selected LDCs.
LDCs are characterised by industrial sectors that provide 
only a small proportion of GDP. Although the contribution 
of agriculture to GDP also appears low, most people in these 
countries depend largely on agriculture for survival. Poverty 
levels—the fraction of people with an income below 1 USD 
per day—are in general above 40%. While provision of basic 
services like clean water and sanitation is improving in many 
LDCs, access to modern forms of energy like electricity and 
gas remains extremely low.
The low level of economic development determines the low 
level of energy consumption, and also the forms of energy 
used (Table 12). Sub-Saharan Africa has one of the world’s 
lowest per-capita consumption rates of modern energy, and 
even this is declining, since the rate of electrification cannot 
keep pace with population increase. The low level of electri-
fication is due to a number of factors including poverty in 
general, a highly-dispersed rural population, a low degree of 
industrialisation, a historically inefficient energy sector, and 
difficulties in accessing capital to finance the development of 
modern energy sources [3].
For LDCs throughout this region the major part of energy is 
used in households as Table 13 shows. By far the largest part 
of this energy is used for cooking and comes from tradition-
al biomass such as firewood, charcoal and agricultural waste, 
which supplies as much as 95% of all energy consumed in 
some countries, and an average of 81% for the whole SSA 
region.
The major developmental challenges for all the countries 
in the region may be expressed in terms of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Although there is no specific 
Table 11 
Key indicators for selected LDCs of sub-Saharan Africa.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
(Africa Economic Outlook, [1] (all except electricity access), World Energy Outlook [2] (electricity access data); assuming a 70/30 rural/urban population split)
Country
Burkina Faso
Mozambique
Zambia
Tanzania
Population (m)
13.6
20.2
11.9
39.0
GDP per capita 
(USD, PPP)
1,314
1,957
1,167
594
Access to 
electricity 
(%)
7
6.3
19
11
Access 
to clean 
water (%)
88.3
40
62
59.8
Access to 
sanitation 
(%)
9.9
34
27
Literacy 
(%)
12.8
69.4
GDP contribution 
from industry (mining 
and manufacturing) (%)
15.9
13.7
14.2
9.6
GDP contribution 
from agriculture 
(%)
17.9
21.4
9.6
17.9
Table 13 
Sectoral energy split in selected LDCs in SSA in 2005  
(percentage of total final energy consumption) (International Energy Agency [4]; data from Burkina Faso is from 2004 [5])
Country
Burkina Faso
Mozambique
Zambia
Tanzania
Households
81.8
78.0
66.7
79.5
Industry
10.1
17.1
24.1
10.3
Agriculture
0.3
4.4
Commerce, 
service sector
0.7
0.4
1.7
Transport
6.8
4.4
6.3
2.5
Other
0.5
0.1
0.8
3.3
Table 12 
Primary energy consumption of selected LDCs in SSA in 2005  
(International Energy Agency [4]; data from Burkina Faso is from 2004 [5]; generating capacity is from SADC [6] and MMCE [7])
Country
Burkina Faso
Mozambique
Zambia
Tanzania
Total primary 
energy con-
sumption (ktoe)
3,054
10,207
7,124
20,404
Biomass (%)
85.4
85.4
78.7
92.1
Coal (%)
1.3
0.2
Oil and gas 
(%)
14.0
5.4
9.5
6.9
Other 
(renewable) 
(%)
0.3
11.2
10.7
0.7
Electricity imports 
as a fraction of total 
primary energy (%)
0.3
–2.0
–0.2
0.1
Electricity generating 
capacity (2002) (MW)
136
2,388
1,778
881
Electricity 
consumption 
(GWh/y)
546
9,143
2,256
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MDG for energy, it is now widely accepted that access to en-
ergy contributes, and is indeed essential to the achievement 
of all the MDGs. Thus, access to clean, affordable and reliable 
energy is a prerequisite for the countries of SSA, not only for 
household uses like cooking, heating and lighting, but also 
for industry and agriculture, social services and transport. 
It is through the productive use of energy, in the broadest 
sense including energy for education, health and other so-
cial services, as well as for income-generating activities, that 
these populations can be helped out of poverty to lead rich 
and fulfilling lives.
With regard to the climate change problem, the LDCs of SSA 
contribute very little to global greenhouse gas emissions, 
and this is likely to remain the case into the foreseeable fu-
ture. The overriding issue is how to provide increased energy 
for development. While the emission of greenhouse gases 
like CO2 is not the main driver for energy policy in SSA, it 
would be wise even at this stage to replace high-carbon fuels 
with low-carbon alternatives such as natural gas, and to in-
clude CO2-free renewable energy, as long as these solutions 
are close to being economically competitive. In such cases, 
carbon financing schemes such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) might provide supplementary funding 
for new energy developments.
Two main challenges are apparent in the energy sector:
t )PXUPQSPWJEFBDDFTTUPDMFBONPEFSOFOFSHZUP 
 growing populations, often in dispersed rural settle- 
 ments, as well as social services and growing industries
t )PXUPFOTVSFBSFMJBCMFBOETUBCMFFOFSHZTVQQMZJOUIF 
 wake of recent energy shortages. These have been  
 caused by, for example, water shortages in hydropower- 
 dependent countries such as Ghana and Tanzania,  
 rising oil prices, and the recent power shortfall in South  
 Africa, which has seriously affected neighbouring coun- 
 tries to the north
6.3.1 Energy on the development agenda
Each LDC in SSA has different priorities and different re-
sources, and each will need different approaches to meet the 
two challenges referred to above. In general, however, the 
key is to mobilise financial resources, both internal and ex-
ternal, to allow investment in energy infrastructure.
Tied to this is the need to place energy firmly on the develop-
ment agenda alongside other necessities like health, educa-
tion, roads and water supply. This will encourage both inter-
nal investment stakeholders (such as banks and private-sector 
companies) and international development agencies to treat 
energy as a priority and to channel the required funding to-
wards energy development. Wherever possible it is certainly 
advantageous to tie energy investment to other sectors like 
education, health and industry; multi-sectoral involvement 
helps scarce resources to be used in the best way possible.
There are indications that energy is indeed moving up the 
development agenda and being reflected in donor priorities. 
The latest Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), for 
instance, recognise the importance of energy. An encour-
aging development in recent years has been a growing at-
tention to energy in EU-based assistance. The EU Energy 
Initiative has since 2005 channelled about €200 million to 
energy projects in SSA, and we can hope that the recently-
agreed Africa-EU Energy Partnership will increase dialogue, 
cooperation and resources for African energy development. 
-JLFXJTF JOJUJBUJWFT JO UIF8PSME#BOL6/PSHBOJTBUJPOT
MJLF6/%1BOE6/*%0BOEBGFXCJMBUFSBMEPOPSTTVDIBT
UIF(FSNBO#.;(5;BSFHJWJOHSFOFXFEQSJPSJUZ UPFO-
ergy development.
6.3.2 Energy resources and supply
Africa as a whole is endowed with vast fossil energy resourc-
es, especially coal and natural gas. The ratio of resources to 
production is over 194 for coal, over 78 for natural gas and 
32 for oil, compared to global figures of 147 for coal, 63 for 
HBTBOEGPSPJM <>/FXEJTDPWFSJFTPGPJMBOEHBTIBWF
grown by 46% and 34% respectively in the past 20 years [8], 
and this trend continues, most recently in Ghana where sig-
nificant offshore oil resources have been identified [9].
In addition to its fossil-fuel reserves, Africa has 20% of the 
XPSMETLOPXOSFTPVSDFTPGMPXDPTUVSBOJVNNPTUMZJO/B-
mibia (27% of the African total) and South Africa (38%). 
/VDMFBS QPXFS IPXFWFS JT MJLFMZ UP CF DPOĕOFE UP 4PVUI
Africa. Africa also has 11% of the world’s technically-ex-
ploitable hydropower resources, concentrated in the Great 
Lakes region and in countries along the Atlantic coast from 
Guinea to Angola. The Democratic Republic of Congo alone 
has 42% of Africa’s technically-exploitable hydro resources 
[10].
Wood fuel is extensively used in Africa, especially in SSA 
where it provides 70-90% of final energy consumption. The 
current consumption of wood fuel in Africa is estimated at 
5,600 PJ, or 31% of the global total [10]. Most SSA countries 
have had programmes for reforestation and dissemination of 
energy-efficient wood stoves since the droughts of the 1970s 
and 1980s [11].
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There is a growing consensus that the so-called fuel-wood 
crisis has been exaggerated, and that observed depletion of 
forests is often caused by broader changes in land use [see e.g. 
11, 12, 13, 14]. Depletion of forest resources, however, is still 
a major concern around cities and large towns, and in areas 
where charcoal is made [11]. We need better data on the loss or 
gain of African forests, but wood fuel and agricultural wastes 
are increasingly considered to be sustainable energy resources 
that help to alleviate poverty rather than cause it [11].
Modern biomass comprises bioethanol, biodiesel, biogas 
and agricultural wastes, all of which Africa is well placed to 
produce. Widespread use of modern biomass has so far been 
hindered by high capital costs, lack of institutional and pol-
icy support, and inadequate research [15]. While reasonably 
successful in other developing countries, biogas for house-
hold applications has not so far played an important role in 
Africa. A major challenge for biofuel production in develop-
ing countries remains the possibility of competition for land 
between the biomass and food crops. There are, however, 
promising ways to maintain food production while increas-
ing the production of biofuels, e.g. by using marginal lands 
for biofuels and improving crop yields by intensifying farm-
ing systems in SSA [16].  
Electricity production in Africa is 3% of the global total. 
In Africa as a whole, thermal generation dominates and is 
foreseen to do so until 2030. Coal-fired power plants, for 
instance, accounted for 45% of generating capacity in 2004 
and are projected to settle at 46% in 2030. Generation from 
natural gas is expected to increase from its current figure of 
25% to 38% by 2030 [16]. However, most of this coal and 
natural gas generation is, and will continue to be, in South 
Africa, the other coal-producing countries of Southern Af-
SJDBTVDIBT#PUTXBOBBOE;JNCBCXFBOEUIFPJMQSPEVDJOH
DPVOUSJFTPG/JHFSJBBOE/PSUI"GSJDB
Considerable natural gas resources are now being discovered 
JOUIF4PVUIFSO"GSJDBODPVOUSJFTPG/BNJCJB.P[BNCJRVF
and Tanzania. For the foreseeable future these resources will 
be able to cater for the high demand of South Africa and 
the neighbouring countries of the Southern African Devel-
PQNFOU$PNNVOJUZ	4"%$
/FWFSUIFMFTT GPS UIFNBKPS-
ity of LDCs in Africa, coal and other fossil fuels have to be 
imported. With rising oil prices, these countries are increas-
ingly looking to renewables as the cheapest option.
/FYUBęFSDPBMBOEOBUVSBMHBTBTTPVSDFTPGFMFDUSJDJUZDPNFT
hydropower. Most LDCs rely on hydro, but at a capacity that 
is limited by lack of funding or international support for 
large commercial projects. This is in spite of the high priority 
hydropower is given by major regional players including the 
African Union and the Regional Economic Communities [17]. 
Countries that are largely dependent on hydropower, such as 
Tanzania and Ghana, have also experienced interruption in 
supplies from frequent years of drought. The trend then has 
been to resort to diesel generation in the short term and to 
build thermal power stations in the longer term.
6.3.3 Other renewable energy sources
There are promising solar, wind and geothermal resources 
in many parts of Africa, but in the SSA region these alterna-
tives are being accepted and taken up very slowly, mainly 
due to the high investment cost. Current figures show about 
500,000 solar home systems (SHSs) in Africa, concentrated 
in a few countries with specific SHS programmes. Kenya has 
BCPVUVOJUT4PVUI"GSJDBBCPVU;JNCBCXF
85,000, Morocco 37,000 and Uganda about 20,000 [18, 19]. 
Wind resources are generally located in coastal regions, but 
so far wind has only been exploited on a large scale in Egypt 
(230 MW) and Morocco (124 MW) [20]. Geothermal en-
ergy could also make a considerable contribution, with an 
estimated potential of 2.5–6.5 GW, although so far only 129 
MW in Kenya has been tapped [21]. 
The recent rise in oil prices, from 20–30 USD per barrel 
from 1985–2003 to the current high level, may dramatically 
change this situation. Besides an increased focus on SHSs, 
wind parks and geothermal energy, hybrid systems consist-
ing of small-scale hydro, wind or solar PV in combination 
with diesel may be a least-cost option for mini-grid systems 
in the future [22].
6.3.4 Conclusions
The key drivers shaping energy development in the LDCs of 
Africa are:
Energy access (for poverty alleviation, income generation, 
industrial development and social services) is increasingly 
recognised as essential to achieving the MDGs, even though 
this is unlikely to happen fully in the SSA countries within 
the 2015 timeframe. Inclusion of energy access in poverty 
reduction plans is becoming widespread, though so far only 
a minority of countries regard energy as a high priority. 
There is little doubt that the way forward lies in electricity 
access for the majority, whether from central grids or decen-
tralised, often with clean fuels like LPG as a supplement for 
heating and cooking.
Energy security has become a crucial issue, particularly fol-
lowing the Southern Africa power crisis, but also in West 
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and East Africa due to water shortages limiting the energy 
available from hydropower. Significant coal-fired capacity 
(over 15 GW) is planned for immediate development within 
the Southern African region to bridge the capacity gap.
Continuing coal use: According to Shell Energy Scenarios to 
2050, oil and gas are to peak at global level in 2015–2020, but 
the demand for coal continues regardless of the quest to curb 
carbon emissions [23]. In the case of Africa both resource 
uncertainty and the prospect of increasing oil prices favour 
continuing coal use particularly for electricity generation. 
In this context, cooperation in the form of regional power 
pools is important; this has already become evident in sub-
regions of SSA such as the Southern African Power Pool and 
the West African Power Pool [24].
Climate change, while important as far as impacts and adap-
tation are concerned, does not in itself appear as a priority 
driver in SSA energy policy, since per-capita energy con-
sumption and CO2 emissions are low. Moreover, since it is 
developmentally essential to increase energy consumption, 
UIFSF JT MJUUMF QPMJUJDBM JODFOUJWF UP SFEVDF FNJTTJPOT /FJ-
ther is there any obligation within the Climate Convention. 
/FWFSUIFMFTTDMJNBUFDIBOHFJTSFMFWBOUJOWJFXPGUIFMJLFMZ
baseline scenario which, as argued above, is likely to involve 
significant coal and oil use. There will thus be increasing op-
portunities for cooperation with industrialised countries, 
through carbon financing, to invest in cleaner low-emission 
energy technologies, including clean coal, gas, biomass and 
other renewables, where appropriate.
Economic development of African LDCs will inevitably oc-
cur at different paces, depending on factors including re-
source availability, internal political priorities, connection 
to regional “locomotives” like South Africa, and geopolitical 
factors. Accompanying such development, as well as driving 
it, will be an increased demand for energy. The most obvious 
energy resources to meet immediate needs are fossil fuels: 
coal, oil and natural gas. However, Africa has vast resources 
of biomass and hydropower, and, given the necessary invest-
ment and technological development, these resources could 
be exploited both for domestic use and as major earners of 
export revenue.
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7.1 OECD countries
Poul Erik Morthorst, Risø DTU; Dolf Gielen, IEA, Paris
We are facing serious challenges in the energy sector. The 
global economy is set to grow fourfold between now and 
2050, and growth could approach ten-fold in developing 
countries like China and India. This promises economic 
benefits and huge improvements in people’s standards of liv-
ing, but also involves much more use of energy. Unsustain-
able pressures on natural resources and on the environment 
are inevitable if energy demand is not de-coupled from eco-
nomic growth and fossil fuel demand reduced.
A global revolution is needed in the ways that energy is 
supplied and used. Far greater energy efficiency is a core 
SFRVJSFNFOU /FX SFOFXBCMF FOFSHZ TPVSDFT BOE DBSCPO
free technologies have to be developed. A dramatic shift is 
needed in government policies, notably creating a higher 
level of long-term policy certainty over future demand for 
low-carbon technologies, upon which industry’s decision-
makers can rely. Unprecedented levels of cooperation among 
the world’s major economies will also be crucial, bearing in 
mind that under the “business-as-usual” scenario for 2050, 
less than one-third of global emissions are expected to stem 
from OECD countries.
Increasing concerns over climate change and security of 
supply imply that our energy systems will have to change 
drastically in the future. Renewable energy sources includ-
ing wind power, photovoltaics (PV) and biofuels will need to 
make significant contributions to our energy systems, along-
side traditional sources such as coal, oil and natural gas.
Renewable energy technologies such as wind power and PV 
are characterised by inherent variability of production. This 
will increase the complexity of future energy systems, and 
introduce the need for advanced features including demand 
response, regulation and storage. This in turn calls for ad-
vanced modelling techniques to support decisions on how to 
develop future energy systems. Most of these decisions will 
have consequences lasting for 30–40 years or even longer, so 
it is of the utmost importance that they are based on sound 
reasoning and accurate calculations.
Modelling energy systems over large regions of the world is 
a complicated matter, so only a limited number of energy 
studies and models exist. Some of the more important ones 
are the World Energy Outlook and the Energy Technology 
Perspectives undertaken by the IEA; the long-term scenarios 
reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC); the studies prepared by the World Energy Council 
(WEC); and work carried out in relation to European Union 
policy. For this Energy Report we have chosen to focus on 
the IEA Energy Technology Perspectives because of its time-
liness and long-term view.
7.1.1 Energy Technology Perspectives
Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP 2008) [1] is an in-
depth review of the status of, and outlook for, existing and 
advanced clean energy technologies. It draws on modelling 
work within the IEA Secretariat and expertise from the IEA’s 
international energy technology collaboration network. ETP 
2008 is a companion to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2007 
[2], taking that publication’s reference (“baseline”) scenario 
and extending it from 2030 to 2050.
ETP 2008 presents several different sets of scenarios. The 
“ACT” scenario shows how global CO2 emissions could be 
brought back to current levels by 2050, while the “BLUE” 
scenario targets a 50% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050. 
Only the BLUE scenario will be described here.
The main assumptions of the BLUE scenario are:
t (MPCBMQPQVMBUJPOJTBTTVNFEUPHSPXBUZGSPN 
 2005 to 2050. OECD population is assumed to grow by  
 0.2% /y in the same period, reflecting continued growth 
 JO/PSUI"NFSJDBTMPXHSPXUIJOUIF&6BOEBEFDMJOF 
 in the OECD Pacific region
t (%1JTXPSMEXJEFBTTVNFEUPHSPXCZZGSPN 
 2005 to 2050. The main growth will be in develop 
 ing Asia, with approximately 5.2% /y in China and  
 India. Growth in the OECD is assumed to average 1.9%  
 ZXJUIUIFIJHIFTUHSPXUIJO/PSUI"NFSJDBBOEMPX 
 est in Japan
Oil import prices in the baseline scenario are consistent with 
the World Energy Outlook Reference Scenario: a crude oil 
price of USD 62–65 bbl and a natural gas price of approxi-
mately USD 8/MBtu in 2030–2050 (constant-2006 prices). 
BLUE assumes lower oil prices, but this is more than com-
pensated for by a CO2 incentive of USD 200/t CO2, giving an 
effective oil price of USD 80/bbl.
Reducing CO2 emissions by 50% by 2050 is a tough chal-
lenge that implies a very rapid change of direction. Costs are 
not only substantially higher, but also much more uncertain, 
because BLUE demands the deployment of technologies that 
are still under development, and whose progress and ulti-
mate success are therefore hard to predict. BLUE requires 
urgent implementation of unprecedented and far-reaching 
new policies in the energy sector.
7Future energy systems to cope with 
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Figure 16 shows how the marginal costs of CO2 abatement 
increase as the targeted CO2 savings increase. For BLUE, the 
figure is at least USD 200 per tonne of CO2 saved, and it 
could be as high as USD 500 if the progress of key technolo-
gies is disappointing. The blue area indicates the cost range, 
bounded by optimistic and pessimistic technology assump-
tions.
As well as their environmental benefits, the ACT and BLUE 
scenarios also show a more balanced outlook for oil mar-
kets. Under ACT, demand for oil continues to grow, but the 
forecast increase of 12% between now and 2050 is much less 
than in the business-as-usual scenario. BLUE shows a much 
more marked difference, with oil demand 27% less in 2050 
than it is today. However, this does not greatly reduce short- 
and medium-term investment needs in fossil-fuel supply. All 
the scenarios predict that massive investments in fossil-fuel 
supply will be needed in the coming decades.
Energy efficiency improvements in buildings, appliances, 
transport, industry and power generation represent the larg-
FTUBOEMFBTUDPTUMZTBWJOHT/FYUJOUIFIJFSBSDIZPGJNQPS-
tance come measures to substantially decarbonise power 
generation. This can be achieved through a combination of 
renewables, nuclear power, and the use of carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) at fossil-fuel plants. Whichever the final 
target, action in all these areas is urgent and necessary.
It is particularly important to avoid becoming locked into 
inefficient technologies for decades to come. The BLUE sce-
nario requires higher-cost options including the industry-
sector application of CCS, and alternative transport fuels. 
Figure 17 shows the sources of CO2 savings in BLUE com-
pared to the baseline scenario. Policymakers should remem-
ber that long lead times are frequently required to imple-
ment changes and that priorities in each country will vary 
according to national circumstances. Moreover, reducing 
methane emissions in the energy sector is also an important 
part of an overall climate change strategy, as these emissions 
offer important opportunities for near-term and cost-effec-
tive greenhouse gas reduction.
CCS for power generation and industry is the most impor-
tant single new technology for CO2 savings in both ACT and 
BLUE, in which it accounts for 14% and 19% of total CO2 
savings, respectively. BLUE includes higher-cost applications 
of CCS for industry and gas-fired power stations. There is a 
massive switch to renewables for power generation, espe-
cially to wind, PV, concentrating solar and biomass, so that 
by 2050, 46% of global power in the BLUE scenario comes 
from renewables. Renewable technologies across all sectors 
account for 21% of the CO2 savings in the BLUE scenario 
against the baseline scenario. A substantial switch to nuclear 
contributes 6% of CO2 savings, based on the construction 
of 32 GW of capacity each year between now and 2050. 
/VDMFBS BDDPVOUT GPSOFBSMZ POFRVBSUFS PG QPXFS HFOFSB-
tion in BLUE, and hydro for half as much, building on the 
important role both technologies already play in the baseline 
scenario.
The report’s broad range of options for power generation 
shows that there is considerable flexibility for individual 
countries to choose which precise mix of CCS, renewables 
and nuclear technology they will use to decarbonise their 
power sectors.
The BLUE scenario is very challenging for the transport sec-
tor: significant decarbonisation of transport, which has hith-
erto been dominated by the internal combustion engine, is 
likely to be much more costly than in sectors such as power 
generation. BLUE assumes that advanced biofuels will play 
a significant role, within the limits of sustainable production 
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Emission reductions under the BLUE scenario, 2050 [1]
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and cropping. Trucks, shipping, and air transport will be the 
chief consumers of biofuels, since other non-hydrocarbon 
options are likely to be very expensive to apply to these 
transport modes.
Table 14 shows the energy supply and demand consequences 
of the BLUE scenario for the OECD countries and the world 
as a whole.
In the BLUE scenario, total primary energy demand in the 
OECD countries is expected to decline by 0.1% /y from 2005 
to 2050, which is significantly lower than the average 1.4% /y 
growth of the last 15 years. Growth in energy demand from 
the rest of the world is expected to be much higher, so that 
the OECD’s share of world primary energy demand will de-
cline from almost 49% in 2005 to 34% by 2050.
Demand for oil is forecast to decline by 0.8% /y globally, and 
BU UXJDF UIBU SBUF 	 Z
 JO UIF0&$% DPVOUSJFT/PUF
however, that this is an average that encompasses global 
growth in the next two decades, followed by rapid decline. 
Owing to new policy initiatives to reduce CO2 emissions, the 
demand for coal in the OECD region will decrease at 1.9% 
/y; world coal use will decline at 0.6% per year.
CO2-neutral fuels will develop rapidly in the OECD between 
2005 and 2050. This applies to biomass and waste, which 
will grow at 3.7% /y, but especially to other renewables (in-
cluding wind power and solar), which are forecast to grow 
strongly at an average 5.7% /y over this time period. Even 
in this extreme scenario, the OECD countries will still rely 
heavily on fossil fuels, which will provide 44% of their total 
primary energy in 2050. The global share of fossil fuels will 
be 52% in 2050 according to the BLUE scenario.
Accounting in terms of primary energy equivalents has its 
limitations, as it is heavily influenced by the conventions 
for conversion efficiency, notably for nuclear and renewable 
power. An analysis of final energy demand provides more 
insight into the role of renewables. In Table 15, power gen-
eration from renewable sources has been translated into pri-
mary energy equivalents using an efficiency of 40%, a refer-
ence value for power generation from fossil fuels.
In BLUE renewables in power generation account for 67% of 
total renewables use in the OECD countries, but only 57% of 
renewables worldwide.
In the power industry the role of renewable energy sources 
is forecast to increase significantly, making renewables the 
largest source of power in this scenario. Globally, renewable 
energy including hydro will account for 46% of total power 
generation in 2050, compared to 18% today. For the OECD 
countries the figures are 50% in 2050 compared to 18% to-
day.
BLUE assumes that biomass will be a key part of the renew-
able energy supply, and that primary bioenergy use would 
grow by nearly 200%. The type of biomass would be radically 
different from today: while the use of traditional biomass will 
decline, biofuels and bio-feedstocks will grow significantly. 
In the transport sector, second-generation biodiesel and jet 
fuel from biomass would become important, since very few 
sustainable energy alternatives exist for trucks, shipping and 
aviation.
Emissions of CO2 are influenced by developments in energy 
systems in two ways. On one hand, the general increase in 
energy consumption implies higher CO2 emissions, while on 
the other, shifts in the energy mix away from fossil fuels tend 
to reduce emissions. In the BLUE scenario, CO2 emissions 
from OECD countries will total 3.8 Gt in 2050, representing 
a decline of 71% compared to the present value, or an aver-
age decline of 2.7% /y. The global figures are more modest, 
with an average decline of 1.5% /y until 2050. By 2050 the 
non-OECD countries would account for 72% of total global 
CO2 emissions, and would have reduced their emissions by 
27% compared to the 2005 level.
This analysis assumes least-cost decision-making as a basis 
for the regional distribution of emissions reductions. Other 
criteria would result in different distributions. Also, the re-
Table 14 
World and OECD energy requirements under the BLUE scenario [1]
Coal
Oil
Gas
Nuclear
Hydro
Biomass and waste
Other renewables
Total
2005
1,130
2,247
1,211
611
109
194
39
5,542
OECD (Mtoe)
2050
476
1,043
820
1,259
186
1,009
470
5,263
–1.9%
–1.7%
–0.9%
1.6%
1.2%
3.7%
5.7%
–0.1%
2005–2050
 
2005
2,892
4,000
2,354
721
251
1,149
61
11,429
World (Mtoe) 
2050
2,251
2,840
2,951
2,184
542
3,604
1,013
15,386
–0.6%
–0.8%
0.5%
2.5%
1.7%
2.6%
6.4%
0.7%
2005–2050
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gional distribution of emission reductions is not the same 
as the distribution of the cost burden. These distribution is-
sues are probably one of the key hurdles to clear in achieving 
deep emissions cuts. OECD analysis suggests that the cost 
of implementing the emissions reductions required for the 
BLUE scenario would result in modest GDP reductions in 
the OECD countries (-1% in 2050), but much more signifi-
cant impacts in certain non-OECD countries [3].
7.1.2 Summary
The IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives presents an in-
depth review of the status and outlook for existing and ad-
vanced clean energy technologies, offering scenario analysis 
of how a mix of these technologies can make a difference.
The BLUE scenario in ETP 2008 targets a 50% reduction in 
CO2 emissions by 2050. Its main points are:
t 3FEVDJOH$0ǠFNJTTJPOTCZCZJTBUPVHI 
 target. Achieving it will require the use of a large  
 number of new and existing energy technologies,  
 including renewables, low-carbon technologies and  
 CO2 storage
t 5PUBMQSJNBSZFOFSHZEFNBOEJOUIF0&$%DPVOUSJFTJT 
 expected to decline by 0.1% /y from 2005 to 2050, com- 
 pared to average growth of 1.4% /y over the last 15  
 years. Future growth in OECD energy demand is also  
 forecast to be much lower than in the rest of the world,  
 so that the OECD share of world primary energy de- 
 mand will decline from almost 49% in 2005 to 34% in  
 2050
t 0&$%EFNBOEGPSPJMXJMMEFDMJOFPOBWFSBHFBU 
 /y, though it should be kept in mind that this is an aver- 
 age that combines demand growth in the next two  
 decades with rapid decline thereafter. By 2050 oil will  
 meet 20% of OECD energy demand, compared to 40%  
 today
t 'PTTJMGVFMTXJMMDPOUJOVFUPCFBWFSZJNQPSUBOUFOFSHZ 
 source in the OECD countries, providing 44% of total  
 primary energy in 2050. Worldwide, the share of fossil  
 fuels is 52% in 2050
t *OUFSNTPGUIFJSQSJNBSZFOFSHZFRVJWBMFOUTSFOFXBCMF 
 energy sources will account for 50% of total energy  
 supply in the OECD by 2050, compared to 18% today.  
 The main contributors will be wind power, hydro and  
 solar. Renewables will become the largest source of  
 power generation.
Table 15 
Development of renewable energy according to the BLUE scenario [1]
 OECD (Mtoe)    World (Mtoe)
 Final Final Primary  Annual  Final Final Primary  Annual 
    (equivalents) growth   (equivalents) growth
 2005 2050 2050 2005–2050 2005 2050 2050 2005–2050
Hydro 117 186 465 1.0% 256 542 1,355 1.7%
Biomass and waste power 18 81 203 3.4% 27 210 525 4.7%
Geothermal power 7 50 124 4.5% 9 91 228 5.2%
Wind power 20 197 493 5.2% 24 445 1,112 6.7%
Solar power 1 153 383 11.9% 1 409 1,022 14.3%
Other renewables power 0 9 24 10.6% 0 35 89 12.2%
Geothermal heat 4 49 49 5.7% 4 165 165 8.6%
Solar heat 2 49 49 7.4% 3 165 165 9.3%
Biofuels and feedstocks 76 492 652 4.2% 94 1,461 2,301 6.3%
Traditional solid biomass 57 94 94 1.1% 923 588 588 –1.0%
Total renewables   2,535     7,549 
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7.2 China, India and other rapidly  
 developing countries 
Xianli Zhu, Kirsten Halsnæs, Subash Dhar  
UNEP Risø Centre, Risø DTU 
The energy demand growth in rapidly developing countries 
will be a major driving force for the global energy demand 
increase. Without significant technology changes in the ex-
isting energy systems, satisfying the energy demand in these 
countries will lead to significant increase in global GHG 
emissions, however deep the emission reduction could be 
achieved in OECD countries [1]. This section takes China 
and India as examples to understand the energy and climate 
challenges facing rapidly developing countries and iden-
tify the key technologies that could help address these chal-
lenges. Finally, it examines the importance of international 
cooperation and carbon finance in speeding up the transfer 
and deployment of clean energy technologies in rapidly de-
veloping countries. 
7.2.1 Future energy demand and GHG emissions 
To assess the energy and climate challenges facing China 
and India, the first step is to understand these countries’ fu-
ture energy demand. To date, a wide variety of studies have 
been carried out to model future energy demand and related 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the whole world, as 
well as its various regions and countries. All these models 
depend on a few key assumptions: economic growth, eco-
nomic structure, population growth, energy technology 
progress, and political intervention.
The SRES Emission Scenario Database (ESD) [2], hosted 
CZ UIF +BQBO /BUJPOBM *OTUJUVUF PG &OWJSPONFOUBM 4UVEJFT
	/*&4
 DPNQBSFT WBSJPVT ()( FNJTTJPOT NPEFMT UBLFO
from the existing literature [3]. The ESD contains dozens of 
studies on the future energy demands of China and India, 
though many studies focus on country groups, sub-conti-
nents or continents. Figure 17 shows the scenarios in the 
ESD that deal with primary energy demand in China up to 
2050, as well as the corresponding data for India.
Due to the fact that in India and China, a large share of the 
energy comes from coal, which is more CO2 intensive com-
pared with other fuels to provide the same amount of en-
ergy, rapid energy consumption growth means significant 
increases in the GHG emissions from these countries [1, 
4]. A recent research project jointly carried out by the UK 
and Japan examined the GHG mitigation potential among 
different regions to find out how to accelerate technological 
change to achieve the G8 targets of 50% reduction in world 
annual GHG emissions in 2050 from the emission level in 
2000. Research results are published in a supplement issue 
of the journal ‘Climate Policy’ in 2008. Under that project, 
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AR4 China and India 2050 primary energy consumption scenarios; 
prepared by the authors based on data from the Emission Scenarios Database [2]
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Barker, Scrieciu, and Foxon [5] used the E3MG macro-
econometric model and got results in terms of GHG emis-
sions by 2050 (Figure 19).
Under the baseline scenario (Base 2050), the GHG emissions 
of US, China, India, and other development will see major 
increase on the 2000 basis, as a result it is projected that the 
global GHG emissions will double by 2050. In the Cprice 
scenario, worldwide policy intervention will be introduced, 
so as to create a global real (year 2000) carbon price of $2.5/
tCO2 in 2011, rising by $2.5 per year to $100/tCO2 in 2050. 
Consequently, the global GHG emissions will be reduced to 
less than the 2000 level in 2050. In this scenario, China needs 
to reduce its GHG baseline 2050 emissions by over 80%, and 
India by around 50%. Put together these two countries will 
contribute to almost half of the global emission reduction 
in annual GHG emissions. However, to realise the G8 target 
lowering global GHG emissions by 50% on the 2000 basis 
in 2050, China needs to realize much deeper cuts even on 
the 2000 level, while India could increase its emissions by 
almost 60% on its 2000 level. 
7.2.2 Key technologies
One key energy challenge facing China and India is how to 
satisfy robust increases in energy demand over the next few 
decades, especially for power generation. As Table 16 shows, 
China and India’s share of world fossil fuel reserves are much 
lower than their share of world population. Large future in-
creases in oil demand, which will occur as a growing part  of 
the population becomes able to afford private cars, will be 
met mainly by imports from the world market.
Shortage of domestic natural gas reserves is as severe as the 
shortage of oil reserves in both China and India. The dif-
ference with gas is that given these countries’ present low 
consumption, increases in the near future could be satisfied 
mainly by boosting domestic production. Insufficient domes-
tic supplies of both natural gas and oil mean that applications 
for these fuels in developed countries, like electricity produc-
tion, space heating, and cooking, in China and India will have 
to rely on other sources of primary energy or imports.
Coal is the only fossil fuel for which China and India do not 
face significant import dependence in the decades to come. 
Most studies, in fact, indicate that coal will be the most im-
portant source of energy in China and India until 2050. The 
'JSTU$IJOB/BUJPOBM$MJNBUF$IBOHF"TTFTTNFOUQSFQBSFE
by over 200 Chinese experts and published by six Chinese 
government ministries, projects that by 2050, nuclear and 
renewables could together provide over 30% of the country’s 
primary consumption. With the addition of oil and natural 
gas, this would mean that the country’s dependence on coal 
for energy could finally be reduced to below 50% [7].
Unless major technology breakthroughs are made, renew-
able energy will increase only slowly as a fraction of total en-
ergy supply. This is due to the fact that traditional biomass is 
still the main source of fuel for cooking and heating among a 
large share of the rural population in both China and India. 
Converting households to fossil-fuel-dominated commer-
cial energy supply, during the ongoing process of massive 
urbanisation, will partially offset any increases in modern 
biomass and other renewable energy sources.
Clean coal technology will be a top priority for the power 
sectors in both countries. Given their balance of fossil fuel 
reserves and the current tight market for oil and gas, coal will 
continue to be the most important energy resource in both 
China and India, so the clean use of coal will be necessary.
Clean coal technologies include super-efficient coal-fired 
power plants, coal gasification, and carbon capture and stor-
age (CCS). Such technologies could reduce local air pollu-
tion as well as GHG emissions from the use of coal, and are a 
high priority in the national energy strategies of both coun-
tries. Indian coal generally has a high ash content, which 
significantly reduces the efficiency of power generation in 
standard boilers. Coal beneficiation (cleaning) technologies 
are therefore also important for India.
/VDMFBSDVSSFOUMZPOMZQMBZTBNBSHJOBMSPMFJOUIFFMFDUSJDJUZ
supply of China and India. China has 8.6GWe (net) of nucle-
ar power units in operation, providing 62.86 billion kWh - 
2.3% of its total electricity generation in 2007. In India, 2.5% 
of the electricity was generated from nuclear in 2005 [1], the 
Table 16 
Fossil fuel reserves, production and consumption for China and India, 2006 [6]
Fuel China    India
 Proven  % of World Reserve /  Production /  Proven  % of World Reserve /  Production /
 reserve total production consumption reserve total production consumption
Oil 16.300 bn barrels 1.3% 12.1 53% 5.7 bn barrels 0.5% 19.3 31%
Gas 2.45 trillion m³ 1.3% 41.8 105% 1.08 trillion m³ 0.6% 33.9 80%
Coal 114.5 bn tons 12.6% 48 102% 92.4 bn ton 10.2% 207 88% 
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country’s installed capacity of nuclear power generating units 
had increased, to 3.6 GWe in 2006. Uranium is more widely 
distributed around the world than are oil and gas, and high 
import dependence does not lead to the same level of con-
cern over supply security. In both China and India, nuclear 
is taken as an important means for improving long-term en-
ergy security and reducing dependence on international oil 
and natural gas import. Both countries have made ambitious 
plans for nuclear power development. China’s latest target is 
increasing its nuclear capacity to 60GWe, or 6% of the coun-
try’s total installed generating capacity in 2020, then further 
to 160GWe in 2030. The Indian government's nuclear power 
generation programme sets the ambitious target to raise 
nuclear power generation capacity to 20 GW by 2020 and 
to 40 GW by 2030.  The ‘Integrated Energy Policy’ report 
[9] prepared by the Expert Committee of the Indian Plan-
ning Commission recommends that if the nuclear coopera-
tion agreement between India and the US could eliminate 
sanctions from nuclear suppliers against India, the Indian 
government should actively import nuclear power plants 
and fuel, and make nuclear power the most potent means 
of improving long-term energy security and achieve energy 
independence by utilizing its vast thorium resources. 
The development of renewable energy depends very much 
on the availability of suitable resources. For China the key 
technologies for renewable electricity will be hydro and 
wind. In India, it will be hydro, wind, solar PV, and concen-
trating solar power (CSP), thanks to the country’s abundant 
sunshine (Figure 20).
With their large territories and population bases, rapid eco-
nomic growth and rising living standards, China and India 
are seeing rapid growth in freight and passenger transport. 
They are already home to several of the world’s “super-cities” 
and massive urbanisation ensures that many other cities 
continue to expand and new ones spring up. In view of these 
nations’ shortage of oil reserves, clean vehicles and public 
transport will be the key technologies in tackling the four-
fold challenge of oil supply, local air pollution, traffic conges-
tion and GHG emissions.
On the energy demand side, various energy efficiency tech-
nologies will play a major role in slowing the increase in 
energy demand and GHG emissions. China and India, like 
other developing countries, generally use energy relatively 
inefficiently. China’s average energy conversion and utilisa-
tion efficiency is around 25% lower than that of developed 
countries, and in 2000, the energy consumed per unit of 
production in the Chinese electricity, steel, non-ferrous 
metal, petrochemical, building material, chemical, and tex-
tile industries was around 40% higher than the international 
benchmark [7]. There is huge potential for improving energy 
efficiency in the industrial, residential and commercial sectors.
7.2.3 International technology transfer and carbon 
ﬁnance  
In both countries, lots of new investments are being made 
and will be made on electricity generation, infrastructure fa-
cilities and building construction, large increases in private 
cars, and electrical appliances. These new investments offer 
more cost-effective opportunities for emission reduction 
than the early retirement of low-efficiency products. Due to 
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Potential of renewable energy for electricity supply in large 
economies by 2050 [10]
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Table 17 
Biomass and waste combustion for energy supply in China and India, 
2004 [8]
Share of residential 
energy consumption
68%
83%
Share of total primary 
energy consumption
14%
33%
China
India
Total
(Mtoe)
219.1
189.9
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these factors, as shown in Figure 21, the GHG emissions of 
China and India as well as other developing countries could 
be significantly reduced in relation to their baseline scenario 
at a carbon cost of 50 US$/tCO2.  
In China, India, and other rapidly developing countries, a 
common reality is that they still have a large poor popula-
tion. Economic development, poverty alleviation, reliable 
and affordable energy supply to their citizens, and local air 
pollution control are often of high political priority to the 
national governments. A lot of measures could contribute to 
climate change, e.g. early retirement of low efficiency energy 
production or consumption equipment and replacing them 
with new ones, or a switch to cleaner energy, or choosing 
advanced technology and equipment. 
Moreover, the majority of the existing GHGs in the atmo-
sphere were emitted by developed countries in the course 
of their industrialisation and development since the 1750s. 
Meanwhile, developing countries, which are less responsible 
for global climate change, are more vulnerable to and suffer 
more from the negative impacts of climate change and do 
not have the funds to take climate change adaptation mea-
sures. In contrast, developed countries, with their financial 
resources and technology capacity, are in a better position 
for taking immediate actions to reduce their GHG emis-
TJPOTćF 6/'$$$ SFDPHOJ[FE UIF BCOPSNBM CVSEFO PG
climate change to developing countries and established the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’: de-
veloped countries are obliged to take the lead in responding 
to climate change and support the climate change actions via 
technology and fund transfer. 
The Kyoto Protocol established specific emission reduction 
targets for developed countries and economies in transition 
and created the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ so that ad-
ditional emission reductions in developing countries could 
get carbon funding through selling their credits to developed 
DPVOUSJFT4JODFUIFĕSTU$%.QSPKFDUXBTSFHJTUFSFEJO/P-
vember 2004, CDM has effectively injected tens of billions of 
US dollars of investment in developing countries. The 3788 
$%.QSPKFDUTBMSFBEZJOUIF6/'$$$$%.QJQFMJOFBUUIF
end of July 2008 are expected to generate over 2,700 MtCO2 
PGFNJTTJPOSFEVDUJPOTCZUIFFOEPG	'JHVSF
/FX
projects are continuing to enter the international pipeline at a 
speed of around 150 projects per month. 
92% of the expected CER generation as of 2012 are from 4 
large developing countries, China, India, South Korea, and 
Brazil, indicating the existence of large low-cost emission re-
duction opportunities in these large and rapidly developing 
countries [11]. The CDM has proved itself an effective mar-
ket instrument to channel funds toward emission reduction 
in rapidly developing countries.
As the first commitment period will end in 2012, the future 
of CDM and future international climate cooperation de-
pends on the post-2012 climate negotiations. Technology 
and fund transfer remains the key issue of debate between 
developed and developing countries. How to enable a larger 
participation of developing countries in the global efforts 
against climate change through carbon finance, special do-
nor financing, or in the form of great liberalisation of some 
key technologies is not agreed upon yet. 
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Figure 21 
Relationship between carbon prices and CO² reduction from baseline in 2050 in selected counties taken from the literature 
published since the TAR [12]
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7.2.4 Conclusions
Rapidly developing countries like China and India together 
with other large and fast emerging economies are important 
forces in shaping the world trends of development, energy, 
and climate performance in coming decades. These coun-
tries, due to their enormous new investments in energy in-
frastructure in the coming years, have the rare opportunity 
of transition toward low carbon development and low-cost 
GHG emission reduction.
China’s and India’s remarkable and robust economic growth 
over the last two or three decades has led many people to 
believe that both countries will continue to grow rapidly in 
the decades to come and such economic growth will pose 
enormous challenges in satisfying energy demand and miti-
gating greenhouse gas emissions.
With their vast territories and great differences in regional 
circumstances, China, India, and other rapidly develop-
ing countries will need to use almost every technological 
solution available to meet energy and climate challenges. 
A few technologies, however, are especially important. For 
electricity generation, the most important technologies for 
China and India will be those relating to clean coal, followed 
by nuclear power, hydro, wind, and solar. For the transport 
sector, public transport and clean vehicle technologies will 
be critical. Various energy efficiency technologies are also 
important to slow down energy demand increase and pro-
vide low-cost GHG emission reductions. China and India 
are already taking measures to address the economic, social, 
and environment challenges caused by their rapid increase 
in energy consumption and GHG emissions. This includes 
ambitious targets for renewable energy and energy efficien-
cy, increased domestic production, and international tech-
nology and cooperation. 
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Growth of total expected CERs from existing CDM projects  [11]
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7.3 Africa 
Ivan Nygaard ,Gordon Mackenzie and Said Abdallah,  
UNEP Risø Centre, Risø DTU; Peter Zhou, EECG, Botswana
Compared to other regions of the world, economic develop-
ment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been extremely slow 
during the last 45 years (Figure 23). Most SSA countries fall 
into the category of least developed countries (LDCs), and 
over this period a number of them have experienced nega-
tive average growth rates, while very few have been able to 
double their per-capita income. This is not the right place for 
a thorough discussion of this severe development problem, 
but it is clear that the energy future for these countries will 
depend very much on their economic development, which 
– seen in this historical context – may be difficult to pre-
dict. At the same time, economic development depends to 
a large extent on the abilities of LDC governments to put in 
place a physical, financial and organisational infrastructure, 
including an energy infrastructure, to serve as an enabling 
environment.
/POF PG UIF FYJTUJOH MPOHUFSN FOFSHZ TDFOBSJPT QSPWJEFT
a disaggregated figure for the energy consumption of SSA 
or even of Africa as a whole8. Reasons for this may include 
the uncertainty of such estimates, and Africa’s small share 
of global energy consumption. The energy demand projec-
tions in Figure 24 are therefore based on the alternative pol-
icy scenario from IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2007, which 
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Total primary energy demand in Africa, and electricity production 
from various energy sources 
World Energy Outlook alternative policy scenario [2]
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8  Existing energy scenarios to 2050, such as Energy Technology Perspectives from the OECD/IEA, the Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050 from World 
Energy Council and the Shell Energy Scenarios are all global scenarios, which do not provide disaggregated information on Africa [4, 5, 6].
9  The Alternative Policy Scenario (APS) describes outcomes that would result from implementation of policies that are under consideration today. 
Many aspects of APS are comparable with the ACT scenario from the Energy Technology Perspectives [5]. The Blue Map scenario from Energy 
Technology Perspectives referred to in section 7.1 contains more optimistic assumptions, and includes development and widespread uptake of 
technologies, which are not available today. The global emission projections in 2050 for the Blue Map scenario and the ACT scenario are 14 and 27 
Gt CO2  annually, which should be compared to the baseline scenario of 62 Gt CO2 [5].
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 forecasts total energy demand and electricity production up 
to 2030 [2]9. The projections are based on an average eco-
nomic growth rate of 3.9% per capita, which is well above 
the historical growth rates for the region as illustrated in 
figure 21. In spite of the low energy demand level in 2005, 
demand is only expected to increase with an average of 1.4 
% per annum, compared to the world average of 1.3 %, and 
consequently Africa’s share of global energy demand only 
increases from 5.3 to 5.9 % from 2005 to 2030. The ener-
gy demand in 2030 corresponds to an energy-related CO2 
emissions of 0.8 tonne per capita, compared to 16.5 t in the 
USA and 6.1 t in Europe [2].  
Reducing CO2 emissions should therefore not be the main 
concern in the development of an energy system for the poor 
people in Africa. Actors such as the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank and several bilateral donor organisa-
tions have therefore increasingly acknowledged that African 
LDCs should focus on economic development, transfer of 
least-cost technologies and adaptation to climate change, 
rather than on CO2 reductions [3]. This focus is reflected in 
the following subsections.
7.3.1 Biomass for cooking
According to the projections illustrated in Figure 24, tra-
ditional biomass (mainly fuel wood) will continue to be a 
major energy source for cooking in SSA, especially for the 
majority of the population who live in rural areas, while for 
various reasons biogas is not expected to play a major role for 
household applications [2]. Although the fuel-wood crisis 
in SSA seems to have been exaggerated (Section 6.3.2), and 
despite forestry management programmes and improved 
wood-stoves, fuel wood is expected to remain a scarce re-
source around large towns in many parts of SSA [7].
7.3.2 Electriﬁcation: a big challenge
Current electrification rates in African LDCs are extremely 
low, at around 26% for SSA as a whole, and increased ac-
cess to modern energy services is a major development goal 
[8]. Regional bodies such as FEMA, ECOWAS, EAC and 
CEMAC have set optimistic political goals of high electri-
fication rates by 2015 [9], but these statements may be po-
litical wishes rather than realistic plans based on future in-
vestment flows. The World Bank draws a more pessimistic 
picture, believing that reaching 48% electrification in SSA by 
2030 will require an annual investment of 4 billion USD, or 
twice the historical investment in the energy sector in SSA 
[3]. For 2050, a realistic estimate could be that about 80% of 
the population in SSA has access to electricity10. 
7.3.3 Regional cooperation to exploit diversity
While rural electrification is important for social and eco-
nomic development, it will not greatly affect gross electricity 
demand: even once they are connected, rural dwellers are 
not expected to be able to afford large amounts of electricity. 
On the other hand, electricity consumption is expected to 
increase significantly in urban areas, where people are striv-
ing for modern lifestyles copied from the North.
To meet this increasing demand for electricity, it will be es-
sential to exploit Africa’s diversity of energy resources. Oil 
and gas reserves are concentrated in Northern and Western 
Africa. Hydroelectric, geothermal and, increasingly, natu-
ral gas potential exist in Central and Eastern Africa, while 
Southern Africa has coal and some natural gas.
At present there are embryonic attempts at regional integra-
tion between North, West, East, Central and Southern Af-
rica, via a transport infrastructure for gas, oil and especially 
electricity [10, 11]. By 2050 the regional power pools are ex-
pected to be interconnected to form an Africa-wide power 
pool that will also link to Europe and the Middle East. The 
process will start with interconnections between the stron-
gest African economies, which at the same time will benefit 
poorer countries in between [11].
The driver for this interconnection will be the regional 
spread of energy resources in SSA. Cheap coal from South 
Africa, natural gas from Nigeria, and hydropower from Inga 
Falls in the Democratic Republic of Congo are examples of 
resource concentrations that cannot be exploited efficiently 
by individual countries. The hydro potential at the fully-
developed Inga Falls facility, for instance, is estimated to be 
39 GW, or 288 TWh/y, which is enough to supply 23% of 
Africa’s predicted electricity demand in 2030 [12].
7.3.4 Hybrid and non-grid systems
Large-scale infrastructure investments need to go hand in 
hand with the development of decentralised energy systems 
at the community level. The first of these are expected to 
be based on small diesel generators, but from 2010 to 2020 
10  The WEC [12] estimates that the current 2 billion people without access to electricity will have fallen to about 500 million by 2050.
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they will increasingly take the form of hybrid systems based 
on small-scale hydro, wind or PV. The diesel component of 
these hybrid systems may increasingly be replaced by biofu-
els, as long as this does not conflict with food production.
Most LDCs in SSA have rather low population densities, 
and in a number of countries people live in dispersed settle-
ments rather than nucleated villages. This means that non 
grid-based rural electrification will be the least-cost option 
for a fair part of the population. As an example, a recent 
energy plan for Burkina Faso projects that 38% of villages, 
corresponding to 8% of the population, will not be covered 
by either grids or mini-grids before at least 2020, because 
they are simply too far from the existing grid, too small and 
too dispersed [13]. In addition to this 8% of the population, 
a large number of people living in dispersed areas around 
nucleated settlements are likely to be served in the cheapest 
way by solar home systems (SHSs) [14]. This example indi-
cates that SHSs may play an important role for rural electrifi-
cation in Africa as a supplement to grid based systems.
7.3.5 Transport
Transport demand is expected to increase significantly in 
44"VOUJMBMUIPVHIBUBMPXFSSBUFUIBOJOUIF/PSUI
due to the low economic capacity of a large part of the pop-
ulation. Locally-produced biofuels may be an option for 
cheaper transport fuel in some countries with low popula-
tion densities, but in general the transport sector is likely to 
follow the technological development path for both indi-
WJEVBMBOEQVCMJDUSBOTQPSUJOUIF/PSUIćJTXJMM JODMVEF
electrically-powered public transport in large cities, and a 
large share of gasoline and diesel cars replaced by electric 
or hybrid vehicles before 2050. This is, however, expected 
UPUBLFQMBDFNPSFTMPXMZUIBOJOUIF/PSUIBTTVNJOHUIBU
OECD countries continue to export used cars to Africa.
7.3.6 Conclusions
Compared to other regions, the rate of economic develop-
ment in SSA has been extremely low, and in some cases even 
negative, over the last 45 years. Future energy development 
in LDCs will depend strongly on economic growth, which 
– seen in a historical context – is difficult to predict. At the 
same time, establishing an enabling environment in terms 
of energy infrastructure may be crucial to social and eco-
nomic development. Projections to 2030 show that reducing 
CO2 emissions will not be the main concern when develop-
ing an energy system for Africa’s poor. Development actors 
have therefore increasingly acknowledged that in African 
LDCs the focus should rather be on economic development, 
transfer of least-cost technologies, and adapting to climate 
DIBOHF /FWFSUIFMFTT UISPVHI DBSCPO ĕOBODJOH UIFSF JT
likely to be an increased opportunity for the application of 
climate friendly energy technologies.
Projections based on such assumptions indicate that bio-
mass will still be important for cooking in 2050. The present 
low electrification rate of 26% may, under optimistic con-
ditions, increase to about 80% by 2050. Increased coopera-
tion between existing regional power pools will be essential 
for exploiting large but regionally diverse resources, such as 
hydro, coal and natural gas, in providing electricity to meet 
increasing urban demand.
Rural electrification will to some extent depend on afford-
able grid-based electricity from hydro and coal, but many 
dispersed settlements are expected to be supplied mainly by 
individual PV systems or mini-grids based on hybrid PV 
and diesel or biofuel. According to projections, transport 
will increase significantly, but at a slower pace than in the 
/PSUI(BTPMJOFBOEEJFTFMDBSTBSFBMTPMJLFMZUPCFSFQMBDFE
CZFMFDUSJDBOEIZCSJEDBSTNPSFTMPXMZUIBOJOUIF/PSUI
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8.1 Danish CO² reduction scenarios
Kenneth Karlsson and Peter Meibom, Risø DTU; Anders  
Kofoed-Wiuff and Helge Ørsted Pedersen, EA Energy  
Analyses, Denmark
Based on a review of recent low-carbon energy system stud-
ies for Denmark, this section discusses the most important 
options for significantly reducing Danish CO2 emissions 
within the next 10-50 years. We begin with an overview of 
the present Danish energy system, focusing on the avail-
ability of renewable energy resources. After this comes the 
main conclusions of six different energy system studies for 
Denmark, which are used as input to a discussion about CO2 
emission reduction, and finally a conclusion.
8.1.1 The present Danish energy system
Denmark has excellent wind resources, thanks to its flat ter-
rain and nearness to the sea. Climate and hydrology allow 
high yields of biomass from agriculture, although land it-
self is a scarce resource due to the country’s small size and 
relatively high population density. The long Danish coastline 
could allow wave energy to become important in the future. 
Photovoltaics and solar heating could also contribute in the 
longer term, though their cost-effectiveness are not as at-
tractive as in sunnier countries to the south.
Denmark’s power system is presently characterised by com-
bined heat and power (CHP) plants delivering heat to district 
heating systems, and a high proportion of wind power. The 
CHP plants are a combination of a few large plants fuelled 
mainly by coal and natural gas, and a large number of distrib-
uted CHP plants using natural gas, straw and municipal waste.
Fuel for road transport is dominated by gasoline and diesel.
Gross energy consumption in Denmark increased by only 
5% during the period 1970-2006. This was because of the 
introduction of CHP plants and wind power on the supply 
side, and energy efficiency improvements on the demand 
side (energy savings) [1]. CHP plants improve the system 
efficiency while the influence of wind power is described 
through statistical methods. In statistics for gross energy 
consumption wind power is counted as PJ electricity pro-
duced while coal used in a power plant is counted for by 
its caloric value (energy content using lower heating value) 
– therefore a replacement of thermal power by wind power 
will reduce the gross energy consumption in the statistics.
8.1.2 Low-carbon energy studies
Concerns over global warming and energy security have 
placed renewable energy and CO2 emissions reduction high 
on the Danish political agenda. This has resulted in a num-
ber of energy system studies:
A Visionary Danish Energy Policy 2025 [Ministry for Trans-
port and Energy 2007]: was launched by the Government in 
January 2007, focusing on the framework for a future energy 
policy. The main idea is that energy technologies should be 
chosen through a combination of market mechanisms and 
political regulation. The government wishes to secure a fu-
ture energy supply that is safe and reliable, environmentally 
friendly, and supports growth and competitiveness. Goals to 
be reached before 2025 include at least 30% renewable en-
ergy, gross energy consumption at the same level as in 2006, 
and a 15% cut in fossil fuels compared to 2006. The long 
term vision is a total phase out of fossil fuels in Denmark 
[2].
IDA Energy Plan 2030 [IDA 2006]: The Danish Society of 
Engineers (IDA) proclaimed 2006 an “energy year”, during 
which it examined future energy solutions for Denmark. As 
a framework, the IDA adopted three main targets for 2030: 
Denmark should be self-sufficient with energy, as it is today; 
greenhouse gas emissions should be half their 1990 level; 
and exports of energy technology should quadruple, with 
a doubling of jobs in the energy sector. IDA used a model 
of the energy system, known as EnergyPlan [3], to find the 
most cost-effective way to meet these targets [4].
Danish Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scenario for 2020 and 
2050 [EA Energy Analyses and Risø DTU 2008]: was drawn 
up by EA Energy Analyses and Risø DTU for the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency (DEPA) and the Danish 
Energy Authority (DEA) in 2007. It contains two scenarios 
for 2020 and three for 2050; they account for all the green-
house gasses emitted in Denmark, with the exception of in-
ternational air and ship traffic. The scenarios are analysed in 
a spreadsheet-based energy system model called STREAM 
(see description of model in the report). For 2020, the main 
goals were to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% or 
40% compared to 1990 and for 2050 the reduction goals was 
60% to 80% [5].
Cutting CO2 Emissions [Greenpeace 2008]: describes the re-
sults of an analysis prepared for Greenpeace in January 2008, 
setting out what is needed to meet reduction targets for 2008-
12 and 2020. The analysis is based on the SESAM model [6], 
which differs from the tools used in the other studies in that 
it allows investments and energy balances to be tracked year 
8CO² reduction strategies up to 2020
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by year. The framework for the analysis was that CO2 emis-
sions in 2020 should be 40% below their 1990 level, and oil 
and natural gas consumption should decline [7].
Scenarios for Danish GHG Reductions in 2020 and 2050 
[COWI 2008]: were prepared in 2007 by the consultancy 
COWI for the Danish Environmental Protection Agency 
(DEPA) and the Danish Energy Authority (DEA). The fo-
cus is on energy supply technologies, transport technologies, 
and GHG reduction measures outside the energy sector. The 
analysis yielded marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves, 
which rank measures according to their abatement costs, 
for 2020 and 2050. The marginal abatement cost is found 
by comparing each investment option to a baseline case and 
dividing its cost by the resulting CO2 reduction [8].
The Future Danish Energy System [The Danish Board of 
Technology 2007]11: In 2004 the Danish Board of Technol-
ogy invited the largest players in the energy sector, research-
FST /(0T BOE UIF %BOJTI 1BSMJBNFOU UP IFMQ JOWFTUJHBUF
options for the development of the Danish energy system. 
Technology scenarios were developed to show how by 2025 
Denmark could halve its CO2 emissions compared to 1990, 
and halve its oil consumption compared to 2003. This study 
led to the development of the STREAM modelling tool. All 
stakeholders were involved in the process of creating the 
scenarios through workshops, meetings and hearings while 
findings were continuously disseminated in newsletters [9]. 
Table 18 summarises the main assumptions and conclusions 
of these studies, with emphasis on the years from 2020 to 
2030. All the studies except A Visionary Danish Energy Pol-
icy achieve CO2/GHG reductions in the order of 40–50%, 
compared to 1990, by 2020-2030. Increases in investment 
and fuel costs compared to business-as-usual scenarios are 
either negative or below 0.5% of GDP, meaning that these 
low-carbon energy systems would cost society little. Most 
of the studies assume no decrease in economic activity; they 
envisage exponential growth in GDP and private consump-
tion, in line with the official forecasts from the Danish Min-
istry of Finance. IDA Energy Plan and Cutting CO2 Emis-
sions both assume saturation in the demand for transport, 
while Cutting CO2 Emissions generally assumes significantly 
lower growth in energy demand than the other studies.
The conclusion that large CO2 reductions can be achieved 
within the next 12-22 years, with low additional costs while 
maintaining high economic activity, is very interesting. It 
contradicts real-world experience, i.e. the fact that Denmark 
will probably not be able to fulfil its CO2 emissions reduc-
tion targets for the first Kyoto period (2008–2012) through 
domestic reductions alone [10].
The predicted costs of reducing GHG emissions rely on 
many assumptions, including future fossil fuel prices; high 
fossil fuel prices make the scenarios based on high propor-
tions of renewable energy more attractive. Interestingly, the 
oil prices assumed in five of the studies are significantly low-
er than present oil prices.
Furthermore, this type of analysis is limited in its coverage 
of macro-economic effects such as market disturbances, re-
bound effects, labour effects and changes in tax revenues. 
Except for Scenarios for Danish GHG Reductions in 2020 
and 2050, by COWI, the studies exclude externalities such as 
socio-economic costs related to health effects, environmen-
tal impacts and damage to buildings and monuments. 
The modelling tools used in the presented type of scenario 
analyses describe technically possible and economically fea-
sible solutions’ for future energy systems. They do not in-
clude political processes and related transaction costs linked 
to the approving of new policy, legislation and regulation, 
e.g. setting energy efficiency targets and standards. Market 
failures; such as a private investor’s short term investment 
horizon sometimes leading to in-optimal solutions for the 
society – is not treated in this type of scenarios. The scenario 
analysis simply assumes that the “right” political decisions 
are made in adequate time and that private investors do what 
is best for the society. Therefore, the scenarios should be seen 
as guidelines to how our society technically can reach certain 
environmental goals at a certain socio-economic cost. They 
are not telling us how to regulate the markets and which po-
litical decisions we have to take when. That is the next step in 
the process and therefore the involvement of politicians and 
other decision makers is very important. 
Figure 25 compares predictions of gross energy consump-
tion from the different studies (note that the target years also 
differ). Compared to A Visionary Danish Energy Policy, all 
the other studies assume significant energy savings, resulting 
in lower total energy consumption and reduced use of coal, 
natural gas and oil. Reduced dependence on fossil fuels will to 
some extent counteract the decrease in Danish oil and natu-
ral gas production expected in the coming years. Production 
is expected to fall close to zero before 2050 (Statement on the 
/PSUI4FBUPUIF1BSMJBNFOUCZUIF.JOJTUFSGPS&DPOPNJD
and Business Affairs, from 2003). However, fossil fuels will 
11  The Danish Board of Technology is an independent body established by the Danish Parliament. The Board is advising the Danish Parliament and 
other governmental bodies in matters pertaining to technology.
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retain a significant role, providing 40–50% of Denmark’s en-
ergy until at least 2030. The proportion of renewable energy 
increases over the years, so the studies with later target years 
have generally higher shares of renewable energy.
The most important measures for achieving these very posi-
tive results are:
Energy savings: Yearly reductions of the order of 1–3% in 
energy consumption, compared to a development with en-
ergy efficiencies fixed at present levels. Energy-saving mea-
sures often have attractive payback times; the IDA Energy 
Plan, for instance, concludes that energy saving is the cheap-
est way to ensure security of supply and reduce CO2 emis-
sions. This can be difficult in practice, however, because it 
involves influencing the choices of very large numbers of 
energy consumers.
More efficient conventional vehicles, and plug-in hybrid ve-
hicles: Curbing growth in the energy consumption of road 
vehicles is crucial to achieving CO2 emission reduction tar-
gets, as the transport sector at present is nearly 100% reliant 
on fossil fuels. Using renewably-generated electricity as the 
fuel for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles also helps to intro-
duce renewable energy to this sector. Toyota has announced 
that a plug-in version of its Prius hybrid car will be on the 
market in 2010, so it could be feasible for plug-ins to form a 
significant share of the Danish car fleet by 2020–2030. Plug-
in hybrid vehicles will also help electric companies handle 
the variability and limited predictability of wind power in a 
cost-effective way.
Wind power: Denmark already has significant experience 
with wind power, as well as good wind resources, so increas-
ing the share of wind power is an obvious move; most future 
expansion is likely to be offshore. One problem is the need 
to reinforce the power transmission grid, in part to meet the 
needs of future offshore wind power plants. Planning per-
mission for new overhead lines is hard to obtain, due to op-
Table 18 
Main conclusions of, and assumptions behind, six Danish energy system scenario studies
Title of study A Visionary Danish  IDA Energy Plan Danish GHG  Cutting CO²  Scenarios for   The Future  
 Energy Policy  Reduction  Emissions Danish GHG Danish Energy  
 2025  Scenarios  Reduction System
Commissioned for Danish Government IDA DEPA/DEA Greenpeace DEPA/DEA Danish Board of  
      Technology
Prepared by DEA Aalborg University EA Energy Analyses,  ECO Consult Cowi A/S EA Energy Analyses,  
   Risø DTU   Risø DTU, DONG  
      Energy, Energinet.dk
Published Jan 2007 Dec 2006 Feb 2008 Jan 2008 Feb 2008 Apr 2007
Time perspective 2025 2030 2020, 2050 2020, 2030 2020 2025
GHG/CO² reduction  GHG: –15% CO²: –60% GHG: –40%, -80% CO²: –40%, –50% GHG: –50% CO²: –50%
compared to 1990 
Renewable share (%/net) 30% 44% 30%, 100% 30%, 45% N.A. 46%
Savings (%/year) 1.25–1.5% 1.8% 1.9% 1.5-2% N.A. 2.8%
Oil price (USD/barrel) 50 68 57, 75 123, 140 50 50
CO² quota price (€/ton) 24 20 24 N.A. 40 20
Growth parameters  Exponential (2.) Exponential  Exponential (1.) Saturation Exponential (1.) Exponential (2.)
(GDP, private consumption,   (saturation in
demand for transport)   transport)  
Interest rate (%) 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6%
Cost (% of GDP) ? < 0% 0.1%, 0.5% < 0% 0.5% ~ 0%
Comment (1.) Economic growth projections from The Danish Energy Authority, Jan 2008
Comment (2.) Economic growth projections from The Danish Energy Authority, Jan 2007
2005
 
A Visionary Danish
Energy Policy 2020
 
IDA Energy Plan
2030
 
Danish 
GHG Reduction 
Scenarios 2020
 
Cutting CO² 
Emission 2020
 
Future Danish 
Energy System 
2025
RE Oil Coal Natural gas
Figure 25
Gross energy consumption (PJ/year)
1000 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Gross energy consumption by fuel category. The dominant renewable energy sources 
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studies in the way they treat international air transport.
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position from local communities. Underground and under-
sea cabling are alternatives, but are likely to cost more.
Biomass: Used to heat buildings, to supply process heat for 
industry, and in CHP plants. Denmark already has a large 
body of knowledge about the use of straw and wood pellets 
for CHP, making this technology attractive. The develop-
ment of second-generation biofuel technologies could make 
biofuels a sensible choice for transport in the future.
Flexibility: Handling large amounts of wind power, which is 
fluctuating in nature, requires flexibility in both power con-
sumption and in other generating technologies. There are 
many ways to do this, including heat pumps, flexible pric-
ing mechanisms and appliances, and the use of electricity for 
transport (see above).
Infrastructure planning: Decisions such as where to build 
new transmission lines, where to upgrade existing lines, 
whether to use overhead or underground cables, and where 
to locate new wind farms can also help to support greater 
use of intermittent power sources such as wind. These are 
political decisions that create the framework within which 
the energy markets function, and they need government in-
volvement.
Energy markets: These are important in optimising the use 
of fuels and infrastructure, and to drive investment in new 
UFDIOPMPHZ/FXBOEJNQSPWFENBSLFUNFBTVSFTBSFOFFEFE
to internalise costs connected with energy conversion and 
use that are currently treated as externalities. To take advan-
tage of potential demand flexibility, future markets will need 
to be able to distribute price signals to end-users.
8.1.3 Conclusions
Significant CO2 emission cuts by 2020 to 2050 will require a 
mix of new measures covering both energy demand and en-
ergy supply. The costs are low compared to continuing with 
an energy system dominated by fossil fuels. The most impor-
tant measures will be energy savings (including the trans-
port sector), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, wind power 
and biomass.
The scenarios presented here show that it is possible to 
make ambitious CO2 cuts without compromising economic 
growth. This is a complex issue, however, involving politi-
cians, energy companies, industrial energy users, scientists, 
educational institutions and the energy-using public. We all 
need to understand the role each of these actors play in cre-
ating our future energy system.
An important tool here is the scenario process, for instance 
as set out in the project The Future Danish Energy System, 
facilitated by the Danish Board of Technology. Open debate 
on scenarios that involve all the stakeholders gives a holistic 
view of the energy system, not least to the politicians, and 
helps to locate planning bottlenecks and market imperfec-
tions.
Scenarios and roadmaps created through open processes 
and involving both politicians and the public can combine 
complex analysis of energy markets and systems with the 
political decisions needed to ensure that Denmark meets its 
environmental goals and secures its future energy supplies.
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8.2  Global CO² reduction strategies up  
 to 2020
Subash Dhar and John M. Christensen, UNEP Risø Centre, 
Risø DTU
8.2.1 Introduction
A global CO2, or more precisely green house gas reduction 
strategy must work towards stabilizing the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere because higher concen-
trations are going to increase the rate of global warming [1]. 
In this sense it differs from country level strategies which are 
mainly focused on stabilizing the greenhouse gas emissions 
at certain agreed levels. This difference arises due to the in-
herent property of the greenhouse gases that they affect the 
atmosphere for many years after they have been emitted [2]. 
The country level strategies are a result of negotiations at the 
global level where global strategies set the boundary within 
which the negotiations are conducted.
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [3] assesses techno-
logical mixes for different CO2 stabilisation scenarios up 
to 2100. In this section we have a more modest agenda: to 
bring out more explicitly the technological options that 
would be needed in the short term (before 2020) to stabilise 
atmospheric GHGs at around 450 ppm CO2e. To do this we 
looked at the background literature for the IPCC Fourth As-
sessment Report [3] and the IPCC Scenario Database for the 
Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) [4].
CO2 reduction strategies may not necessarily be costlier com-
pared to a strategy with no explicit policies to mitigate CO2. 
In a detailed review of CO2 mitigation scenarios it was found 
that the optimal costs for many low and high CO2 scenarios 
were identical [5]. There is, however, a path dependency, and 
to achieve low CO2 emission in the long term it is important 
to latch on a low-emission technology mix early [6].
8.2.2 Global GHG emissions
The SRES classified its scenarios into four storylines desig-
nated A1, A2, B1 and B2 [7]. These storylines have become 
a standard starting point for modellers working on climate 
change issues across the world. Of the four, we found that 
the B2 storyline has been used most commonly when com-
paring the various stabilisation scenarios [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17]. The B2 storyline describes a world in which 
“the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and 
environmental sustainability” [7]. In view of this, we chose 
scenarios based around the B2 storyline. In the scenarios 
following the B2 storyline the general trend is of increas-
ing emissions up to 2100 (Figure 26) [3] which would mean 
increasing concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere. In-
creasing concentrations mean increasing temperatures and 
higher risks [3]. If we want to limit the risks then it is im-
portant to keep the CO2 concentrations at the lowest feasible 
target which is 450 ppm CO2e. However there are very few 
scenarios which have looked at stabilization at levels below 
500 ppm CO2 because 450 ppmv is considered as a difficult 
target and almost out of reach [18].
However we still stick to a 450 ppmv CO2e stabilisation re-
gime, because past experience shows that achievement has 
been below what has been agreed upon. Most Annex I coun-
tries which took binding commitments for reducing their 
GHG emissions will not be able to meet their commitments 
(Figure 27). If there is agreement on a stiff target (say 450 
ppmv CO2e) then the chances are that the actual figure will 
be higher (say 500 ppmv CO2e).
The 450 ppm CO2e stabilization target would mean emis-
sions should start reducing after ten years from now [3] and 
given the technological lock the emission path in stabiliza-
tion regime is not much different from the B2 scenario with-
out stabilization targets. Therefore, the cumulative GHG 
reductions achieved before 2020 are very small (Figure 26). 
The stabilization paths vary between scenarios, however, 
early action gives more flexibility in the future. In Figure 26 
the scenario with lower emissions in 2020 and 2050 is able 
to sustain positive GHG emissions even in 2100. However, 
early action would require rapid deployment of technologies 
which are currently close to commercialisation.
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8.2.3 GHG mitigation potentials
GHG emissions can be reduced through action in the en-
ergy, industrial, agricultural, forest and waste sectors [3, 17]. 
The energy sector currently accounts for the largest share 
of GHG emissions (Table 20), and this share will rise in the 
future [3]. Table 20 also shows that in 2000 a substantial 
fraction of total emissions was from gases other than CO2, 
though this share is projected to decrease [3].
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [1] does not provide 
us with specific technologies, but it does show details of the 
GHG mitigation that would happen across different sectors 
(Figure 28). We will use this information to make some as-
sumptions about technologies.
We have focused on the 450 ppm stabilisation scenario, 
which will require strong GHG mitigation and therefore a 
high permit price. At a high permit price we find that the 
top four sectors which would contribute the most to GHG 
mitigation are energy supply, industry, transport, and build-
ing (Table 19).
8.2.4 Mitigation technologies
/FX UFDIOPMPHJFT UIBU DBO SFEVDF ()( FNJTTJPOT BSJTF
from the interaction of three drivers: research and develop-
ment, learning-by-doing, and spillovers which happen due 
to technological developments in other areas [6]. Policies 
specifically related to climate change affect mainly the first 
two of these, first by increasing R&D on technologies with 
important potential for GHG mitigation, and second by cre-
ating incentives for their deployment, leading to faster learn-
ing-by-doing. GHG problems cannot be solved by a single 
technology [2] and therefore R&D investments would have 
to be distributed over a wide portfolio of technologies.
Energy conservation and efficiency
For stabilisation at 450 ppmv CO2e, energy efficiency improve-
ments are important in the period up to 2020, and in the lon-
ger term they become the largest single source of mitigation 
(Figure 29). Many short-term energy efficiency measures even 
have negative abatement costs [20]. The barriers to energy con-
servation are therefore mainly institutional and would require 
changes in policies to pass on correct signals to consumers.
Efficiency improvement and energy conservation are the 
dominant choices in the industrial and building sectors.
Industry
Industry uses energy, often in the form of steam, as a source 
of process heat and to drive machinery. R&D should focus 
on redesigning processes so that they require less steam, heat 
or mechanical energy to operate [2]. Improving the efficien-
cy of individual equipment items such as boilers and electric 
motors is often difficult, since in general these are already 
highly efficient [2], but this does not mean that such generic 
improvements should be ignored.
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Figure 27
Annual GHG emissions for Kyoto Annex I countries [19]
Baseline GHG emissions in 2010
Russia and Ukraine are not included, since both countries underwent major economic restructuring 
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Table 19 
Mitigation to be expected from the industry sectors with the largest 
reductions, assuming a permit price of USD 100/tCO²e
Sector Mitigation Potential (GT CO²-eq.)
Energy Supply ~ 12
Industry ~ 4
Transport ~ 1.5
Building ~ 1.5
Agriculture ~ 1.2
Table 20 
GHG emissions by gas and by industry, 2000 (Mt CO²e/y) [17]
Industry sector                                  Gas  Industry total Industry share (%)
 CO² CH4 N²O F  
Energy 23,409 1,467 224 0 25,100 67
LUCF & Agriculture 3,435 3,109 2,999 0 9,543 25
Industry 829 0 158 447 1,434 4
Waste 0 1,357 92 0 1,449 4
Gas total 27,673 5,933 3,473 447 37,526 100
Gas share (%) 74 16 9 1 100
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Building sector
The building sector offers tremendous opportunities for en-
ergy conservation, but making good use of these involves 
giving suitable incentives to end users. Building codes, en-
ergy labelling and regulatory innovations all have a part to 
play. In the longer term, efficiency can also be improved 
through a shift in technological paradigm. In lighting, for 
example, we will move from incandescent bulbs to fluores-
cent lamps, and then to solid-state (LED) lamps [2].
Carbon capture and storage
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) could be an important 
long-term mitigation measure in strong stabilisation re-
gimes [3], but we see none coming up commercially until 
2020 (Figure 29). CCS offers the flexibility of continuing to 
use the fossil fuels on which we have become so dependent.
CCS can be used in combination with coal, oil, gas and bio-
mass. Coal-fired power plants are not the cheapest option for 
CCS, but they have the largest potential for GHG mitigation 
[2]. The required CO2 removal technology was discussed in 
the last issue of this Energy Report, but it is also important 
to understand the consequences of storing large quantities of 
CO2 underground.
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Figure 28 
Permit price versus emission reduction level for several sectors, 2030; adapted from IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [3]
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Renewables
Renewable energy will play a major role in the strong stabili-
sation scenarios [3]. Renewable technologies help to reduce 
the costs of mitigation through the sharp reduction in tech-
nology costs that follow from large-scale deployment [2]. For 
instance, large-scale use of solar PV in the quest to meet a sta-
bilisation target of 450 ppmv CO2e would reduce the costs of 
this technology. There is a wide range of renewable technolo-
gies, and a diverse portfolio may help to reduce the risks [2].
A substantial part of the world’s electricity, especially in the 
two largest developing countries, India and China, is gener-
ated from coal. There is strong pressure to continue this coal 
dependence, even in a future in which these two countries 
will need to contribute more to reducing GHG emissions. 
For stronger mitigation, a major shift is required away from 
coal towards less carbon-intensive fuels like natural gas and 
renewables.
Among the renewable sources, solar and wind are the most 
widely implemented, although continued R&D is required to 
further reduce their capital costs. Solar and wind face prob-
lems in grid integration due to their intermittency. These 
issues require R&D in electricity storage and transmission 
technologies [2].
The years up to 2020 will see limited use of biofuels (Figure 
29) beyond what would happen in the base scenario, since 
first-generation biofuels come into conflict with food secu-
rity, and second-generation biofuels will take some time to 
be commercialised. In the longer term biofuels could play a 
major role in a carbon-constrained regime [16,2]. Biomass 
with CCS would shift a lot of biomass for electricity pro-
duction, leaving little for biofuels because with CCS biomass 
would have negative emissions. The overall availability of 
biomass will always be constrained by the availability of land 
[2] which has to meet competing demands for food, pasture, 
forests and urban development.
Nuclear
In the strong stabilisation regimes, nuclear power could play 
an important role in the short as well as the long term [3]; 
stabilisation at 450 ppmv CO2 e would be difficult without it. 
In the short term, the nuclear option requires the creation of 
sites for permanent disposal of nuclear waste. In the longer 
term nuclear waste would be a major problem, so it would be 
essential to design reactors than can recycle used fuels [2].
Non-CO2 gases
The largest contributor in this category in the long term is 
NFUIBOF <> UIPVHI JO UIF TIPSUFS UFSN/Ǡ0BOE' HBTFT
(i.e., HFC, PFC and SF6 ) taken together, will be equally im-
portant. There are two ways to reduce the effect of non-CO2 
emissions: first by reducing the formation of these gases, and 
second by capturing and re-using them. Of the two, capture 
and re-use has lower marginal abatement costs [2]. Methane 
emissions can be reduced very cheaply due to the value of 
methane as an energy source; two very successful examples 
are reduced flaring from oilfields and refineries, and the ex-
traction of methane from coal mines.
Hydrogen
In the transport sector the two main technological solutions 
are biofuels and hydrogen. Hydrogen fuel systems can even 
be attractive when they do not offer major climate change 
benefits, thanks to their ability to reduce local air pollution 
[2]. Carbon penalties provide further advantages by encour-
aging the production of hydrogen from biomass, or from 
fossil fuels with CCS. For hydrogen transport systems to 
become commercially viable, however, R&D is required in 
hydrogen storage, distribution and use [2].
Cumulative emission reduction GtCO²-eq
0 42 6 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Figure 29
Mitigation choices for stabilisation at 450 ppmv CO²e [16]
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8.2.5 Conclusions
Climate change is a long-term problem, and early action is 
important in order to remain on a lower emission trajectory 
that will provide flexibility in the future. Technologies that 
are important for short-term mitigation are not necessarily 
sufficient in the long term. A diversified portfolio of choices 
is needed, and this will require R&D investment over long 
periods before we reach the ultimate objective.
The stabilisation of emissions at 450 ppm CO2e would require 
measures that will contribute to a sustainable society, such 
as increased use of renewables, energy efficiency and energy 
conservation. These will need to be supplemented, however, 
by measures such as nuclear power and CCS, which make 
no apparent contribution to sustainability. They may even 
reduce sustainability, since research is required to reduce the 
problems associated with nuclear waste and CCS.
Solar and wind are the key renewable technology choices for 
electricity generation in the future especially for early miti-
gation as they are mature and ready for commercialization. 
The diffusion of these two technologies will depend on our 
ability to reduce their capital costs, and also to overcome the 
barriers that hinder their integration into existing electricity 
grids. The latter will require research in the related areas of 
electricity storage and transmission.
The use of biomass is constrained by the availability of land 
and the need for improvements in crop productivity. Bio-
mass could be converted into biofuels to replace fossil fuels 
in the transport sector, or used to generate power, especially 
in combination with CCS.
The focus on non CO2 gases can also help in early mitiga-
tion besides bringing down the overall costs for mitigation. 
/VDMFBSJTBOPUIFSUFDIOPMPHZXIJDIDBOIFMQJOFBSMZNJUJ-
gation.
Strong CO2 mitigation would also require providing correct 
policy incentives so that negative cost measures like energy 
efficiency are taken up. This is essential so that CO2 mitiga-
tion happens at lowest cost.
Finally GHG mitigation efforts may create second-order ef-
fects and externalities that are currently difficult to foresee. 
Therefore R&D efforts should also focus on the externalities 
that can result from different technologies. A  wide portfolio 
of technologies can also help in mitigating the risks arising 
from these unforeseen externalities.
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New and emerging technologies: 
options for the future
All over the world, increasing energy consumption, liberalisa-
tion of energy markets and the need to take action on climate 
change are producing new challenges for the energy sector. 
At the same time there is increasing pressure for research, 
new technology and industrial products to be socially accept-
able and to generate prosperity. The result is a complex and 
dynamic set of conditions affecting decisions on investment 
in research and new energy technology. 
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
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Risø Energy Report 2
New and emerging bioenergy technologies 
Three growing concerns – sustainability (particularly in the 
transport sector), security of energy supply and climate 
change – have combined to increase interest in bioenergy. 
This trend has been further encouraged by technological ad-
vances in biomass conversion and signiﬁcant changes in en-
ergy markets. We even have a new term, “modern bioenergy”, 
to cover those areas of bioenergy technology – traditional as 
well as emerging – which could expand the role of bioenergy. 
Edited by Hans Larsen , Jens Kossmann and 
Leif Sønderberg Petersen
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Risø Energy Report 3 
Hydrogen and its competitors
Interest in the hydrogen economy has grown rapidly in recent 
years. Countries with long traditions of activity in hydrogen 
research and development have now been joined by a large 
number of newcomers. The main reason for this surge of in-
terest is that the hydrogen economy may be an answer to the 
two main challenges facing the world in the years to come: 
climate change and the need for security of energy supplies. 
Both these challenges require the development of new, 
highly-efﬁcient energy technologies that are either carbon-
neutral or low-carbon.
Edited by Hans Larsen , Robert Feidenhans’l and 
Leif Sønderberg Petersen
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Risø Energy Report 4 
The future energy system: 
distributed production and use
The coming decades will bring big changes in energy sys-
tems throughout the world. These systems are expected to 
change from central power plants producing electricity and 
sometimes heat for customers, to a combination of central 
units and a variety of distributed units such as renewable 
energy systems and fuel cells. 
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
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Risø Energy Report 5
Renewable energy for power and transport
Global energy policy today is dominated by three concerns: 
security of supply, climate change, and energy for develop-
ment and poverty alleviation. This is the starting point for Risø 
Energy Report 5, which addresses trends in renewable energy 
and gives an overview of the global forces that will transform 
our energy systems in the light of security of supply, climate 
change and economic growth. The report discusses the status 
of, and trends in, renewable energy technologies for broader 
applications in off-grid power production (and heat). 
Edited by Hans Larsen and Leif Sønderberg Petersen
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Risø Energy Report 6 
Future options for energy technologies
Fossil fuels provide about 80% of global energy demand,
and this will continue to be the situation for decades to
come. In the European Community we are facing two major 
energy challenges. The ﬁrst is sustainability, and the second 
is security of supply, since Europe is becoming more depen-
dent on imported fuels. These challenges are the starting 
point for the present Risø Energy Report 6.
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